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Abstract
In my dissertation, I scrutinize the notion of profit maximization being the objective of a firm.
I explore the influence of widely diversified shareholders on corporate governance through
voting at director elections. I proceed in three major steps. First, in a theoretical model
I show that correlation in voting behavior is associated with the weights shareholders have in
determination of firm’s objective. Next, I provide empirical evidence that portfolio structure
matters for voting decisions, and that voting decisions translate into noticeable effects on
directors’ career prospects. Finally, I discover that similar portfolios are associated with
similar voting behavior, and that this result extends to groups of shareholders with a sizable
impact on voting tallies in director elections.
I derive the objective function of a firm with heterogeneous shareholders. In contrast to
Fisher separation theorem, I drop the price-taking assumption. Therefore, shareholders have
no unanimous preferences for profit maximization. I allow shareholders to act strategically
by omitting the conditional sincerity assumption and by accounting for possible correlation
in their votes. I derive the exact form of the objective function and provide the equilibrium
existence conditions. The resulting objective function can be approximated by a weighted
sum of shareholders portfolios’ profit. Shareholder groups with positive within-group corre-
lation carry greater weight.
In the second chapter, I present an evidence that mutual fund’s portfolio structure mat-
ters for its voting decisions, and that director elections, the most common type of corporate
elections, have delayed consequences for nominees’ career prospects. In an event study of
funds’ mergers, I find that a merger affects the acquiring mutual fund’s voting behavior. I ob-
serve higher chances of future non-nomination for directors with lower shareholder support.
xv
This result resonates with the literature on shareholder dissent. I find that low shareholder
support is also associated with a notable decrease in the length of director’s tenure at a com-
pany.
In the third chapter, I analyze the role of shareholders’ portfolio / ownership structure
on voting participation in director elections. I find that portfolio composition matters for
how mutual funds vote. Funds with more similar portfolios are more likely to cast identical
votes. An increase in within-group similarity of mutual funds’ portfolios leads to an increase
in the number of broker “Non-Votes”. Thus, highly diversified horizontal shareholding causes
lower participation (“rational apathy”) among other shareholders. This effect gives widely
diversified cohorts of mutual funds, shareholders of the firm, a higher marginal influence at
director elections than their plain share of ownership would suggest.
xvi
Chapter 1
Objective Function of a
Non-Price-Taking Firm with
Heterogeneous Shareholders
1.1 Introduction
Quite often, Finance and Industrial Organization literature assume that a firm has the
simple objective of profit maximization. This assumption rests on a classical result, Fisher
separation theorem (Fisher, 1930). It asserts that shareholders with heterogeneous portfolios
unanimously agree on the objective of profit maximization if firms are price-takers (Milne,
1974; Hart, 1979; DeAngelo, 1981). While we may model a finite number of firms as price-
takers under certain conditions (Fama & Laffer, 1972), these conditions are unlikely to be
satisfied in the real world. This paper derives a firm’s objective function without relying on
the price-taking assumption.
A few notable attempts in the literature have been made to relax this assumption. Rotem-
berg (1984) omits the price-taking assumption but constrains the model to identical investors.
He shows that equilibrium with shareholder unanimity exists under the assumption that firms
1
act in the interest of the owners of their capital. Milne (1981) examines the firm’s objective
function as a collective choice problem. He establishes that in light of Arrow’s Possibil-
ity Theorem (Arrow, 1963), in general, shareholders’ preferences cannot be aggregated into
a firm’s objective function.
Grossman & Stiglitz (1977) reconcile the conventional profit maximization objective with
the view of maximization of manager’s utility in a dynamic setting. They conclude that una-
nimity cannot be assured unless “competitivity” (price-taking) assumption is satisfied. Hart
(1979) and DeAngelo (1981) confirm the necessity of price-taking assumption for unanimity.
The present paper derives a micro-founded firm’s objective function when firms are not
perfect competitors. I start by confining the model to the one-period static case where
shareholders hold exogenously defined heterogeneous portfolios. Every firm must decide
on a single-dimensional policy variable from a compact convex-set. The payoff from firms’
activities to shareholders is certain once all policy decisions have been made. Between-firm
externalities are embedded into this deterministic payoff to shareholders. I do not assume
any particular form of competition between the firms.
The unanimity condition is often relaxed in the literature. For instance, Benninga &
Muller (1979) provide conditions of existence of a production equilibrium that is supported
by a majority of firm’s shareholders. Harris & Raviv (1988) derive conditions that make the
simple majority with “one share - one vote” voting rule socially optimal. DeMarzo (1993)
views firm’s objective as being defined by a decision mechanism based on shareholder control.
Hansen & Lott (1996) and Cre`s & Tvede (2005) study the conditions of sufficient internaliza-
tion of between-firm externalities via majority voting among shareholders. The latter states
“[a firm’s] behavior is modeled as representing the shareholders’ interests through a central-
ized political process”. That is, the firm’s objective is defined as adopting the production
plan that cannot be defeated in the majority elections.
2
In this paper the objective function of a firm arises from the corporate governance process.
Shareholders delegate the policy decision to an elected manager or director slate.1 At each
firm a pair of office-motivated candidates announce their policy choices that they commit
to. The candidate who receives more than half of the votes wins the office. A candidate
with exactly half of the votes becomes the manager with probability 1/2. Hence, the policy
selection process of the winning candidate embodies the firm’s objective function as his
proposal gets implemented.
The value of the derived objective function goes beyond just the theoretical interest.
With the rise in common ownership over the last two decades (Davis, 2008; Lindsey, 2008;
Matvos & Ostrovsky, 2008; Harford et al., 2011), questions about its effects gain more
traction among researchers. Common ownership is associated with lower industry returns,
anticompetitive effects in airline industry, higher probability of mutual fund opposing man-
agement in elections, higher CEO compensation, and other effects (see Schmalz, 2018 for
a review). Profit maximization is unlikely to be the firm’s objective in the absence of perfect
competition (Hansen & Lott, 1996; Gordon, 2003). The current alternative in the literature
is the maximization of a weighted sum of profits of shareholders’ portfolios (Salop & O’Brien,
2000). My paper contributes to the literature by establishing the sufficient conditions that
allow this representation of objective function and by providing a procedure for recovering
the weights for different shareholders. For instance, European Commission case regarding
Dow/DuPont merger (European Commission, 2017) has failed to use Modified Herfindahl-
Hirschman index of market concentration because the required control weights were not
computed. My work provides a straightforward path for computing these weights starting
from the voting rights of corresponding shareholders.
I model the corporate governance process with help of an additive bias model of manager
elections (Banks & Duggan, 2005). Prospective managers compete for office in majority
1In the simplest meaningful case, there are two candidates for this position. For example, shareholders
may voice their view through nomination of a contender manager to challenge the incumbent manager’s
policy.
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vote elections with no abstention. They propose firms’ policies in order to attract votes
of shareholders. Managers do not derive any utility from the implemented policy per se,
but from holding office. Shareholders vote strategically at every firm to maximize their ex-
pected utility. Each shareholder has a symmetric random bias (taste shock) that is realized
after all candidates made their proposals. The bias component serves two purposes: (i) it
“smoothens” otherwise discontinuous shareholder’s best response function, and (ii) it allows
to account for correlated behavior of different shareholders. Institutional shareholders tend
to vote according to their ideology: some prefer to align their votes with management recom-
mendations while other prefer to vote according to proxy advisors’ recommendations (Bolton
et al., 2018; Bubb & Catan, 2018). My model allows the correlated behavior to accommodate
such party preferences of institutional shareholders.
The two most related papers in the literature are Azar (2017) and Brito et al. (2018).
Both of them consider a similar corporate governance model with probabilistic voting. Here
I briefly summarize the differences in my approach. First, current literature, to my knowl-
edge, only considers the case of independent random bias components. This hinders the
ability to accommodate shareholder ideology in voting. Correlated bias components allow
for a greater influence of small shareholders of the same ideology on firm’s behavior. Sec-
ond, Brito et al. (2018) explicitly and Azar (2017) implicitly assume conditional sincerity
of shareholders. That is, shareholders decide on votes at one firm, taking their decisions at
other firms as given. I consider an equilibrium refinement that excludes weakly dominated
strategies of shareholders (Alesina & Rosenthal, 1996). This way shareholders act strategi-
cally by taking into account their decisions at all firms simultaneously. Third, both Azar
(2017) and Brito et al. (2018) establish the objective function by matching the first-order
condition of manager’s problem. This approach delivers the same equilibrium point, but it
may not provide conclusive evidence on the form of the objective function.2 I adopt a more
2That is, both papers essentially assume that objective function of a manager is linear in portfolio profits
of all shareholders. This works as a linear approximation but it should not be taken for the exact objective
function.
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transparent approach where I explicitly derive a Taylor approximation for an exact objective
function. Fourth, I find an additional condition for equilibrium existence, which is missing
in both papers. The bias component must be large enough (but limited) for an equilibrium
to exist.
The present work also features a geometric analysis that allows me to solve the model with
correlated random bias components. I introduce a mapping of the voting model into a set
of polytopes in a multidimensional space. This analysis bypasses the hurdle of a symbolic
approach in deriving the final result.
In the application of geometric analysis, I rely on the results of Lasserre (1983), Khachiyan
(1993), Avis et al. (1996), and many others. I’m able to improve on some of their results.
In particular, I clarify the conditions of second order differentiability of polytope’s volume
with respect to location parameters of its hyperplanes. This is a compromise between the
strong but restrictive result of Khachiyan (1993) and the weak result under weak conditions
of Lasserre (1983). I also weaken conditions of continuity of polytope’s volume with respect
to hyperplanes’ positions presented in Lasserre (1983).
1.2 Theoretical model
This chapter introduces the general version of my theoretical model. I setup the model
and list the assumptions needed in order to establish equilibrium existence. A geometric
interpretation is presented to simplify most proofs.
1.2.1 Setup
An industry consists of N firms that are owned by I investors. I assume that investors are
external in the sense of Brito et al. (2018), i.e. firms do not own control or cash flow rights
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in other firms.3 Investor-i is characterized by her cash flow rights vector βi and control
rights vector γi. This characterization is exogenous to the model. For any firm-n I have∑I
i=1 βin = 1 and
∑I
i=1 γin = 1 with βin, γin ≥ 0.
Each firm has an unidimensional policy variable, qn, that is set by the manager in charge.
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I assume qn ∈ [0, Q¯] ⊂ R, where Q¯ > 0 is an upper boundary. The manager is elected
by investors under simple majority rule with no abstention in competition between two
prospective managers, {An, Bn}. The managers are office-motivated, risk-neutral, and have
utility of 1 if elected and 0 otherwise. A manger can only hold position in one firm, there
are 2N prospective managers in total. The choice of firm’s policy does not affect manager’s
utility.
Investors have a two-part utility function. First part, Ri(q; βi, γi), is deterministic, given
the firms’ policies, and represents the benefit coming from owning cash flow and control rights
in firms. Second part is stochastic and reflects investor’s bias towards particular manager
being elected. Let q be the vector of established firms’ policies and m be the vector of elected
managers (where mn ∈ {An, Bn}), then investor-i’s utility function is
ui(q,m; βi, γi) = Ri(q; βi, γi) + δ
N∑
n=1
1[mn = An]ξin, (1.1)
where 1[mn = An] is an indicator function equal to 1 when manager An wins, δ > 0 is
a scale parameter, and ξin is a random utility shock associated with the election of manager
An at firm n. For any firm n, the joint distribution of ξin, i ∈ {1, ..., N} is assumed to be
symmetrical around 0.5 Function Ri(q; βi, γi) is two-times differentiable and strictly concave
in policy of any firm, fixing the policies of other firms.
3This is not a significant restriction since a non-degenerate case of ownership structure involving internal
investors can be represented by a specific control and cash flow rights structures of external investors only.
See Brito et al. (2018) for details.
4While generalization to multidimensional policy case is possible, I stick to the unidimensional case for
the sake of simplicity.
5The symmetry assumption is needed in order to guarantee that prospective managers are ex-ante identical
in the eyes of investors if they propose the same policies for the firm.
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The game has two stages. At the first stage, potential managers simultaneously propose
policies in order to attract the votes of investors. Policy proposals may take form of prob-
ability distribution over feasible policies or a single policy. After that, the nature decides
on the investors’ taste shocks. Then, at the second stage, investors simultaneously decide
whom to vote for at every firm in order to maximize their utility. Finally, at the end of the
game, policy proposals of winning candidates get implemented. In a case of probabilistic
policy proposals the uncertainty is resolved at the end of the game by the nature selecting
a single value from a proposed probability distribution over the feasible policies.
The game proceeds as follows:
• Investors are exogenously endowed with cash flow, βi, and control rights, γi, in firms.
Information on βi and γi for all i is public.
• Prospective managers propose their policies simultaneously at all firms. For a firm, n,
these proposals are qAnn and q
Bn
n , possibly in a form of probability distribution over the
policy space [0, Q¯].
• Random utility shocks ξin get realized for all firms, n, and investors, i.
• Investors simultaneously decide whom to vote for at every firm.
• Managers get elected and implement the proposed policies. The nature decides on
a policy outcome in a case of a probabilistic proposal being used.
For an arbitrary firm n, let C be a placeholder for the candidate in question, let sM
be the strategy profile of all candidates, and let min(s
M) ∈ ∆{An, Bn} be the strategy of
investor-i. Then the random variable VC =
∑I
i=1 1
[
min(s
M) = C
]
γin is the share of votes
candidate C receives.
Definition 1.2.1. For a given set {Ri(·; βi, γi); βi, γi}Ii=1 of model parameters, a Subgame
Perfect Nash equilibrium with no weakly dominated strategies is a strategy profile
(
sM , sI(sM)
)
,
where sM =
(
(qAnn , q
Bn
n )
)N
n=1
is the strategy profile of prospective managers, and sI(sM) =
7
((
min(s
M)
)N
n=1
)I
i=1
is the strategy profile of investors, such that for every firm, n, and every
candidate, C, at that firm we have
qCn ∈ argmax
qCn
E
[
1
[
VC >
1
2
]
+
1
2
1
[
VC =
1
2
]∣∣∣∣sM−qCn
]
(1.2)
and for every investor, i, we have
mi ∈ argmax
mi∈(∆{An,Bn})Nn=1
E
[
ui
(
q(sM , sI), m(sM); βi, γi
)∣∣sI−mi ; sM] , (1.3)
where
• C ∈ {An, Bn} is the candidate at firm n
• qCn is the strategy of candidate C at firm n
• sM−qCn strategies of all candidates except candidate C
• min is the strategy of investor i at firm n, min ∈ ∆{An, Bn}
• mi is the strategy of investor i at all firms
• m(sM) is the vector of elected candidates given their strategies sM
• q(sM , sI) is the vector of firms’ policies
• candidates who equally split votes secure position with probability 1
2
• candidates and investors do not play weakly dominated strategies.
That is no candidate at any firm can change his strategy in a way that increases his
chances to secure the office position, and no investor can increase her utility by changing her
voting behavior.6
6A special note regarding mathematical expectations in conditions 1.2 and 1.3 is needed. Condition 1.2
uses expectation to accommodate the taste shocks of investors and account for the mixed strategies of
investors. In condition 1.3 expectation takes care of the mixed strategies of investors, the probabilistic
strategies of prospective managers, and the tie cases when candidates split votes in half. The taste shocks
have already been realized by this moment.
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1.2.2 Equilibrium refinement
The rather mild assumption of excluding weakly dominated strategies allows me to simplify
the backward induction analysis for investors. The following lemma summarizes the result I
get for them.
Lemma 1. If at an arbitrary firm-n prospective managers submit identical proposals, qAnn =
qBnn , then an investor-i’s choice of the manager to vote for is based on her taste shock only.
That is investor-i votes for An if ξin > 0 and she votes for Bn when ξin < 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
In a case of a tie, ξin = 0, I assume that investor flips a fair coin to decide. The following
lemma helps us to characterize the equilibrium.
Lemma 2 (Equal probability). Every candidate has exactly 50% chance of being elected in
an equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
Given the symmetry of the model with respect to prospective managers within a firm, I
will pursue a symmetric equilibrium where these candidates propose identical non-random
policies.7
Further, in order to prove equilibrium existence, we will need to know the off equilibrium
path strategies of investors. The following lemma summarizes this result.
Lemma 3. If for all firms, k, except one firm, n, the policy proposals, possibly probabilistic,
are the same, qAkk = q
Bk
k , and for that one firm policy proposals are different, q
An
n 6= qBnn ,
7This refinement does not reduce the competitiveness among the candidates. The individual best response
depends on the actions of the other candidate, managers’ actions at the other firms, shareholders’ payoff and
bias structures.
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then investor-i votes for the prospective manager An if
E
[
R((q1, ..., qn−1, qAnn , qn+1, ..., qN )
⊺; βi, γi)
]
+ δξin >
> E
[
R((q1, ..., qn−1, qBnn , qn+1, ..., qN)
⊺; βi, γi)
]
, (1.4)
where qk = q
Ak
k = q
Bk
k for k 6= n, and the expectation resolves uncertainty in a case of
probabilistic policy proposals.
Proof. See Appendix.
1.2.3 Taste shocks structure
The model admits possible correlation in voting decisions of shareholders. Such correlation
may arise due to investor ideology (Bolton et al., 2018; Bubb & Catan, 2018), influence of
proxy advising firms (Ertimur et al., 2013; Iliev & Lowry, 2015), or by following management
recommendations. The correlation is imposed onto the taste shock component of investor’s
utility function.
Any admissible correlation structure is supported. The following assumption defines the
taste shock structure.
Assumption 1. At an arbitrary firm-n there are Mn > 0 independent, symmetric around
0, uniform random variables8, ζnk, with standard deviations σ1, ..., σMn. Every investor at
firm-n is characterized by Mn weights, w
i
1, ..., w
i
Mn (with at least one being different from
zero). And the taste shocks for investors at firm-n are
ξin =
Mn∑
k=1
wikζnk.
8A more advanced model is feasible: if joint probability density function for ζnk, ∀k is real continuous
(positively) homogeneous function within the unit cube then the derivation follows the same route and relies
on the formula provided in Lasserre (1998).
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This assumption greatly simplifies the solution process. It allows for a simple geometric
interpretation of probability that a coalition supports the candidate. While the uniformity
assumption for ζnk has an impact on the policy outcome in the equilibrium, the main effect
on established polices rather comes from correlation between the taste shock variables ξin.
The next few technical results provide some useful properties of the taste shocks structure.
Lemma 4 (Symmetry of taste shocks). Given assumption 1, the taste shocks have joint
distribution that is symmetrical around zero in the following fashion.
P ({d1ξ1n ≤ d1x1, ..., dIξIn ≤ dIxI}) = P ({d1ξ1n ≥ −d1x1, ..., dIξIn ≥ −dIxI}),
for ∀(x1, ..., xI), and ∀(d1, ..., dI) ∈ ×Ii=1{−1, 1}, where (d1, ..., dI) determine the direction of
inequality signs.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 5 (Taste shocks correlation). Given assumption 1, at an arbitrary firm-n, taste
shocks of investors i and j are correlated in the following way
Corr(ξin, ξjn) =
∑Mn
k=1w
i
kw
j
kσ
2
k√∑Mn
k=1(w
i
k)
2σ2k
√∑Mn
k=1(w
j
k)
2σ2k
.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 5 shows that any admissible correlation structure can be achieved.
1.3 Geometric interpretation
The assumption 1 allows me to replace a rather difficult candidate’s problem of winning
probability maximization with a simpler geometric problem.
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Consider a substitution for assumption 1’s weights, wik →
√
12wikσk
9. It preserves full
generality while allowing me to make ζnk i.i.d. uniform on
[−1
2
, 1
2
]
. To avoid excessive
notation I omit the index of the firm, n, since almost everywhere I work with an arbitrary
firm-n.
The joint probability distribution of ζnk, k ∈ {1, ...,Mn} can then be represented by a unit
cube in Mn-dimensional space with a center at (0, ..., 0)
⊺. The cube’s volume represents
a set of possible realizations for the vector of random variables (ζn1, ..., ζnMn). We can assign
a mass to this cube that represents the probability of this vector being within the cube. It
is reasonable to normalize such mass to 1 since the probability of this event is 1. Following
the same path, the cube’s mass density can be described by joint probability distribution
function. Since the probability that vector (ζn1, ..., ζnMn) lands inside an arbitrary Mn-
dimensional shape is the integral of joint probability function over this shape, this probability
also equals to the mass of the shape given the mass density function defined above. For
a uniform and independent random variables, ζnk, the mass density is uniform within the
cube and zero everywhere else. This allows us to calculate the probability of (ζn1, ..., ζnMn)
being in a certain subset by evaluating the volume of this subset within the cube.
1.3.1 Shareholder’s decision and coalition formation
Lemma 3 provides the condition (inequality below) for an investor-i to vote for the candidate
An. The following transformation shows how this condition can be translated into the
geometric counterpart.
ξin >
E
[
R((q1, ..., q
Bn
n , ..., qN)
⊺; βi, γi)
]− E [R((q1, ..., qAnn , ..., qN)⊺; βi, γi)]
δ
To compactify the inequality, denote the right hand side by R¯i(q
Bn
n )−R¯i(qAnn )
δ
. Replacing ξin
by assumption 1, while redefining the weights to make the switch to normalized ζnk random
9The square root of 12 appears from the variance formula for uniform distribution.
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variables, I get
Mn∑
k=1
√
12wikσkζnk >
R¯i(q
Bn
n )− R¯i(qAnn )
δ
. (1.5)
This inequality describes a half-space in RMn formed by a plane with a normal vector
√
12
(
wi1σ1, ..., w
i
MnσMn
)
. The plane contains the origin point when the candidates pro-
pose identical strategies. Investor-i votes for the candidate An when realization of ζnk,
k ∈ {1, ...,Mn}, lands into this half-space. A geometric way to calculate the probability of
such event is to compute the volume of the convex shape formed by intersection of this half-
space with the unit cube. Since the uniform distribution of (ζn1, ..., ζnMn) does not contain
any mass points I can consider a closure of the half-space defined by inequality 1.5.10
The most elegant contribution of this interpretation is the ability to characterize the
probability of an event when a coalition of investors votes for the same candidate. Let ϑ1
be a coalition of investors that vote for manager An, ϑ1 = {i|i ∈ {1, ..., I}, min = An}. To
conveniently describe a coalition, consider a vector θ1 such that θ1i = 1 if investor-i belongs
to the coalition, and θ1i = 0 otherwise.
Construct a convex shape by intersecting a unit cube with a set of half-spaces defined by
a modified version of the inequality 1.5,
(2θ1i − 1)
Mn∑
k=1
√
12wikσkζnk
||√12wi ⊙ σ|| ≥ (2θ1i − 1)
R¯i(q
Bn
n )− R¯i(qAnn )
δ||√12wi ⊙ σ|| , (1.6)
for all i ∈ {1, ..., I}, where σ = (σ1, ..., σMn), wi = (wi1, ..., wiMn),
||√12wi ⊙ σ|| =
√
12
∑Mn
k=1w
i
kσkw
i
kσk, and ⊙ represents Hadamard product.11 This
shape represents the set of realizations of (ζn1, ..., ζnMn) that correspond to voting behavior
prescribed for coalition ϑ1. The volume of the shape reflects the probability of this event.
10The inequality 1.5 defines a half-space that does not include the boundary formed by the hyperplane.
The Mn dimensional volume of the boundary is zero, and, since uniform distribution has no mass points,
the probability of random point being on a boundary is zero. Including the boundary makes the half-space
closed which simplifies the further steps: intersection of several such half-spaces results in a closed convex
shape.
11Modification consists of normalization and accounting for the “sign” to choose the correct half-space.
Hadamard product for two matrices A and B of the same dimension is defined as (A⊙B)i,j = (A)i,j(B)i,j .
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The shape is a convex H-polytope where halfspaces are defined by inequality 1.6 for
i ∈ {1, ..., I} together with the halfspaces that form the unit cube.
1.3.2 Comparative statics for a single coalition
Comparative statics has a geometric interpretation as well. The candidate An may want
to know how an update in his policy proposal, ∆q, affects the probability that coalition ϑ1
forms and supports him. For simplicity, I consider a marginal change in policy proposal so
the corresponding polytope does not change much.12 Multiple investors may be affected by
a such change.
For now, consider an effect that this change has on an arbitrary investor-i. WLOG
assume that θ1i = 1. Then the factor in the right hand side of inequality 1.6 will be
R¯i(q
Bn
n )−R¯i(qAnn )−∆R¯i
δ
, where ∆R¯i = R¯i(q
An
n + ∆q) − R¯i(qAnn ). Hence, a policy adjustment
results in a shift of hyperplane for investor-i along the normal vector
√
12
(
wi1σ1, ..., w
i
MnσMn
)
governed by a change in investor-i’s deterministic component of utility function, ∆R¯i. If this
hyperplane was forming a (Mn − 1)-dimensional face, facet, of the polytope then the shift
would result in a change of volume, and, consequently, in a change of probability that
coalition ϑ1 forms to support An.
To quantify the size of the change I take a derivative of the right hand side of inequality 1.6
with respect to qAnn .
∂RHS
∂qAnn
= − (2θ1i − 1)
δ||√12wi ⊙ σ||
∂R¯i(q
An
n )
∂qAnn
(1.7)
This expression gives us the direction and the rate at which investor-i’s hyperplane moves
along the normalized normal vector (2θ1i−1)||wi⊙σ||
(
wi1σ1, ..., w
i
Mn
σMn
)
. Note that this vector points
towards the newly formed half-space. See inequality 1.6. This means that a negative value
12Since even a smallest change may easily change the number of vertices/faces of the polytope I need to
be a bit more precise here. By “not changing much” I mean that the moving hyperplane will not cross any
vertices formed by the other hyperplanes. This excludes any vertices that originally were at the moving
hyperplane.
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in equation 1.7 represents a movement of the hyperplane along the normal vector in the
opposite direction that captures new volume into the formed half-space.
There is one more missing link between the derivative of the polytope volume and equa-
tion 1.7. Since the hyperplane defined by inequality 1.6 forms13 only one facet of the polytope
at best, its effect on polytope’s volume is limited. It is proportional to the Mn − 1 dimen-
sional volume of this facet and the rate of shift of the hyperplane. Using the Proposition 3.3
from Lasserre (1983) I can prove the following result.
Proposition 1. Given a coalition ϑ1, marginal change in probability, V(θ1), that this coali-
tion is going to form and support prospective manager An solely due to actions of investor-i
is
∂V(θ1)
∂R¯i(qAnn )
=
(2θ1i − 1)Vi(θ1)
δ||√12wi ⊙ σ|| , (1.8)
where V(θ1) is volume of coalition ϑ1’s polytope, and Vi(θ1) is the Mn−1 dimensional volume
of facet formed by investor-i’s hyperplane.
Proof. See Appendix.
An immediate next step is to use proposition 1 to describe the effect of marginal change
of policy proposal on the probability of support from coalition ϑ1. This time I allow every
investor to re-evaluate the benefit of voting for/against the prospective manager.
Corollary 1. Given a coalition ϑ1, marginal change in probability, V(θ1), that this coalition
is going to form and support prospective manager An due to a change in his policy proposal,
qAnn , is
∂V(θ1)
∂qAnn
=
I∑
i=1
(2θ1i − 1)Vi(θ1)
δ||√12wi ⊙ σ||
∂R¯i(q
An
n )
∂qAnn
. (1.9)
Proof. See Appendix.
13Here “forms” means that the facet also belongs to the hyperplane.
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1.3.3 Candidate’s problem
Prospective manager An may also want to know how a change in his policy proposal, q
An
n ,
affects his overall probability of getting into the office. This is a rather straightforward
problem as it just requires to take a sum over all possible coalitions that assure winning for
the candidate An.
14
Let ΘAn be a set of coalitions at firm-n such that candidate An wins. Recall that γin is
control rights of investor-i at firm-n. Then the vector of any coalition ϑh ∈ ΘAn satisfies the
dot product condition θ⊺hγ·n ≥ 0.5. The total probability of candidate An winning is the sum
of volumes associated with these coalitions,
P [mn = An] =
#ΘAn∑
h=1
V(θh). (1.10)
In equilibrium, as lemma 2 suggests, candidates split volume of the unit cube in half. Most
coalitions in ΘAn have associated polytopes that share facets. Such facets are formed by
investors that are non-pivotal in these coalitions. Prospective managers maximize their
winning probability by catering to investors which form facets shared by both pro An and
pro Bn coalitions. These are the pivotal investors.
In the next section we are going to exploit a great result that follows from the geometric
interpretation to obtain objective function of a firm. This will allow us to establish objec-
tive function directly without matching the first order conditions as Azar (2017) and Brito
et al. (2018) do. The disadvantage of matching approach is that multiple different objective
functions may have the same first order conditions. The present approach removes this hur-
dle by directly transforming the stated manager’s utility function into the firm’s objective
function.
14If a certain coalition leads to a tie between the candidates, then each candidate adds this coalition
probability with half weight, i.e. tie is resolved with a coin flip. Further I implicitly assume this tie breaking
rule if need arises.
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1.4 Objective function
Firm’s objective stems from the objective of the party that determines the firm’s actions.
The present work treats firm as an artificial construct, an interface, that allows involved
parties (consumers, producers, managers, investors, etc.) to interact with each other in
a formal way. A firm has no preferences over the outcomes apart from the ones that are
implied by the decision making mechanism.
In this paper, the objective function of a firm is set by the manager who acts in his own
interest conditional on restrictions put in place by the shareholders in the decision making
mechanism (elections). To recover the firm’s objective function I need to transform the
prospective manager’s utility maximization problem into the firm’s optimal policy problem.
An office-motivated candidate wants to maximize the probability of winning the elections.
Within the geometric interpretation this is equivalent to maximizing the volume of the unit
cube that belongs to the winning coalitions. Equation 1.10 expresses this volume as a sum
of volumes of polytopes associated with these.
1.4.1 The exact formulation
Without loss of generality, assume that candidate An will win the elections.
15 Let us fix
the candidate Bn’s proposal as q
B
n . For an arbitrary coalition, ϑ1, that is winning for can-
didate An, let the volume of corresponding polytope be V(θ1; q
A
n , q
B
n ). Let H be the set of
inequalities that form the unit cube, H =
{
(−1)kζ
n
⌈
k/2
⌉ ≥ −1
2
, for k = 1, 2, ..., 2Mn
}
. For
further notational convenience, let us enumerate the investor-formed hyperplanes as I(i) for
i = 1, ..., I, and the walls of the unit cube as H(k) for k = 1, ..., 2Mn.
15Due to the symmetry of the problem the same can be done if I assume that candidate Bn will win the
elections.
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Using Theorem 3.1 from Lasserre (1983) I can rewrite the volume of the polytope as
V(θ1; q
A
n , q
B
n ) =
1
Mn
(
I∑
i=1
R¯i(q
An
n )− R¯i(qBnn )
δ||√12wi ⊙ σ|| (2θ1i − 1)VI(i)(θ1; q
A
n , q
B
n ) +
+
2Mn∑
k=1
1
2
VH(k)(θ1; q
A
n , q
B
n )
)
, (1.11)
where VI(i) is the Mn − 1 dimensional volume of facet formed by hyperplane I(i), and the
same is true for VH(k). The next proposition summarizes the objective function of a firm.
Proposition 2. Assume that candidate An will win the elections. Then his problem of
choosing the right policy proposal, against the worst possible strategy of other candidate, Bn,
does essentially define the firm’s objective function.
Candidate An maximizes the probability of being elected,
max
qAn
P [mn = An] = max
qAn
#ΘAn∑
h=1
V(θh; q
A
n , q
B
n ) =
= max
qAn
1
Mn

 I∑
i=1
R¯i(q
An
n )− R¯i(qBnn )
δ||√12wi ⊙ σ||
#ΘAn∑
h=1
(2θhi − 1)VI(i)(θh; qAn , qBn ) +
+
2Mn∑
k=1
1
2
#ΘAn∑
h=1
VH(k)(θh; q
A
n , q
B
n )

 , (1.12)
where #ΘAn is the set of winning coalitions, q
B
n is the worst possible (for candidate An)
strategy of candidate Bn.
Proof. See Appendix.
The advantage of proposition 2 result over the similar results in existing literature is that
it is a direct result that does not come from extrapolation of manager’s first order condition.
Hence, it remains valid for all possible combinations of parameters and strategies no matter
how far the proposed strategy is away from the equilibrium one. Yet it might be difficult to
use this result further as is.
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1.4.2 A Taylor approximation of the objective function
To simplify the firm’s objective function I construct a Taylor approximation that is suffi-
cient within the set of reasonable16 strategies. Assume now that the candidate Bn plays
some reasonable strategy qBn , while candidate An is playing an arbitrary strategy q¯
A
n . This
corresponds to the following payoff function for candidate An,
P [mn = An] =
#ΘAn∑
h=1
V(θh; q¯
A
n , q
B
n ).
Consider candidate An changing his strategy to q
A
n . While the change is small, I can use
Taylor expansion for individual coalitions’ probabilities over the set of investors’ deterministic
payoff functions to evaluate candidate’s An payoff.
I call a polytope in H-representation non-degenerate if its every inequality corresponds
to a half-space. I call the same polytope non-redundant if half-space forming hyperplanes
with collinear normal vectors do not intersect.
Required differentiability is established by the following result.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the polytope is defined in a non-degenerate and non-redundant
way. Function V(θh; q
A
n , q
B
n ) is differentiable in R¯i(q
A
n ). Under additional condition
∀i
that no triplet of polytope forming half-spaces has hyperplanes, that have common point of
intersection, and have linearly dependent normal vectors, the function V(θh; q
A
n , q
B
n ) is twice
differentiable.
Proof. See Appendix.
16I assume that a firm’s strategy is not reasonable if there exists another strategy such that every investor,
with positive control rights, prefers the latter one in a bilateral comparison. The set of reasonable strategies
is not empty. It includes at least one point if all shareholders agree on a single strategy. If shareholders
disagree, the set includes a continuum of points where shareholders disagree on the direction of change in
the policy.
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That is for a single coalition we have,
V(θh; q
A
n , q
B
n ) = V(θh; q¯
A
n , q
B
n ) +
I∑
i=1
∂V(θh; q¯
A
n , q
B
n )
∂(R¯i(qAn )/δ)
(
R¯i(q
A
n )− R¯i(q¯An )
δ
)
+
+O
(∣∣∣∣R¯i(qAn )− R¯i(q¯An )δ
∣∣∣∣
2
)
. (1.13)
Using the Proposition 1 , we can write down the candidate’s An payoff as
P [mn = An](q
A
n |qBn ) =
#ΘAn∑
h=1
V(θh; q
A
n , q
B
n ) =
#ΘAn∑
h=1
V(θh; q¯
A
n , q
B
n )+
+
#ΘAn∑
h=1
I∑
i=1
(2θhi − 1)Vi(θh)
||√12wi ⊙ σ||
(
R¯i(q
A
n )− R¯i(q¯An )
δ
)
+O
(
max
i
∣∣∣∣R¯i(qAn )− R¯i(q¯An )δ
∣∣∣∣
2
)
, (1.14)
where Vi(θh) is the Mn − 1 dimensional volume of facet formed by investor-i’s hyper-
plane. This equation represents an approximation of the firm’s objective function when both
prospective managers play the equilibrium strategy. The proposition below summarizes this
result.
Proposition 4. In an equilibrium, firm’s objective function from the perspective of manager
An can be approximated as
P [mn = An](q
A
n ) =
I∑
i=1
#ΘAn∑
h=1
(2θhi − 1)Vi(θh)
||√12wi ⊙ σ|| R¯i(q
A
n ). (1.15)
Proof. See Appendix.
That is, firm maximizes the weighted sum of shareholders’ deterministic payoffs. In the
base interpretation, these payoffs are their portfolios profits. The weights have two compo-
nents: Banzhaf power index (Banzhaf, John F. III, 1964) and correlated voting multiplier,
Vi(θh)
||√12wi⊙σ|| .
Absent any correlation among shareholders, Mn = I and i.i.d. ξin, the correlated voting
multipliers are all the same, Vi(θh)||√12wi⊙σ|| =
Vj(θh)
||√12wj⊙σ|| , ∀i, j. Then the weights,
∑#ΘAn
h=1 (2θhi−1),
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correspond to the number of coalitions where investor-i is pivotal. That essentially translates
into the Banzhaf power index up to a constant factor. This uncorrelated case effectively
replicates the result in Brito et al. (2018).
When correlation is present, correlated voting multipliers reweigh the Banzhaf power
index to account for joint voting behavior of shareholders. Given the complexity of possible
correlation structures the exact effect on weights is hard to describe. In general, investor
groups with positive correlation receive better relative representation in the objective func-
tion. In contrast, investor pairs with negative correlation tend to offset the each-others’
voting power which negatively affects their relative representation. This feature of objec-
tive function is relevant as empirical evidence suggests non-trivial correlation structures in
investors’ votes (Bolton et al., 2018; Bubb & Catan, 2018).
1.5 Equilibrium existence
So far I learned the properties of the equilibrium assuming it exists. In this section I’m going
to prove its existence. The route I’m taking is the following. I assume the properties I found
earlier, derive the structure and features of best response functions, and apply a fixed-point
theorem to establish existence. This closes the loop, and the assumed properties become to
be derived for an existing object.
1.5.1 Concavity of candidate’s objective function
Before I proceed with the proof of equilibrium existence, I would like to establish concavity
of the objective function for high enough values of taste shocks scale parameter δ.
Proposition 5. Candidate’s objective function is concave in proposed policy under fixed
arbitrary values of all other inputs and large enough taste shocks.
Proof. See Appendix.
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Concavity of objective function implies that candidate’s best response is a singleton.
Given that both candidates are ex-ante the same and can copy each other’s strategies, the
maximum ex-ante probability of winning the elections is 50% in equilibrium. Hence, the
peak of each objective function has to be 0.5. Since there is a single peak and the peak
can be achieved by copying the opponent’s strategy, peaks have to coincide in equilibrium17,
which means that both candidates propose the same policy within a firm.
1.5.2 Existence result
Building on the model elements derived above, I present the equilibrium existence result.
Proposition 6. In the game described in sections 1.2.1, 1.2.2, and 1.2.3 with a taste shock
structure compatible with conditions of proposition 3 a Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium
exists for a finite but large enough taste shocks.
Proof. See Appendix.
I employ sufficient conditions of proposition 3 to simplify the proof. These mildly restrict
the set of feasible taste shock structures in exchange for a way to show the strict concavity
of candidate’s objective function.
In contrast, the magnitude requirement for the taste shocks is a necessary condition.
As numerical simulation shows, prospective managers may have non-quasi-concave objective
functions if the taste shocks are not large enough. In this case, they will use probabilistic
policy proposals. That severely complicates the analysis and I do not study this case in my
paper.
17This claim implicitly assumes that I condition manager’s An objective function on the best response of
manager Bn and vice versa.
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1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I derive the objective function of a non-price-taking firm with heterogeneous
shareholders. In contrast to the requirements of the Fisher separation theorem, I drop the
price-taking assumption as it is unlikely to be satisfied in markets with finite number of
firms. To address the recent rise in common ownership, I allow for heterogeneous portfolios
with arbitrary allocation of voting rights. I employ the additive bias model of managers
elections to capture the corporate governance process and to derive the objective function.
For further generality, I allow for possible correlation in investors’ voting behavior. This
provides a path for understanding the influence of proxy advisers and diversified minority
shareholders on firm’s objective.
My contribution to the literature consists of several parts. Within the scope of additive
bias model, I find the exact form of the objective function while allowing for a correlated
shareholders’ voting behavior. Then, by redesigning the assumption set, I remove the need
for the assumption of conditional sincerity of shareholders. I also discover that the taste
shocks have to be of sufficient magnitude in order for the equilibrium to exits. This necessary
condition is missing in the present literature.
I find that the firm’s objective function can be approximated as a weighted sum of
investors portfolios’ profit. In coherence with the literature, the weights are proportional
to Banzhaf power index when correlated voting is absent. These weights change drastically
if shareholders are able to correlate their votes. In general, a group of shareholders with
positive within-group correlations receives better relative representation in the objective
function. These features of the objective function may assists the studies of influence of
proxy advisers, strategic behavior of institutional investors, and the influence of common
ownership on firm’s behavior and competition.
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Appendix A
Proof of lemma 1
An arbitrary investor-i maximizes her payoff by choosing a vector of voting decisions mi =
(mi1, ..., m
i
n, ..., m
i
N)
⊺, where min ∈ ∆{An, Bn}. While I can not fully describe her behavior for
every possible state of input parameters (strategies of prospective managers) and all possible
strategies of other investors, I can characterize her behavior with respect to candidates that
propose identical policies.18
At firm-n candidates An and Bn propose q
An
n = q
Bn
n . WLOG assume that ξin > 0.
Suppose that investor-i plays strategymi such thatmin 6= An. That is she votes for candidate
Bn with some positive probability. Our goal is to prove that this strategy is weakly dominated
by m˜i = (mi1, ..., An, ..., m
i
N)
⊺ if her voice is ever pivotal.
From condition 1.3 we know that investor-i maximizes expected utility conditional on
actions of other players. We can rewrite that expectation in the following way using qAnn =
qBnn and equation 1.1 to substitute the utility function
E
[
ui
(
q(sM , sI), m(sM); βi, γi
)∣∣sI−mi ; sM] =
= E
[
ui
(
q(sM , sI), m(sM); βi, γi
)∣∣∣sI−mi ; sM−(qAn ,qBn ), qAn = qBn = qn
]
=
= E
[
Ri(q; βi, γi) + δ
N∑
k=1
1[mk = Ak]ξik
∣∣∣∣∣sI−mi ; sM−(qAn ,qBn ), qAn = qBn = qn
]
=
= E
[
Ri(q; βi, γi) + δ
N∑
k=1,k 6=n
1[mk = Ak]ξik
∣∣∣∣∣sI−mi; sM−(qAn ,qBn ), qAn = qBn = qn
]
+
+ E
[
δ1[mn = An]ξin
∣∣∣sI−mi ; sM−(qAn ,qBn ), qAn = qBn = qn
]
.
18Candidates may use probabilistic strategies in their policy proposals.
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Notice that the first term does not depend on action of investor-i at firm-n, min, since the
implemented policy qn, possibly probabilistic, is the same no matter which candidate wins.
The second term only depends on the taste shock of investor-i at firm-n.
Several cases are possible. First, consider a situation where her voice is never pivotal,
e.g. there is another investor with more than 50% of voting power. Then her vote at the
firm n does not matter and she may as well vote m˜in = An. And her strategy, m˜
i, is not
weakly dominated by another one that differs only in min.
Second, she might be the controlling investor with more that 50% of voting power at
firm-n. Since candidates propose the same policy, qAnn = q
Bn
n , the first term is the same for
both candidates in expectation over elected managers and implemented policies. The only
difference comes from the second term, δ1[mn = An]ξin, where we can drop the expectation
since she is the controlling investor. Given ξin > 0, she derives higher utility from candidate
An being the manager. Hence, her strategy is m˜
i, and m˜i dominates mi.
Third, she might be pivotal sometimes depending on the actions of other investors and
the nature. While both strategies mi and m˜i bring her the same expected payoff if her
voice is not pivotal, strategy m˜i brings her higher expected payoff than mi if her voice is
pivotal.19 Hence, strategy m˜i weakly dominates mi. By the no weakly dominated strategies
assumption she will not play mi. That is she plays m˜i, and m˜in = An.
Finally, we conclude that she votes for manager An if ξin > 0 and for manager Bn if
ξin < 0. The last step is to consider ξin = 0. With ξin = 0 both candidates deliver the
same expected payoff to the investor-i. Then she may vote for anyone at firm-n without
perturbing her utility function.
Proof of lemma 2
For a pair of prospective managers at an arbitrary firm n consider the following cases:
19Note that as above, the expectation of the first term is the same and the difference comes from the taste
shock depending on the manager elected.
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• Strategies qAnn and qBnn are played such that E[1[mn = An]] = 0.5. Then lemma 2 is
trivially true.
• Strategies qAnn 6= qBnn are played such that E[1[mn = An]] 6= 0.5. WLOG assume that
E[1[mn = An]] < 0.5. Then candidate An can increase the winning probability by
deviating to the strategy qAnn = q
Bn
n , so we are not in equilibrium.
Candidates with identical strategies can only be distinguished by the random utility
component they derive to shareholders. Since random variables ξin have symmetric joint
distribution around zero the ex-ante chance to elect a certain candidate is 50%.20 The
following steps show this result.
Consider an investor-i’s decision to vote for manager An, denote this event as 1[i votes for
An]. By lemma 1, investor-i votes for the candidate An if ξin > 0 or with probability 1/2 if
ξin = 0.
1[i votes for An] = 1[ξin > 0] + x1[ξin = 0],
where x ∼ Bernoulli(1/2) and is drawn independently at any tie. Recall that VAn is the
share of votes submitted in the favor of the prospective manager by shareholders. Then due
to the symmetry of joint distribution
P
[
VAn >
1
2
]
= P
[
I∑
i=1
(1[ξin > 0] + x1[ξin = 0]) γin >
1
2
]
=
= P
[
I∑
i=1
(1[−ξin > 0] + x1[ξin = 0]) γin > 1
2
]
=
= P
[
I∑
i=1
(1[ξin < 0] + x1[ξin = 0]) γin >
1
2
]
=
= P
[
I∑
i=1
(1[ξin < 0] + (1− x)1[ξin = 0]) γin > 1
2
]
=
= P
[
1−
I∑
i=1
(1[ξin > 0] + x1[ξin = 0]) γin >
1
2
]
= P
[
VAn <
1
2
]
.
20This implies that the case with identical strategies, qAnn = q
Bn
n , but E[1[mn = An]] 6= 0.5 is not possible.
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Note that P [mn = An] + P [mn = Bn] = 1, hence
P [mn = An] = E
[
1
[
VAn >
1
2
]
+
1
2
1
[
VAn =
1
2
]]
=
= E
[
1
[
VAn <
1
2
]
+
1
2
1
[
VAn =
1
2
]]
= P [mn = Bn] =
1
2
.
Proof of lemma 3
By lemma 1 investor-i, when making her decisions at firms k 6= n, is going to adhere to the
taste shocks only. This result holds for all investors. Hence, the voting decisions and election
outcomes at other firms are not affected by the behavior of candidates at the firm-n.
The expected utility of investor-i has the following form
E
[
ui
(
q(sM , sI), m(sM); βi, γi
)∣∣sI−mi ; sM] =
= E
[
ui
(
q(sM , sI), m(sM); βi, γi
)∣∣∣sI−mi ; sM−(qAn ,qBn ), qAn 6= qBn
]
=
= E
[
Ri(q; βi, γi) + δ
N∑
k=1
1[mk = Ak]ξik
∣∣∣∣∣sI−mi ; sM−(qAn ,qBn ), qAn 6= qBn
]
=
= E
[
δ
N∑
k=1,k 6=n
1[mk = Ak]ξik
∣∣∣∣∣sI−mi ; sM−(qAn ,qBn ), qAn 6= qBn
]
+
+ E
[
Ri(q; βi, γi) + δ1[mn = An]ξin
∣∣∣sI−mi ; sM−(qAn ,qBn ), qAn 6= qBn
]
,
where sM−(qAn ,qBn ) = (q
A1
1 , ..., q
An−1
n−1 , q
An+1
n+1 , q
AN
N )
⊺ = (qB11 , ..., q
Bn−1
n−1 , q
Bn+1
n+1 , q
BN
N )
⊺. Note that the
first term does not depend on the voting strategy or on the election result at the firm-n.
This allows us to concentrate on the second term only. Since at every other firm the policy
proposals are the same, the implemented policies are the same as well. For the firm-n the
implemented policy depends on result of the elections. The second term can be written in
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the following way depending on the election outcome:
E
[
R((q1, ..., qn−1, qAnn , qn+1, ..., qN)
⊺; βi, γi)
]
+ δξin, if candidate An is elected
E
[
R((q1, ..., qn−1, qBnn , qn+1, ..., qN)
⊺; βi, γi)
]
, if candidate Bn is elected
where the expectation remains to account for possibly stochastic policies. This result does
not depend on voting strategies at firms other than firm-n. Hence, investor-i only cares
about how her vote may affect the chances of candidate An given the strategies of other
investors at the firm-n.
As in the proof of lemma 1 several cases are possible. WLOG assume that
E
[
R((..., qAnn , ...)
⊺; βi, γi)
]
+ δξin > E
[
R((..., qBnn , ...)
⊺; βi, γi)
]
.
First, her voice may be never pivotal. Here I assume that she votes for the candidate An
whose policy gives her higher expected utility. This assumption is optimal since her voice does
not matter anyway. Second, her voice may be pivotal sometimes. Then by the exclusion of
weakly dominated strategies she votes for An because this is not a weakly dominated strategy.
If she voted for Bn with positive probability then her voice being pivotal sometimes would
reduce her expected utility. Third, her voice might be always pivotal. Then she again votes
for An since that maximizes her expected utility.
Proof of lemma 4
By assumption 1, ζnk is symmetric around 0, that is −ζnk is distributed the same as ζnk.
Due to the linear structure of ξin and independence of ζnk, we can conclude that −ξin has
distribution identical to the distribution of ξin.
−ξin =
Mn∑
k=1
wik(−ζnk) ∼
Mn∑
k=1
wik(ζnk) = ξin.
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Now we can generalize this result to the case of joint distribution.
P ({d1ξ1n ≤ d1x1, ..., dIξIn ≤ dIxI}) = P ({−d1ξ1n ≤ d1x1, ...,−dIξIn ≤ dIxI}) =
= P ({d1ξ1n ≥ −d1x1, ..., dIξIn ≥ −dIxI}),
where the first equality is justified by replacing all ζnk with −ζnk within all ξin as demon-
strated above.
Proof of lemma 5
Consider covariance between ξin and ξjn
Cov(ξin, ξjn) = Cov
(
Mn∑
k=1
wikζnk,
Mn∑
k=1
wjkζnk
)
=
Mn∑
k=1
Cov(wikζnk, w
j
kζnk),
since Cov(ζnk, ζnl) = 0 for k 6= l. Then
Cov(ξin, ξjn) =
Mn∑
k=1
wikw
j
kCov(ζnk, ζnk) =
Mn∑
k=1
wikw
j
kσ
2
k.
Last step is to construct correlation using the above formula for covariance.
Proof of proposition 1
Lasserre (1983) defines polytope with the set of inequalities aix ≤ bi and then shows that
∂V(n,A, b)
∂bi
=
Vi(n− 1, A, b)
||ai|| ,
where V(n,A, b) is the volume of polytope, and Vi(n − 1, A, b) is the n − 1 dimensional
volume of facet formed by inequality aix ≤ bi. Adapting the parameters ai and bi to the
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present work I get
ai = −(2θ1i − 1)||wi ⊙ σ||
(
wi1σ1, ..., w
i
MnσMn
)
(1.16)
bi = −(2θ1i − 1)R¯i(q
Bn
n )− R¯i(qAnn )
δ||√12wi ⊙ σ|| . (1.17)
Observe that ||ai|| = 1, then using a chain rule I conclude
∂V(n,A, b)
∂bi
∂bi
∂R¯i(qAnn )
=
Vi(n− 1, A, b)
||ai||
2θ1i − 1
δ||√12wi ⊙ σ|| =
(2θ1i − 1)Vi(n− 1, A, b)
δ||√12wi ⊙ σ|| .
Proof of corollary 1
Recall that polytope’s volume V(θ1) for coalition ϑ1 depends on the positions of hyper-
planes determined by normal vectors and offset coefficients. See inequality 1.6. These offset
coefficients (the right hand side of inequality 1.6) in turn depend on R¯i(q
An
n ). Hence, I
can represent the volume of the polytope as a function that depends on R¯i(q
An
n ) and other
variables.
V(θ1) = V(θ1, R¯1(q
An
n ), ..., R¯I(q
An
n ), R¯1(q
Bn
n ), ..., R¯I(q
Bn
n ), w
1, ..., wI , σ1, ..., σMn)
Then an application of chain rule gives us
∂V(θ1)
∂qAnn
=
I∑
i=1
∂V(θ1)
∂R¯i(qAnn )
∂R¯i(q
An
n )
∂qAnn
.
The last step is to apply the proposition 1.
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Proof of proposition 2
Using equations 1.10 and 1.11 we find the total probability for candidate An to be elected.
Since this is a constant sum game, each candidate chooses a strategy that is a best response
to the worst possible move of the other candidate. Firm’s objective function is, essentially,
the candidate’s An objective function that is given by equation 1.12.
Proof of proposition 3
To prove this proposition I’m going to adopt and modify the proof of proposition 3.3
from Lasserre (1983). For this proof only, to maintain compatibility of notation I will
change the notation to match the one used by Lasserre (1983). That is, the polytope’s
volume, V(θh; q
A
n , q
B
n ), is now V (Mn, A, b), where Mn is the dimensionality of the space, and
A, b (see equations 1.16, 1.17) describe the polytope as intersection of halfspaces, {x|Ax ≤ b}.
Recall that we have two sets of halfspaces here: ones that are formed by investors and the
walls of the unit cube. Since the cube is static, we are only interested in the behavior of
investors-formed hyperplanes. These are described by the inequality 1.6. Please also note
that we require matrix A to have at least one non-zero element in every row. Thus we ensure
non-degeneracy of the polytope representation, i.e. every inequality represents a half-space
in Mn dimensional space.
First order differentiability
In the first half of the proof I will show that with no additional restrictions function
V (Mn, A, b) is differentiable in R¯i(q
A
n ). We start by establishing the form of the derivative
∂V (Mn,A,b)
∂R¯i(qAn )
. As inequality 1.6 suggests, the derivative of interest is proportional to the deriva-
tive ∂V (Mn,A,b)
∂bi
, where i is the index of inequality in (A, b) representation that corresponds to
the inequality 1.6 for i-th investor.
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Two cases are now possible. First, the Mn − 1 dimensional volume of intersection of
investor’s i-th hyperplane with the polytope, Vi(Mn−1, A, b), is non zero. Then the following
result is established by the aforementioned proposition 3.3.
∂V (Mn, A, b)
∂bi
=
1
||ai||Vi(Mn − 1, A, b), (1.18)
where ai is the i-th row of matrix A.
Second, the Mn − 1 dimensional volume of the hyperplane intersection is zero, Vi(Mn −
1, A, b) = 0. Here I repeat the steps from Lasserre (1983) with some modifications.
Consider an i-th hyperplane (WLOG assume that it corresponds to i-th investor, and
this hyperplane is described by i-th row of matrix A) such that Vi(Mn − 1, A, b) = 0. For
a small change, δbi > 0 in bi, I investigate the change in the polytope’s volume
V (Mn, A, b+ δbiei)− V (Mn, A, b), (1.19)
where ei is vector of zeros everywhere except the i-th cell which contains 1.
Observe that the hyperplane i at its original place (bi) separates space into two regions
such that polytope completely resides within only one of them. The contrary violates strict
unimodality of Vi(Mn− 1, A, b) established by Avis et al. (1996) since sectional area can not
be negative. With δbi > 0 the hyperplane moves away from the polytope towards the region
which does not contain any polytope’s volume. Hence, the volume of the polytope is not
changed for δbi > 0.
Now let the small change be negative, δbi < 0. Then the domain of the change in
polytope, ∆(δbi), can be described by the following set of inequalities


bi + δbi ≤ ai · x ≤ bi,
aj · x ≤ bj , ∀j 6= i.
(1.20)
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Define new scalar variables yk and Z as follows
x = x0 +
Mn−1∑
k=1
ykvk + Z
ai
||ai|| , (1.21)
where ai · x0 = bi, and vectors vk, for k = 1, ...,Mn − 1, form an orthonormal basis of the
subspace ai · x = 0. This allows us to represent ∆(δbi) as


δbi ≤ Z||ai|| ≤ 0,∑Mn−1
k=1 yk(aj · vk) ≤ bj − ajx0 − Z aj ·ai||ai|| , ∀j 6= i.
(1.22)
The next step is to confine the boundaries of ∆(δbi) from the inside
21 and the outside. For
this I introduce variables sj and s
′
j
sj = max
(
0, δbi
aj · ai
||ai||2
)
s′j = max
(
0,−δbiaj · ai||ai||2
)
,
and construct the corresponding domains ∆2(δbi) and ∆
1(δbi) as follows
∆1(δbi) is the domain


δbi ≤ Z||ai|| ≤ 0,
∑Mn−1
k=1 yk(aj · vk) ≤ bj − ajx0 + s′j , ∀j 6= i,
and
∆2(δbi) is the domain


δbi ≤ Z||ai|| ≤ 0,
∑Mn−1
k=1 yk(aj · vk) ≤ bj − ajx0 − sj , ∀j 6= i.
21While there is no need to confine these from the inside, I do this to maintain compatibility with the
proof presented by Lasserre (1983).
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Now observe that the following relation holds
∆2(δbi) ⊆ ∆(δbi) ⊆ ∆1(δbi). (1.23)
Denote an Mn-dimensional volume function of a domain as VMn(·), then the relation above
establishes
VMn(∆2(δbi)) ≤ VMn(∆(δbi)) ≤ VMn(∆1(δbi)). (1.24)
Note that for the domains ∆1(δbi), ∆
2(δbi) the variable Z spans the dimension that is
orthogonal to the subspace ai ·x = 0. Hence, these domains are prismatoidal polytopes, and
their volumes can be found as
VMn(∆1(δbi)) =
∣∣∣∣ δbi||ai||
∣∣∣∣VMn−1(∆′1(δbi)) (1.25)
VMn(∆2(δbi)) =
∣∣∣∣ δbi||ai||
∣∣∣∣VMn−1(∆′2(δbi)), (1.26)
where domains ∆′1(δbi) and ∆′2(δbi) are defined as
∆′1(δbi) is the domain
{∑Mn−1
k=1 yk(aj · vk) ≤ bj − ajx0 + s′j, ∀j 6= i (1.27)
∆′2(δbi) is the domain
{∑Mn−1
k=1 yk(aj · vk) ≤ bj − ajx0 − sj , ∀j 6= i. (1.28)
Recall that at δbi = 0 the domains above both coincide with
Mn−1∑
k=1
yk(aj · vk) ≤ bj − ajx0, ∀j 6= i, (1.29)
which is the face of original polytope formed by the i-th investor’s hyperplane. By assumption
above, the Mn−1 dimensional volume of this face is zero, Vi(Mn−1, A, b) = 0. Since the set
of inequalities 1.28 is more restrictive than the set 1.29, and the latter one has zero volume,
I conclude that VMn−1(∆′2(δbi)) = 0.
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Next, I show that VMn−1(∆′1(δbi)) → 0 as δbi → 0. Note that Vi(Mn − 1, A, b) =
VMn−1(∆′1(0)), where ∆′1(0) is the domain defined by 1.29. By assumption above, Vi(Mn −
1, A, b) is zero, and from inequalities 1.27 and 1.29 we see that ∆′1(0) ⊆ ∆′1(δbi). Hence,
if VMn−1(∆′1(δbi)) > 0, all the volume must be contained in the domain ∆′1(δbi)\∆′1(0).
Any point from within this domain must have to violate at least one of the inequalities 1.29.
Consider domains Eu, where u ∈ {1, ..., I}\{i}, defined as


∑Mn−1
k=1 yk(aj · vk) ≤ bj − ajx0 + s′j, ∀j 6= i∑Mn−1
k=1 yk(au · vk) ≥ bu − aux0.
(1.30)
The finite union of these domains covers the domain of the interest,
∆′1(δbi)\∆′1(0) ⊆ ∪Iu=1,u 6=iEu. (1.31)
That is to show that VMn−1(∆′1(δbi))→ 0 as δbi → 0 we need to establish VMn−1(Eu)→ 0 ∀u
as δbi → 0.
Observe that Eu is a compact convex polytope, so it is Jordan measurable (see Tao
(2011)). Tao (2010) in Proposition 1.7.2 establishes that a measurable subset E of RMn−1
has a positive measure iff for any ǫ > 0 there exists a ballB such thatm(E∩B) ≥ (1−ǫ)m(B).
For an arbitrary u suppose that VMn−1(Eu) does not converge to 0 as δbi → 0. That is,
suppose ∃η > 0, s.t. ∀δbi the volume VMn−1(Eu) ≥ η > 022. Then take an arbitrary but
small enough, 1
2
> ǫ > 0, ǫ-ball that has its center inside Eu. Note that the ǫ-ball must
have its center at a distance from every hyperplane that forms the polytope. Otherwise, the
hyperplane that it lies on will dissect away half of its volume, that is m(Eu∩B) ≤ 12m(B) <
(1−ǫ)m(B), which violates the Proposition 1.7.2. Let the distance from the u-th hyperplane
be µ > 0, and realize that s′u ≥ µ, since otherwise the center lies outside the polytope and
22Since VMn−1(Eu) is monotonous in δbi and is bounded below by zero, the only possibility for
limδbi→0 VMn−1(Eu) 6= 0 is to have limδbi→0 VMn−1(Eu) > 0.
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Proposition 1.7.2 is violated. But s′u is directly affected by δbi and for any fixed µ(ǫ) the s
′
u
can be made smaller than µ(ǫ) by taking δbi closer to zero. Hence, center of an arbitrary
ǫ-ball can be excluded from the polytope for sufficiently small δbi, which by Proposition 1.7.2
means that VMn−1(Eu) = 0 when δbi → 0. Finally, it implies that
0 ≤ VMn−1(∆′1(δbi)) = VMn−1(∆′1(δbi)\∆′1(0)) ≤ VMn−1(∪Iu=1,u 6=iEu) ≤
≤
I∑
u=1,u 6=i
VMn−1(Eu)→ 0, as δbi → 0. (1.32)
And we arrive at conclusion that
VMn−1(∆′1(δbi))→ Vi(Mn − 1, A, b) = 0,
VMn−1(∆′2(δbi))→ Vi(Mn − 1, A, b) = 0,
and
lim
δbi→−0
V (Mn, A, b+ δbiei)− V (Mn, A, b)
δbi
≤ lim
δbi→−0
VMn−1(∆′1(δbi))
||ai|| ,
lim
δbi→−0
V (Mn, A, b+ δbiei)− V (Mn, A, b)
δbi
≥ lim
δbi→−0
VMn−1(∆′2(δbi))
||ai|| .
For the case of δbi → +0 we directly established above that
lim
δbi→+0
V (Mn, A, b+ δbiei)− V (Mn, A, b)
δbi
= 0. (1.33)
This concludes our second step and we are left to state that
∂V (Mn, A, b)
∂bi
=
Vi(Mn − 1, A, b)
||ai|| (1.34)
holds for all values of Vi(Mn − 1, A, b) ≥ 0.
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The next step is to show that Vi(Mn − 1, A, b) is a continuous function of b. Lasserre
(1983) in Proposition 3.2. shows that V (Mn, A, b) is a continuous function of b wherever we
have V (Mn, A, b) 6= 0. Our goal differs in two ways: first, we need to show continuity without
the restriction that volume must be positive. Second, we need to do it for a case of Mn − 1
dimensional polytope’s volume, given that hyperplanes are specified inMn dimensional space.
To extend Proposition 3.2 I show that V (Mn, A, b) is continuous in b when V (Mn, A, b) =
0. Consider an arbitrary sequence ck, such that ck → b, as k →∞. Let D(b) = {x|Ax ≤ b}
be an arbitrary domain with Mn-volume being zero, VMn(D(b)) = V (Mn, A, b) = 0. Let
D(ck) be the sequence of domains formed by an arbitrary sequence of perturbations, ck,
D(ck) = {x|Ax ≤ ck}. For an arbitrary largeK two options are possible. First, for all k ≥ K,
VMn(D(ck)) = 0. Obviously, this implies that limk→∞ VMn(D(ck)) = limk→∞ V (Mn, A, ck) =
0. Second option is that ∀K, ∃k > K s.t. VMn(D(ck)) > 0. Observe, that this is equiv-
alent to possibility of fitting a sufficiently small ǫ-ball inside of the polytope. This case is
covered by the same logic as the proof of VMn−1(∆′1(δbi)) → 0 as δbi → 0 above. Hence,
limk→∞ VMn(D(ck)) = 0 and this concludes the proof that V (Mn, A, b) is continuous in b
when V (Mn, A, b) = 0. Since the volume function can not be negative, this result in com-
bination with Proposition 3.2 establishes continuity of volume function of a polytope in
Mn-dimensional space
23.
Now we need to derive conditions under which a polytope defined by intersection of
polytope in Mn dimensional space with a hyperplane has a continuous in b volume function.
Above we established that a polytope specified as intersection of half-spaces in RMn has
continuous Mn dimensional volume with respect to changes in vector b. We can build upon
this result by showing that a polytope formed by intersection of half-spaces and a hyperplane
in RMn can be represented as intersection of half-spaces in RMn−1. Since this polytope lies
23Berger (1987) establishes continuity of volume function on the set compact convex sets with Hausdorff
metric. Lasserre (1983) provides a proof for a particular case of convex polytopes. The present work extends
his result by relaxing unnecessary assumptions.
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within the hyperplane, we need to exclude the dimension orthogonal to the hyperplane.
A similar procedure has been done with the help of equation 1.21.
Let the domain of the polytope be described as D(A, b) = {x ∈ RMn|Ax ≤ b}. Let i
be the index of equation for the hyperplane of interest. Then a following substitution for x
allows us to eliminate the dimension orthogonal to hyperplane i.
x = x0 +
Mn−1∑
k=1
ykvk + Z
ai
||ai|| , (1.21)
where ai · x0 = bi, Z is a scalar, and vectors vk, for k = 1, ...,Mn − 1, form an orthonormal
basis of the subspace ai ·x = 0. This substitution gives us the following form for the polytope
formed by intersection of polytope D(A, b) and the i-th hyperplane.


0 ≤ −Z ai·ai||ai||∑Mn−1
k=1 yk(aj · vk) ≤ bj − aj · x0 − Z ai·aj||ai|| , ∀j 6= i,
(1.35)
where Z = 0, and the first inequality coming from the i-th hyperplane is redundant. The
set of inequalities reduces to
{∑Mn−1
k=1 yk(aj · vk) ≤ bj − aj · x0, ∀j 6= i. (1.36)
The Mn − 1 dimensional volume of this polytope is a continuous function of right hand side
of inequalities if every inequality corresponds to a half-space in RMn−1. This condition can
be written as ∀j 6= i, ∃k s.t. aj · vk 6= 0. That is for every inequality we can find a normal
vector to the hyperplane that separates half-spaces. If for an inequality j, ∀k aj · vk = 0,
then separating hyperplane is not defined, and the inequality works as an indicator function.
This may create a discontinuity when inequality becomes pivotal.
This concludes our proof of first order differentiability.
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Second order differentiability
The second order differentiability is essentially the first order differentiability of first order
derivatives. Since first order derivatives rely on computation ofMn−1 dimensional volume of
polytope formed by cross section with a hyperplane, we can recursively apply our arguments
from the first half of the proof.
Given the form of the first order derivative,
∂V (Mn, A, b)
∂bi
=
Vi(Mn − 1, A, b)
||ai|| , (1.34)
we conclude that the second order derivative has the following form
∂2V (Mn, A, b)
∂bj∂bi
=
1
||ai||
Vij(Mn − 2, A, b)
||(aj · v1, ..., aj · vMn−1)||
, for j 6= i. (1.37)
This formula uses definitions introduced in equation 1.36. Here we also use notation Vij(Mn−
2, A, b) to denote the Mn − 2 dimensional volume of polytope formed by the intersection of
the original coalition polytope with two hyperplanes, i and j. The vector (aj ·v1, ..., aj ·vMn−1)
is the normal vector to the Mn − 2 dimensional hyperplane formed by intersection of j-th
and i-th hyperplanes in Mn dimensional space. By first order differentiability condition this
vector is well defined.
For the second order derivative with respect to the same argument we have a slightly
different formula. To derive it, observe that a change in bi transforms into a change in x0 in
the set of inequalities 1.36. Above we defined x0 as ai · x0 = bi. Then,
∂(aj · x0)
∂bi
=
aiaj
||ai||2 , (1.38)
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which allows us to write down the second derivative as
∂2V (Mn, A, b)
∂bi∂bi
=
1
||ai||
I∑
j=1,j 6=i
−aiaj
||ai||2
Vij(Mn − 2, A, b)
||(aj · v1, ..., aj · vMn−1)||
. (1.39)
Again, the continuity of derivative relies on the continuity of the volume function of
a Mn − 2 dimensional polytope. Assuming that the continuity of first order derivatives is
in place, we need to derive condition under which Mn − 2 dimensional polytope formed by
intersection of Mn − 1 dimensional polytope with j-th hyperplane can be represented as
intersection of halfspaces in RMn−2.
As before, consider a substitution
y = y0 +
Mn−2∑
m=1
zmgm + Z
νj
||νj|| , (1.40)
where νj is a vector νj = (aj ·v1, ..., aj ·vMn−1), vector y0 is such that νj ·y0 = bj−aj ·x0, and
vectors gm, for m = 1, ...,Mn − 2 form an orthonormal basis of subspace νj · y = 0 (which is
also a subspace of ai · x = 0). Restating the set of inequalities 1.36 for Mn − 1 dimensional
polytope,
νj · y ≤ bj − aj · x0, ∀j 6= i, (1.36)
and using substitution 1.40 we get


0 ≤ −Z νj·νj||νj ||∑Mn−2
m=1 zm(νl · gm) ≤ bl − al · x0 − νl · y0 − Z νl·νj||νj || , ∀l 6= i, j.
(1.41)
For Z = 0 we get the domain of intersection of Mn − 1 dimensional polytope with j-th
hyperplane. {∑Mn−2
m=1 zm(νl · gm) ≤ bl − al · x0 − νl · y0, ∀l 6= i, j (1.42)
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This domain is a Mn−2 dimensional polytope in (A, b) representation with volume function
continuous in b as long as ∀l ∃m such that νl ·gm 6= 0. Thus, V (Mn, A, b) is twice continuously
differentiable under the conditions stated above.
Proof of proposition 4
The result is derived directly from equation 1.14 by dropping constants V(θh; q
A
n , q
B
n ) and
R¯i(q¯
A
n ); multiplying by δ and leaving out the error term. What remains is the linear approx-
imation of part of candidate’s An payoff that he has influence upon.
Proof of proposition 5
Consider the exact candidate An’s objective function, see eq. 1.14. To establish concavity
in policy choice variable, qAnn , for fixed arbitrary values of all other inputs, I consider the
declared above property of function R¯i(q
An
n ),
∂2R((q1, ..., qn, ..., qN)
⊺; βi, γi)
∂q2n
< 0, (1.43)
where the expectation is omitted as I look for a symmetric equilibrium. Then, the second
derivative of P [mn = An](q
A
n |qBn ) is
∂2P [mn = An](q
A
n |qBn )
∂(qAnn )
2
=
I∑
i=1
R¯
′′
i (q
A
n )
δ
#ΘAn∑
h=1
(2θhi − 1)Vi(θh)
||√12wi ⊙ σ|| +
+
∂2
∂(qAnn )
2
max
i
∣∣∣∣R¯i(qAn )− R¯i(q¯An )δ
∣∣∣∣
2
O(1). (1.44)
Observe that
#ΘAn∑
h=1
(2θhi − 1)Vi(θh)
||√12wi ⊙ σ|| ≥ 0
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because for any winning coalition where investor-i is not present exists another coalition
where investor-i is present. That coalition lies “right across the investor-i’s hyperplane” so
it exactly compensates the negative effect of the original one. Since Vi(θh) ≥ 0 for all i,
and because every manager has positive chance of being elected, I conclude that for at least
one investor in at least one coalition, Vi(θh) > 0. That is the first term in equation 1.44 is
negative. The second term in this equation has piecewise continuous second derivative with
bounded absolute value. Since parameter δ enters as δ2 in comparison to the first term, the
impact of the second term can be made arbitrary small for large enough δ. That is, ∃δ s.t.
∀δ > δ I have
∂2P [mn = An](q
A
n |qBn )
∂(qAnn )
2
< 0.
This implies concavity of objective function of a firm for large enough investors’ taste shocks.
Proof of proposition 6
Recall, that for the equilibrium to exist, both investors and prospective managers need to
play their best response strategies. I will tackle this problem sequentially in steps. First,
I show that prospective managers reach an equilibrium with desired properties, given that
investors behave in accordance to the results above. Second, I verify that investors’ behavior
is their best response to the prospective managers’ actions.
Above, I derived the firm’s objective function (equation 1.12) and established that under
given policies of all other firms, prospective managers at an arbitrary firm n are going to
play the same strategy. Moreover, I’ve shown that objective function is jointly continuous
in policy parameters of all firms (see the proof of Proposition 3). Our next step is to show
upper hemicontinuity of candidates’ best responses.
For an arbitrary firm, n, consider a continuous mapping Γ : [0, Q¯]N−1 → 2[0,Q¯] such that
∀x ∈ [0, Q¯]N−1, Γ(x) = [0, Q¯]. Define functionM(x) = maxqAnn
{
P [mn = An](q
An
n )
∣∣qAnn ∈ Γ(x)},
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where q−n = x. Denote the best response correspondence as
Φ(x) =
{
qAnn
∣∣qAnn ∈ Γ(x), P [mn = An](qAnn ) =M(x)} .
Then by applying Berge’s Maximum theorem (Berge, 1963; Aliprantis et al., 2006) I establish
that mapping Φ(x) : [0, Q¯]N−1 → 2[0,Q¯] is non-empty, upper hemi-continuous, and compact-
valued. Moreover, since for sufficiently large δ firm’s objective function is concave, the
mapping Φ(x) is also convex-valued (see Sundaram (1996) p. 239).
Construct correspondence, B : [0, Q¯]N → ×Nn=12[0,Q¯], to combine best responses of prospec-
tive managers24 at different firms as B(x) = Φ1(x)×Φ2(x)×...×ΦN (x), where × is Cartesian
product. Here correspondences Φn(x) are the ones defined in the paragraph above, except
that n-th correspondence ignores the firm-n’s policy, hereby reducing the dimensionality of
the argument toN−1. In Theorem 17.28 Aliprantis et al. (2006) show that a Cartesian prod-
uct of finite family of upper hemicontinuous correspondences with compact values is upper
hemicontinuous with compact values. Hence, correspondence B(x) is upper hemicontinuous
and compact-valued. Since underlying correspondences are non-empty, B is non-empty as
well. For high enough δ, correspondence B is convex-valued since Cartesian product preserves
convexity.
Application of Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem (Aliprantis et al., 2006) to correspondence
B establishes existence of compact-valued non-empty set of fixed points,
{
x ∈ [0, Q¯]N ∣∣B(x) = x} 6= ∅.
Now, what I have shown is the existence of a fixed point for prospective managers’ best
responses to their own and investors’ actions. We need to demonstrate that investors are
best responding to managers and themselves as well. Given that the fixed point features
symmetric candidates’ proposals within any firm, using assumption 1, I observe that lemma 3
24Here I use the result that if equilibrium exists, prospective managers of a firm play the same strategies.
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gives rise to inequality 1.5 as shown in chapter 1.3. This inequality represents best response
at firm-n of an investor-i to prospective managers’ equilibrium strategies at all firms expect
firm-n where candidates An and Bn may play deviated strategies. Lemma 3 establishes
independence of investor-i’s best response from other investors’ actions. This effectively
implies sincerity of investors’ best responses. Then, geometric analysis leads to the set of
inequalities 1.6, which describes the probability of support coming from a single coalition.
Finally, taking a sum over all wining coalitions, ΘAn , I receive equation 1.10 that describes
prospective manager An’s objective function. This completes the loop, and thus I have shown
the existence of a Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium.
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Chapter 2
A Connection Between Shareholders’
Portfolios and Directors’ Tenures
2.1 Introduction
Do corporate elections matter? Every year millions of shareholders participate in tens of
thousands of elections at thousands of shareholder meetings in the U.S. Yet less than 1% of
director elections are contested,1 more than 99% of auditor ratification votes receive support
from greater than a half of voting shares outstanding,2 and an ever rising block of shares
is voted by widely diversified institutional investors.3 In this paper, I analyze the structure
of shareholder meetings, the effect of shareholder support on directors’ tenure, and whether
mutual funds take their portfolios into consideration when making voting decisions. I find
that the level of shareholder support is positively associated with the length of director’s
tenure at a company and the probability of future nomination. I examine whether fund
mergers, a possible source of shocks to mutual funds’ portfolio composition, affect mutual
1Institutional Shareholder Services Voting Analytics database documents more than 18000 director elec-
tion events in 2015 and only 107 of those correspond to directors in opposition slates.
2Data comes from ISS Voting Analytics database.
3Backus et al. (2019b)
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funds’ voting patterns. In an event study, I observe that a merger affects the acquiring
mutual fund’s voting behavior.
First, I study the composition of election issues at shareholder meetings. In a frequency
analysis, I find that director elections and auditor ratifications make up more than 80%
of all election issues and appear in 94% and 80% of all shareholder meetings respectively.
A meeting’s agenda composition and other meeting characteristics, like location and time,
might affect shareholder participation (Van der Elst, 2011; Li & Yermack, 2016). Since a loss
of shareholder support may partially come from non-participation of some shareholders (Nili
& Kastiel, 2016; Jill E. Fisch, 2017; Cvijanovic et al., 2019), I choose director elections, as
the most uniformly present election type, to study the effect of shareholder approval on. In
an application of principal component analysis to the classification of shareholder meetings’
compositions, I obtain a similar result: the presence of director elections on meeting agenda
is one of the least important factors in distinguishing between different composition types
of those meetings. This finding strengthens my view that director elections face one of the
most representative samples of voting shareholders.
Second, I conduct a short review of competitiveness for the first few of the most popular
election issue types. Using the data on director elections, I observe that in less than 1%
of cases, a management-proposed slate of director nominees is contested by an opposition
slate. Moreover, Cai et al. (2013) find that the rare instances of director loosing an election
almost always result in him/her staying on the board. A similar situation holds for auditor
ratifications: in a less than 1% of ratification votes an auditor fails to secure more than a half
of the outstanding voting shares as votes of support. Less numerous compensation election
issues demonstrate a greater disagreement in shareholders’ votes: in 12% of cases “Say-On-
Pay” proposals receive support from less than a half of all voting shares outstanding.
Third, I focus on uncontested director elections as the most uniformly present agenda
issue at shareholder meetings. Literature suggests that bad election performance at uncon-
tested director elections does not lead to an immediate removal of the director from the
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board (Cai et al., 2009, 2013), yet there is evidence of a delayed effect (Iliev et al., 2015;
Aggarwal et al., 2019). I test two hypotheses: (a) directors with low shareholder support
refrain or are prevented from being nominated in the next election cycle at the company;
and (b) directors with low shareholder support experience shorter employment spells at the
company. I find both hypotheses to be supported by the data.
For the former hypothesis, using a logit regression, I find that a higher fraction of votes
“For” out of all voting shares outstanding has a positive and significant relationship with the
probability of director’s nomination in the future. Aggarwal et al. (2019) find that greater
percentage of dissent votes is related to higher chances of departing from the board, which
is consistent with my results. My approach differs from theirs in capturing the effect of both
dissent votes and shareholder apathy.4
I test the latter hypothesis using a time-varying Cox’s proportional hazard model. I find
that low shareholder support is associated with shorter director’s tenure at the company.
Moreover, the magnitude of the effect is amplified by majority voting requirement, board
being staggered, and a positive ISS recommendation.
Fourth, I study the effect of mutual funds mergers on an acquiring funds’ voting behavior.
I find that a fund alters its voting pattern soon after a merger with another fund. Because
mergers reshape the acquiring fund’s portfolio structure, this study suggests that there might
be an effect of portfolio structure on the voting behavior. Yet, mergers may also involve other
adjustments to the acquiring fund that might cause this change in its voting behavior.
I compare a fund’s voting record with voting records of other funds at the same firms.
This approach presents two hurdles: (i) since mutual funds are very diverse in terms of their
portfolios and voting behaviors, a direct comparison with any single mutual fund is almost
never possible; and (ii) a comparison based on a group of mutual funds typically leads to
a missing data problem due to variation in the funds’ portfolios. I overcome the first hurdle
by constructing an artificial mutual fund, a synthetic control (Abadie et al., 2010), to which
4I attribute shareholders’ apathy to the non-voted shares.
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I then compare the voting behavior of the actual fund. To my knowledge, I’m the first to use
the synthetic control method in studying corporate governance.5 To deal with the second
hurdle, I use the robust version of the synthetic control method proposed by Amjad et al.
(2018).
Focusing on voting behavior of acquiring mutual funds before and after a merger, I observe
a significant change in their voting patterns. To alleviate concerns that the effect might be
caused by the timing of the mergers before/after the bulk of corporate elections happen or
that it is just an artefact of the synthetic control method, I conduct a placebo study where
I use the same set of merger dates but I replace the acquiring mutual funds with arbitrary
non-merging ones. The placebo study shows no change in voting behavior which rules out
the aforementioned concerns.
The dependence of voting behavior on portfolio structure is important because it con-
tradicts the Fisher separation theorem (Fisher, 1930). The theorem establishes that share-
holders should unanimously agree on the firm’s profit maximizing production plan. The
evidence of it not happening suggests that the price-taking assumption is likely violated and
that mutual funds are internalizing the externalities that firms place on each other.
2.2 Election types
Shareholder meetings include a wide range of election agendas, yet more than 90% of all
election issues fall into one of the top ten popular types. Director elections is by far the
most popular election type: 7 out of 10 election issues are in this category. Typically, there
are multiple directors up for election at a given annual shareholder meeting which inflates
the number of director elections in comparison to other election issues. Table 2.1 presents
counts of the most common election types.
5The synthetic control method was pioneered by Abadie et al. (2010) in their study of California’s
tobacco control program. The method gone largely unnoticed in finance literature (Atanasov & Black,
2016). A notable exception is the paper by Berger et al. (2020). Recently, the synthetic control method
gained traction in voting behavior studies.
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Table 2.1: Election agendas at shareholder meetings. Data comes from ISS Voting Analytics
dataset for years 2003 - 2016.
Agenda general description Count Cumulative %
Elect Director 234305 69.64
Ratify Auditors 29577 78.43
Advisory Vote to Ratify Named Executive Office... 15323 82.99
Amend Omnibus Stock Plan 7025 85.08
Ratify X as Auditors 5669 86.76
Approve Omnibus Stock Plan 4122 87.99
Advisory Vote on Say on Pay Frequency 3536 89.04
Approve/Amend Executive Incentive Bonus Plan 2811 89.87
Elect Subsidiary Director 2465 90.61
Increase Authorized Common Stock 1885 91.17
Adjourn Meeting 1774 91.69
Amend Qualified Employee Stock Purchase Plan 1408 92.11
Declassify the Board of Directors 1360 92.52
Approve Merger Agreement 1330 92.91
Other Business 1072 93.23
Elect Director (Management) 930 93.51
Elect Directors (Opposition Slate) 903 93.77
Amend Articles/Bylaws/Charter-Non-Routine 882 94.04
Approve Qualified Employee Stock Purchase Plan 756 94.26
Reduce Supermajority Vote Requirement 643 94.45
Amend Stock Option Plan 624 94.64
Require Independent Board Chairman 608 94.82
Advisory Vote on Golden Parachutes 514 94.97
Political Contributions Disclosure 508 95.12
Require a Majority Vote for the Election of Di... 477 95.26
Approve Acquisition OR Issue Shares in Connect... 463 95.40
Approve Auditors and Authorize Board to Fix Th... 441 95.53
Amend Non-Employee Director Stock Option Plan 357 95.64
Company Specific-Equity-Related 336 95.74
Approve Reverse Stock Split 292 95.83
Change Company Name 282 95.91
Amend Articles/Bylaws/Charter – Call Special ... 274 95.99
Approve Stock Option Plan 266 96.07
Amend Non-Employee Director Omnibus Stock Plan 265 96.15
Company-Specific – Shareholder Miscellaneous 255 96.22
Restore or Provide for Cumulative Voting 236 96.29
Provide Right to Act by Written Consent 225 96.36
Approve Non-Employee Director Omnibus Stock Plan 223 96.43
Approve Repricing of Options 222 96.49
Proxy Access 219 96.56
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While director elections comprise an overwhelming majority of issues recorded, other
categories also appear frequently at shareholder meetings. In table 2.2, I present 40 most
frequent election types at these meetings. Director elections appear in 94% of the meetings,
followed closely by ratifying auditors at 80% of the meetings. Other frequent issues are
compensation questions,6 governance questions,7 merger issues,8 and proposals related to
equity.9
2.2.1 Election types correlation
Companies follow a certain agenda structure at shareholder meetings. To discover that
structure, I first study the correlation between different types of popular agenda items,
typically present at shareholder meetings. Second, I use principal component analysis to
characterize what components of shareholder meetings define the most important dimensions
across which the content of one shareholder meeting is different from another.
Composition of shareholder meetings is studied in figure 2.1. Since companies may use
somewhat different titles for similar agenda items, I classify all items that appear in at least
0.5% of meetings into 7 major purpose groups.10 Then, I study how these groups correlate
in appearance at shareholder meetings.
6These include issues such as “Advisory Vote to Ratify Named Executive Officers’ Compensation”,
“Amend Omnibus Stock Plan”, “Approve Omnibus Stock Plan”, “Advisory Vote on Say on Pay Fre-
quency”, “Approve/Amend Executive Incentive Bonus Plan”, “Amend Qualified Employee Stock Purchase
Plan”, “Approve Qualified Employee Stock Purchase Plan”, “Amend Stock Option Plan”, “Advisory Vote on
Golden Parachutes”, “Amend Non-Employee Director Stock Option Plan”, “Amend Non-Employee Director
Omnibus Stock Plan”, “Approve Stock Option Plan”, “Approve Non-Employee Director Omnibus Stock
Plan”, “Approve Repricing of Options”, “Performance-Based and/or Time-Based Equity Awards”, among
others.
7These contain such agendas as “Declassify the Board of Directors”, “Require Independent Board Chair-
man”, “Political Contributions Disclosure”, “Amend Articles/Bylaws/Charter-Non-Routine”, “Require a
Majority Vote for the Election of Directors”, “Reduce Supermajority Vote Requirement”, “Amend Arti-
cles/Bylaws/Charter – Call Special Meetings”, “Restore or Provide for Cumulative Voting”, “Proxy Access”,
among others.
8Merger issues have “Approve Merger Agreement” and “Approve Acquisition OR Issue Shares in Con-
nection with Acquisition” agenda names.
9Most common agenda names are “Stock Retention/Holding Period”, “Increase Authorized Common
Stock”, “Company Specific-Equity-Related”, and “Approve Reverse Stock Split”.
10The exact composition of these groups is provided in the beginning of this chapter.
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Table 2.2: Frequencies of occurrence of 40 most popular election agendas at shareholder
meetings. Data comes from ISS Voting Analytics dataset for years 2003 - 2016.
Frequency Agenda
0.9351 Elect Director
0.6751 Ratify Auditors
0.3493 Advisory Vote to Ratify Named Executive Office...
0.1556 Amend Omnibus Stock Plan
0.1287 Ratify X as Auditors
0.0937 Approve Omnibus Stock Plan
0.0810 Advisory Vote on Say on Pay Frequency
0.0619 Approve/Amend Executive Incentive Bonus Plan
0.0430 Increase Authorized Common Stock
0.0402 Adjourn Meeting
0.0319 Amend Qualified Employee Stock Purchase Plan
0.0305 Declassify the Board of Directors
0.0302 Approve Merger Agreement
0.0246 Other Business
0.0173 Approve Qualified Employee Stock Purchase Plan
0.0140 Amend Articles/Bylaws/Charter-Non-Routine
0.0139 Require Independent Board Chairman
0.0135 Amend Stock Option Plan
0.0116 Advisory Vote on Golden Parachutes
0.0112 Political Contributions Disclosure
0.0108 Require a Majority Vote for the Election of Di...
0.0103 Approve Acquisition OR Issue Shares in Connect...
0.0098 Approve Auditors and Authorize Board to Fix Th...
0.0080 Amend Non-Employee Director Stock Option Plan
0.0080 Reduce Supermajority Vote Requirement
0.0068 Company Specific-Equity-Related
0.0064 Change Company Name
0.0062 Amend Articles/Bylaws/Charter – Call Special ...
0.0061 Approve Reverse Stock Split
0.0060 Amend Non-Employee Director Omnibus Stock Plan
0.0058 Approve Stock Option Plan
0.0054 Restore or Provide for Cumulative Voting
0.0051 Provide Right to Act by Written Consent
0.0051 Approve Non-Employee Director Omnibus Stock Plan
0.0050 Proxy Access
0.0050 Company-Specific – Shareholder Miscellaneous
0.0048 Approve Repricing of Options
0.0046 Stock Retention/Holding Period
0.0046 Submit Shareholder Rights Plan (Poison Pill) t...
0.0042 Performance-Based and/or Time-Based Equity Awards
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Figure 2.1: Correlation among the most frequent election agendas at shareholders’ meetings.
Correlation structure reveals two major kinds of shareholder meetings. The first kind
includes annual meetings where shareholders elect directors and ratify auditors. This type
is also likely to include questions on compensation and corporate governance. The second
kind includes special meetings (non-regular, proxy contest, etc.) that deal with merger
and acquisition issues as well as contested director elections. The majority of shareholder
meetings falls into the first category, with a much smaller portion falling into the second
category. Some shareholder meetings exhibit features of both categories and cannot be
easily classified into one specific kind.
2.2.2 Principal component analysis of shareholder meetings
Principal component analysis (PCA) allows me to mechanically discover the combinations
of elections issues that differ the most between different kinds of shareholder meetings. In
this section, I apply PCA to identify those combinations (principal components), to perform
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cluster analysis to identify distinct kinds of shareholder meetings, and to describe the dif-
ferences between these kinds using principal component loadings. I find that shareholder
meetings can be classified into four major categories: meetings which contain compensation
and infrequent11 election issues, meetings that contain none of those, and meetings that
contain one or the other type of aforementioned election issues.
To perform PCA for shareholder meetings composition I implement the following steps.
First, for each shareholder meeting, I construct a vector that describes the types of elections
present at the meeting. A component of this vector is equal to 1 if one or more elections
of the corresponding type were conducted at the meeting and is equal to 0 if otherwise.
The length of the vector is equal to the number of election types considered.12 Second,
for a collection of such vectors for all shareholder meetings, I perform mean removal for
individual components. Since, by construction, each component has the same scale, I do
not normalize the components and leave the variance of individual components unchanged.
This approach enhances PCA’s search for directions of highest variance by accounting for
the natural differences in variances of individual vector’s components.
Principal component analysis reveals that shareholder meetings can be classified into
four major categories. While PCA does not endow those categories with a meaningful
explanation of differences between them, a certain level of understanding can be reached by
studying eigenvectors’ (principal components) loadings. Using a graphical representation of
PCA results for the first three principal components (see a score plot in fig. 2.2), I observe
that four shareholder meeting categories arise from two splits. First, shareholder meetings
are divided into two categories by the presence of compensation issues. Second, those two
categories are subdivided in two halves each by the presence of infrequent election issues
11Infrequent election agendas typically include shareholder-proposed and firm-specific issues.
12Here, I consider the same election types that were used in the previous section in construction of the
correlation diagram. While it is possible to perform PCA on the whole set of 389 different election types’
descriptions available from the ISS Voting Analytics database, this would skew the results as descriptions are
not perfect. The dataset contains multiple mutually excluding election descriptions (e.g. “Ratify Auditors”
and “Ratify X as Auditors”) that would cause artificial clustering of shareholder meetings as only one such
description is used at a given shareholder meeting.
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(these are typically firm-specific and shareholder-proposed issues). Very frequent election
issues, such as director elections and auditor ratifications, do not play a substantial role in
differentiating between various categories of shareholder meetings.
The first split happens in the space spanned by the two major principal components, and
the second split happens along the third most significant principal component. The top left
chart in figure 2.2 shows the first split. Two point clouds represent shareholder meetings
classified into different categories by the PCA. A notable feature of this split is that clouds’
internal structure is very similar. This could be explained in the following way: while
categories split is driven by a major factor that is aligned well with the subspace spanned
by first two principal components, other factors that explain less pronounced differences
between shareholder meetings are not aligned well with this subspace. Therefore, if these
minor factors are independent of the major factor that drives the split, then both point
clouds should have similar structures. Clouds’ structures are determined by the projection
of the minor factors on the subspace defined by the major principal components. Thus,
I can identify the direction of the major factor’s influence within the principal components’
subspace as a vector, that if added to the one cloud’s points would shift this cloud to overlap
with the other one.
Using coherent point drift algorithm by Myronenko & Song (2010), I match the point
clouds from the upper left plot in figure 2.2 and find that the difference between categories in
the first split corresponds to a shift of the red cloud along the vector [−0.86, 0.49] in the space
of the first two principal components. Table 2.3 presents loadings of principal components on
original variables. Using these loadings and the vector [−0.86, 0.49], I compute loadings of the
difference between categories as weighted combination of the first two principal components.
The result is presented in table 2.4. A substantially higher weight is placed on compensation
issues dummy. This result signals that inclusion of compensation issue(s) on shareholder
meeting’s agenda list produces the highest variation in shareholder meeting composition.
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Table 2.3: Principal components’ loadings for the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) of
shareholder meetings’ compositions. Original variables are sorted in a way that shows their
importance according to the PCA: for each eigenvector I determine the most important
original variable based on absolute loadings, then I sort the original variables by the order
of eigenvectors based on this relation.
Eigenvectors
Original dummy variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Compensation Issues -0.86 0.49 -0.16 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
Ratify Auditors -0.44 -0.64 0.22 0.07 0.58 -0.01 -0.10 -0.01
Other issues 0.01 0.31 0.90 -0.29 0.04 -0.06 0.04 0.02
Governance Issues -0.05 0.05 0.29 0.93 -0.21 -0.06 -0.01 0.00
Equity Related 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.12 0.98 0.06 0.03
Elect Director -0.20 -0.36 0.08 -0.10 -0.43 0.04 0.78 0.13
Merger and Acquisition Issues 0.13 0.25 -0.11 0.13 0.45 -0.13 0.30 0.76
Adjourn Meeting 0.12 0.25 -0.08 0.12 0.46 -0.10 0.53 -0.63
Table 2.4: Loadings of the difference vector between shareholder meeting categories in the
first split produced by the PCA. These loadings are computed as a weighted sum of the first
two major principal components’ loadings with vector [−0.86, 0.49] providing the weights.
Vector [−0.86, 0.49] represents a difference between shareholder meeting categories in the
subspace spanned by the first two principal components. The vector specifies a shift of
red point cloud needed such that it would cover blue point cloud in the upper left plot in
figure 2.2.
Original dummy variable Weight Absolute Weight
Compensation Issues 0.9751 0.9751
Other issues 0.1377 0.1377
Governance Issues 0.0686 0.0686
Ratify Auditors 0.0639 0.0639
Equity Related 0.0247 0.0247
Adjourn Meeting 0.0164 0.0164
Merger and Acquisition Issues 0.0102 0.0102
Elect Director -0.0078 0.0078
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Figure 2.2: Score plot for the principle component analysis of shareholder meetings’ com-
position. Components are ordered by the share of variance explained in descending order.
The top left chart shows shareholder meetings’ scores for the first two principle components.
Two clusters are clearly present. Clusters are color-coded differently to track their evolution
across projections at other combinations of principal components. Top right and bottom left
charts present projections involving the third principal component. Both charts show that
the third principal component splits the original clusters. Therefore, 4 different clusters are
identifiable in the space spanned by the first three principal components.
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Table 2.5: Summary statistics for shareholder meetings’ agenda items. Variables are equal
to 1 if corresponding agenda items were present at a shareholder meeting and 0 otherwise.
Agenda item present mean std
Elect Director 0.9387 0.2398
Ratify Auditors 0.8134 0.3896
Compensation Issues 0.5815 0.4933
Other issues 0.1780 0.3825
Governance Issues 0.0861 0.2805
Equity Related 0.0585 0.2346
Adjourn Meeting 0.0402 0.1965
Merger and Acquisition Issues 0.0401 0.1962
Second split happens mostly along the dimension of the third principal component. This
split is driven by the less frequent election agenda issues that are not classified in the short
list I’m using in this paper. While such issues individually have a frequency of occurrence at
shareholder meetings of less than 0.5%, together those issues appear in 17.8% of meetings.
This substantial proportion results in high standard deviation in presence of those rare
election issues.13 Therefore, presence of those election issues serves as a good differentiating
factor between shareholder meeting categories.
Election issues with high variance of occurrence are more likely to be distinctive features
of shareholder meetings. Table 2.5 presents summary statistics for shareholder meetings’
agenda item types. Both compensation and “other” issues have comparatively high variance.
Very common issues, like director elections, and quite rare, like equity related and merger
and acquisition issues, have relatively small variances. Those are less likely to drive the
separation of shareholder meetings into different categories. I do not conduct graphical
analysis of shareholder meetings clustering beyond the first three principal components.
Yet, principal component loadings in table 2.3 shed some light on influence of other election
agenda types on meetings’ composition.
13Since all original variables here are dummies, the standard deviation is directly related to the mean as
per Bernoulli distribution: σ =
√
p(1− p). Standard deviation would be highest for election issues that were
present in exactly half of all shareholder meetings.
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Governance issues comprise a significant portion of the fourth principal component’s vec-
tor. Having smaller standard deviation than compensation or infrequent issues, governance
issues play a modest role in differentiation of shareholder meetings. Auditor ratifications and
equity related issues are predominantly aligned with fifth and sixth principal components
vectors respectively. While auditor ratifications also appear in the first two principal com-
ponent’s vectors, analysis above clearly shows that they do not play a significant role in the
first two splits between shareholder meetings’ categories. Scree plot in figure 2.3 shows that
fifth and sixth principal components explain proportion of original data’s variance similar
to the fourth principal component. Therefore, auditor ratifications, equity, and governance
related issues are equally important in composition of shareholder meeting.
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Figure 2.3: Scree plot for principle component analysis of shareholder meetings’ composition.
The first three components explain more than 73% of variance in the original data.
Lastly, director elections and merger and acquisition issues are mostly pronounced in the
last two principal components’ vectors. These issues do not introduce much differentiation in
shareholder meetings. Director elections are present in 94% of shareholder meetings, while
mergers and acquisitions get voted on in only 4% of meetings. Therefore, both types of
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elections have relatively small variance of occurrence, and they explain only a limited amount
of variance in shareholder meetings’ composition. Mergers and acquisition issues typically
get accompanied by adjourn meeting votes. Figure 2.1 shows substantial positive correlation
between these two types of elections issues. Adjourn meeting votes do not represent the
biggest element in any one of the principal components’ vectors. Thus it is likely that they
do not contribute much to differentiation in shareholder meetings’ composition either.
2.3 Electoral competitiveness
Corporate elections are not always binding, few are contested, and shareholder proposals
are infrequent. Most popular agenda items, like director elections and auditor ratifications,
do not provide a significant variation in outcomes. In fewer than 5% of cases for director
elections and 1% for auditor ratifications proposals fail to secure votes in favor from more
than a half of all outstanding voting shares. Less frequent issues, like “Say-On-Pay” votes,
tend to feature greater share of cases with low shareholder support.
2.3.1 Director elections
Director elections are the most common type of election issues at shareholder meetings. Ap-
proximately 70% of all elections are of this type and about 94% of all shareholder meetings
involve director elections. Yet, competitiveness of director elections is rather low: overwhelm-
ing majority of all director elections are uncontested, a significant portion of companies use
plurality voting standard,14 and very few director nominees lose elections and even then most
of them become directors.
Director elections typically happen at annual shareholder meetings where a slate of direc-
tor nominees is proposed for an election. In a very small number of cases, less than 0.4%, two
slates are proposed: by the management and by the opposition. Companies use two methods
14Under a plurality voting standard, an uncontested nominee needs just one vote in favor in order to be
elected.
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for electing directors: majority and plurality voting standards. Under the plurality voting
standard, a director nominee receiving the most votes in support wins the election. This
method has a substantial drawback: in an uncontested election the nominee needs to receive
just one vote “For” in order to get elected. An alternative method is the majority voting
standard. This approach requires a winning nominee to secure more votes in support than
votes against. Figure 2.4 shows the share of director elections requiring a winning nominee
to pass 50% (or above) threshold. The growth in the last decade is attributed to the changes
in voting practices of the S&P 500 companies, while smaller companies from Russell 2000
mostly stick to the plurality voting standard (see Council of Institutional Investors (2017)
for details).
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Figure 2.4: Share of director elections requiring winning nominee to pass 50% (or above)
threshold. Data on threshold comes from the ISS Voting Analytics dataset. I compute the
share by dividing the number of director elections with the threshold requirement by the
total number of director elections in a given quarter.
Director nominees almost always enjoy a high support rate. I define support rate as the
proportion of shares voted “For” to the total number of voting shares outstanding. This
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Figure 2.5: Density histogram of support rates at director elections. Support rate is defined
as the ratio of votes cast “For” to the total number of shares outstanding (voting shares).
Only 4.7% of director elections had support rate of less than 50% of shares outstanding.
is a very conservative estimate, as less than 1% of companies use total shares outstanding
as the base in their calculations. Figure 2.5 presents a density histogram for support rates
at director elections. The distribution has a heavy rightward skew. Only 4.7% of director
elections received support of less than half of outstanding shares. Since most companies
in the sample do not use the majority voting standard and the ones that do typically use
votes cast as the base in their calculations, the chances of a director nominee to miss the
threshold are even smaller. Cai et al. (2013) investigate director elections from 2004 to 2010
and find that from 105445 directors only 294 directors at 153 firms received less than 50%
of votes “For”. Moreover, only 14 firms adopted some form of the majority voting standard.
Therefore, even if a company uses the majority voting standard, there is a very slim chance
that a nominee does not meet the threshold.
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2.3.2 Auditor ratifications
The second most frequent corporate elections’ issue is seeking ratification from shareholders
on auditor selection. Over 80% of shareholder meetings in the dataset include auditor rati-
fications. This election issue is widespread partially due to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002
that introduced new auditor approval requirements. The act requires exchange-listed com-
panies to have an audit committee that appoints and oversees the auditor. Corresponding
SEC rules (SEC, 2003b) permit shareholder ratification of auditor selection in compliance
with Sarbanes–Oxley Act. The idea behind the ratification process is that shareholders could
voice their concern with the audit committee’s work, selection of a specific auditor, and audit
fees. Auditor ratifications are non-binding.
The density distribution of the support rate15 for auditor ratifications has a significant
rightward skew. Less than 1% of ratification elections do not receive at least half of voting
shares outstanding in “For” votes. Therefore, virtually all auditors put up for a ratification
are successfully ratified by shareholders.
In 2009 SEC allowed NYSE to update Rule 452 (SEC, 2009). The update prohibited bro-
kers from voting clients’ shares in uncontested director elections if they did not receive voting
instructions from their clients. Unlike with director elections, brokers were not prohibited to
vote shares in auditor ratifications (and other routine matters) without clients’ instructions.
This might have incentivized firms to include auditor ratifications on shareholder meetings
in order to reach a quorum.
Krishnan & Ye (2005) find that companies might avoid auditor ratification when share-
holders are dissatisfied with the boards of directors. They also point out that the likelihood
of including an auditor ratification to a shareholder meeting is positively associated with
financial expertise of audit committees. Dao et al. (2008) show that shareholders are more
15As before, I define the support rate as proportion of “For” votes among the the total voting shares
outstanding.
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likely to withdraw their support at an auditor ratification election when the auditor’s tenure
at the company is long.
While there is little evidence that auditors formally fail ratification elections at companies,
low support rates and high levels of shareholder dissent may affect auditors’ dismissals and
resignations. Sainty et al. (2002), using pre Sarbanes–Oxley Act data, provide evidence that
high degree of investor dissatisfaction is associated with a firm being more likely to change
auditors. Barua et al. (2017) examine auditor dismissals using the auditor ratification voting
data from 2011 to 2014. They find that the proportion of shareholder votes against auditors
ratifications is associated with subsequent auditor dismissals.
2.3.3 Compensation issues
Votes of shareholder approval of executive compensation, “Say-On-Pay” votes, comprise the
third largest category among corporate election issues. In 2011, the SEC introduced changes
to Section 14A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that require public companies to hold
an advisory vote on compensation of company’s named executive officers (NEO). The change
was mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act, a comprehensive reform of financial regulation in the
U.S. This change led to a tenfold increase in the number of “Say-On-Pay” votes conducted
at shareholder meetings: for instance, the sample contains 215 such votes in 2010 and 2829
in 2011. This vote is meant to be an annual check of executive officers’ compensation and is
non-binding.
The practical purpose of this vote is to allow shareholders to voice their concerns with
the level of NEO’s compensation, NEO’s performance during the past year, and to convey
that information directly to firm’s management. Literature finds that “Say-On-Pay” votes
are beneficial for the firm. Iliev & Vitanova (2019) show that regular “Say-On-Pay” votes
are valuable to shareholders. Cun˜at et al. (2016) use pre Dodd-Frank era data to find that
adoption of “Say-On-Pay” proposal leads to a 5% increase in the market value of a company.
Robin Ferracone & Dayna Harris (2011) provide evidence that pay for performance discon-
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nect, poor pay practices, and poor disclosure were the most common reasons to vote against
in the failed “Say-On-Pay” votes in post Dodd-Frank era. Cotter et al. (2013) find that
companies with low total shareholder return, inadequately high levels of executive pay, and
companies with negative recommendations from ISS were faced with greater shareholder dis-
sent at “Say-On-Pay” elections. The authors also note that despite the non-binding nature
of these elections, companies that failed a vote undertook a change in their compensation
schedules or engaged in additional communication with shareholders.
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Figure 2.6: Density histogram of support rates at “Say-On-Pay” elections. Support rate is
defined as the ratio of votes cast “For” to the total number of shares outstanding (voting
shares). More than 12% of “Say-On-Pay” elections had support rate of less than 50% of
shares outstanding.
Figure 2.6 presents density histogram of “Say-On-Pay” votes’ outcomes. Unlike director
elections and auditor ratifications, “Say-On-Pay” elections have a sizeable share of cases
(12%) where proposal was not supported by a half of all voting shares outstanding.
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2.4 Election results and director’s job security
Director nominees very often receive high support rates in uncontested elections which makes
losing an election highly improbable even under the majority voting standard. This might
create an impression that uncontested director elections are a pure formality that does not
affect nominee’s chances of being elected as a director (Monks & Minow, 2004). In this
section, I evaluate how election results are related to elected director’s career prospects with
a company. I find that low shareholder support more often precedes director’s departure from
the company. In a time-invariant Cox’s proportional hazard model I do not find a significant
relationship between average level of shareholder support and the length of director’s tenure.
When I account for the evolution of shareholder support rate and other covariates in a time-
varying Cox’s model, I find a significant and economically meaningful association between
the support rate and the length of director’s employment.
Directors value their reputation and might react in the loom of a low support vote (Grund-
fest, 1993). For contested elections, literature provides evidence that contested directors face
a reduction in the number of directorships both in the targeted company and non-targeted
companies (Fos & Tsoutsoura, 2014). Due to a high cost for activist shareholder, contested
elections comprise less than 1% of all director elections. While uncontested elections do not
pose a credible direct threat to nominees of losing directorships, elections’ results serve as
a signal of shareholder perception of the board and CEO performance. Fischer et al. (2009)
find that firms with low board approval rates are associated with greater board and CEO
turnover and lower CEO compensation. Guercio et al. (2008) study “just vote no” campaigns
and find that such concerted actions of shareholders motivate boards to act in shareholders’
interests.
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2.4.1 Directorships’ spells and election results data
Directors typically stay with a company for a number of years and participate in multiple
elections. For the best possible coverage of election events, I reconstruct employment spells’
lengths from the election data. I find that about a third of directors serve on staggered
boards, while others participate in elections annually. Some directors experience transition
of their boards between staggered/non-staggered structures.
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Figure 2.7: Election frequency (inverse) of director elections computed at the level of
Company-Director spells. Years on horizontal axis represent the time between nomina-
tions of the same person for a director position at the same company. Election frequency
of a spell is computed as the median of all elections’ intervals belonging to the spell. The
non-integer numbers correspond to spells having multiple different election intervals with no
clear median.
The director elections data comes from the ISS Voting Analytics dataset. I merge it
with the ISS Directors dataset to obtain directors’ characteristics. Unfortunately, the match
covers only about 40% of directors’ election events. Therefore, I first rely on the Voting
Analytics dataset to identify directors’ employment spells. A detailed description of the
procedure is available in the Appendix.
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The Voting Analytics dataset contains 234305 director election events at 5616 companies
for the years 2003 - 2016. This corresponds to 65788 identified director-company employment
spells. Out of these, 19657 spells contain just a single election event. This is likely due to
director being elected just once at a particular company.16 22437 spells were censored as the
next expected election in a spell would not have been captured if it was to occur after 2016.
The frequency of director elections varies by company. A substantial part, 28% of
director-company spells with two or more elections, of director elections happened at compa-
nies with staggered boards. This manifests in long waiting periods between nominations of
the same person (typically, 3 years). Figure 2.7 presents the distribution of election frequen-
cies for director-company spells. Election frequency of 2 years likely represents employment
spells at companies transitioning between staggered and non-staggered boards of directors.
Directors’ employment spells substantially differ in duration. Figure 2.8 shows the dis-
tribution of employment spells durations. As expected, shorter spells are more numerous in
the data. Therefore, it is probable that director turnover is higher among board members
with less experience at a company. Spells at companies with staggered boards cause 6, 9,
and 12th bars to be noticeably higher than their neighbours. Figure 2.9 demonstrates that
almost every election bears a risk to be the last one for a director at a company. As directors
virtually never formally lose an election if nominated, the last election precedes a decision
of leaving company’s board of directors.
2.4.2 Election results and future nominations
Director elections do not seem to prevent nominees from getting on the boards yet their
results do not go unnoticed. I find that low shareholder support predicts the event of
director leaving the company. Director with higher shareholder support at the last election
has a higher chance of participating in the next election. The magnitude of this relationship
16Some portion of these events might also be related to underrepresented companies in the ISS Voting
Analytics dataset. As well as spells that ended in the first year (3 years) or started in the last year (3 years)
of observable data.
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Figure 2.8: Tenure of directors’ employment spells computed using ISS Voting Analytics
data. Spell length is computed as a difference between the spells’ maximum and minimum
years of election plus the median time difference between elections in the spell. Due to the
nature of procedure used, one-year-length spells are not identifiable as they only include one
election. Three-year-spells are underestimated here due to the absence of 1-term directors
from staggered boards in this statistic. Results in this bar chart are only representative of
the sample used. Censoring occurs since only a limited timeframe is available for study.
Actual directors’ employment spells are likely to be longer.
is comparable to the effect associated with director being a member of compensation or audit
committees.
To understand the effect of election results on director’s tenure at a company, I consider
a simple model of directors nomination. I suppose that directors and nomination committees
make the decision regarding further nomination for a continuing director partially based on
his/her last election results. That is, director may not want to re-elect, if he/she expects
a weak support from shareholders. While this weak support is almost surely would be
sufficient for a formal victory, a lower than his/her peers result might be a negative signal
for the nominee’s directorships at other firms. At the same time, nomination committee
might have similar career concerns and, therefore, avoid nomination of unpopular directors.
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Figure 2.9: Number of elections a director participates in during his/her employment spell
at a company. Bar chart represents results for the dataset in use. Due to censoring, actual
numbers are likely to be higher.
Less popular nominees might also compromise board’s defenses against activist shareholder’s
efforts to engage in a proxy fight.
For every director-company spell in the sample, I identify the last election a director
participated in. I remove all censored spells from the sample because this simple model
does not account for censoring. Using an election as a unit of measurement and within the
framework of logit regression model, I regress an indicator of an election being the last one
for a director on his/her performance in this election, ISS recommendation, and director’s
and company’s characteristics. Table 2.6 presents the results.
The first, base model, specification only includes election results and a few election-
specific characteristics. I consider the percentage of votes “For”, support rate, among total
outstanding voting shares as a measure of shareholder approval. Directors with higher sup-
port rates are more likely to be nominated in the next election cycle at a company. A one
standard deviation increase in the support rate, 14 p.p., is associated with 21% increase in
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Table 2.6: Directors abandoning future nominations for board elections at companies. Dependent
variable is a dummy equal to 1 if election is the last one for a director candidate at a company.
Censored employment spells are excluded from all samples. Support rate reflects the percent of
votes “For” among total voting shares outstanding.
Base model Director
controls
Company
controls
Kitchen
Sink
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Support Rate, % −0.013∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
Staggered Board 1.632∗∗∗ 2.845∗∗∗ 1.595∗∗∗ 2.822∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.274) (0.101) (0.308)
Majority Vote req. 0.602∗∗∗ 0.998∗∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗ 1.045∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.172) (0.093) (0.203)
ISS “For” recommendation −0.073 0.057 −0.016 0.011
(0.070) (0.230) (0.085) (0.272)
Support Rate × Staggered Board −0.002 −0.010∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.010∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004)
Support Rate × Maj. Vote. req. 0.004∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Support Rate × ISS “For” rec. 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
log(Spell Length) −1.311∗∗∗ −1.367∗∗∗ −1.346∗∗∗ −1.410∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.032) (0.018) (0.036)
Director’s characteristics
Director’s Age −0.102∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.019)
(Director’s Age)2 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Director’s Share, % 0.013∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗
(0.004) (0.005)
Nominating Committee memb. −0.057 −0.077
(0.128) (0.136)
Governance Committee memb. 0.035 0.050
(0.128) (0.136)
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Table 2.6, continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Compensation Committee memb. −0.143∗∗∗ −0.147∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.034)
Audit Committee memb. −0.191∗∗∗ −0.186∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.034)
Employed as CEO −0.164∗∗ −0.229∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.083)
Employed as VP −0.630∗ −0.625∗
(0.348) (0.351)
Other employment controls No Yes No Yes
Company’s characteristics
log(Total assets) 0.039∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.010)
Return on assets, % −0.003∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.002)
Book to market ratio 0.000 −0.060∗
(0.000) (0.032)
Leverage −0.009 0.001
(0.008) (0.015)
Constant 1.585∗∗∗ 3.749∗∗∗ 1.309∗∗∗ 4.020∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.567) (0.087) (0.652)
Observations 105196 30622 79589 24674
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
the odds of being nominated next time. This effect is comparable in magnitude to the effects
of compensation or audit committees’ membership, or director being employed as a CEO.
In all four specifications I observe the same sign and similar magnitudes of this effect.
The staggered board dummy carries a substantial coefficient, but this is an artificial
effect coming from the mechanics of staggered boards: a director, sitting on a board, does
not participate in elections every year. This significantly reduces the number of nominations
for these directors over their employment spell at a company in comparison to non-staggered
boards’ directors at other companies. Therefore, an election for a staggered board director
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is intrinsically more likely to be the last one. A similar outcome is observed for the majority
voting requirement. As large number of companies transitioned from plurality to majority
voting requirement over the sample’s timespan, many director spells have ended under the
new requirement while they were primarily lasting under the old requirement. Thus, the
monotonous adoption of majority voting standard likely stands behind the significant positive
coefficient here.
Surprisingly, a favourable ISS voting recommendation does not seem to have an effect on
director’s decision to participate in further company’s elections.
Interaction terms of the support rate with the dummies described above produce mixed
results. The support rate’s effect is amplified at companies with staggered boards but only
when controlling for director’s characteristics. The interaction with the majority voting re-
quirement has a similar dynamic: a higher support rate increases the chance of a future
nomination when I control for the director’s characteristics. The positive ISS recommenda-
tion interaction with the support rate does not have a significant effect anywhere except the
base model specification where the effect is small.
Notably, the spell length has a substantial positive effect on the probability of partici-
pation in future elections. The longer a director stays on a board, keeping everything else
constant, the greater chances are that he/she will be nominated at the next elections. This
effect is present in all four specifications considered.
In the second specification I add director’s characteristics to the base model. I find that
the director’s age has a “parabolic” relationship to the chances of future nomination. Younger
and older directors have smaller chances of being nominated in comparison to middle-aged
directors. The director’s share in a company negatively affects his/her nomination chances,
yet the effect is rather small as directors typically do not hold more than a fraction of a per-
cent of company’s shares. Membership in compensation and audit committees is associated
with an ample increase in chances of future nomination. The same holds true for directors
being employed as a CEO or a VP.
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In the third specification I include company’s characteristics to the base model. A higher
return on assets seems to positively affect the director’s chances of participation in future
elections. The effect of the size of a company does not have a stable sign and depends on
inclusion of director’s characteristics. Other company’s controls do not produce results that
are consistently significant.
Finally, I use “kitchen sink” regression as my fourth specification. For most of the
variables considered, I obtain the same signs and comparable magnitudes of coefficients.
The variable of interest, director’s support rate, remains significant and maintains its sign
across all four specifications.
2.4.3 Election results and directors tenure
A low shareholder support is also associated with shorter director employment spells. In
a survival analysis, I find that higher shareholder support is related to longer duration of
director’s employment at a company when I account for temporal evolution of the share-
holder support level and the company’s and director’s characteristics. Notably, a survival
analysis done in averages does not lead to a significant effect of shareholder support level on
employment spell duration.
The survival analysis provides a capability to account for director-company spells that are
censored due to the limited scope of the data sample.17 This approach allows me to mitigate
influence of possible biases that might have been introduced in the previous analysis by spell
selection due to censoring. Since the survival analysis deals with employment spell’s length
as its main dependent variable, I adjust the hypothesis accordingly. The above analysis of
decision to exit shows that a lower support rate is associated with a higher probability of not
participating in future elections. A reasonable extension of this result could be a hypothesis
that low support rates go in conjunction with reduction in the employment spell’s length.
17More than 34% of spells in the sample are censored.
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I use Cox’s proportional hazard model to implement a survival regression. It features
separation between the influence of static covariates and a population-level baseline hazard
function in modeling of an individual’s hazard. Moreover, this model allows me to estimate
the effect of covariates without the need to estimate or assume a specific form of the baseline
hazard function. As many covariates vary over the duration of a director-company spell, I also
consider Cox’s time varying proportional hazard model. Therefore, I study the relationship
between support rates and employment lengths using the survival analysis in two settings:
with static and time-varying covariates.
The analysis with static covariates involves the use of a statistic that maps values of
a set of time-varying variables into their static counterparts. I chose to use the mean as
such statistic for all variables. In an unreported analysis, I find that the mean support
rate of a director at a company is either not significantly related to his/her employment
spell’s length or the magnitude of such relationship is not economically meaningful.18 In
this analysis, I consider regression specifications that include director and company controls,
as well as, all and none of those. In addition, I construct other statistics that summarize
director’s support: the mean excess support in comparison to his/her peers, the last support
rate, and the last excess support in comparison to historic performance of the director
herself/himself.19 In all but one case, I do not find a significant and meaningful effect on
director-company’s spell length.20
The lack of results in a static covariates approach in this case is likely related to the
inability of simple statistics to convey meaningful information about the director’s election
performance. For instance, the average support rate might not be easily comparable across
18I find the mean support rate as an average of all positive support rates of a director at all elections
he/she participated in at the company.
19The mean excess support in comparison to director’s peers is computed as a difference between the
director’s support and the mean directors’ support in a given election year averaged over all election years
the director participated in. The last support rate corresponds to the support rate of the director in the
last election she/he participated in at the company. The last excess support rate is computed as a difference
between the director’s last support rate and his/her average support rate.
20A significant and economically meaningful effect has been found for the last excess support rate variable
in specification with controls for director’s and company’s characteristics.
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the companies and employment spells that are too distant in time. At the same time,
averaging of company’s and director’s time variant characteristics severely reduces their
informativeness in the regression. That is, for example, a director’s age becomes less relevant
for longer spells, a company’s return on assets means much less for career prospects of
a specific director when averaged over many years, and within spell covariation between
explanatory variables vanishes after averaging.
To address the repetitive nature of elections in company-director spells, I utilize Cox’s
time varying proportional hazard model. Formula 2.1 describes how time changing covariates
are embedded into the model.
h(t|x) = b0(t) exp
(
n∑
i=1
βi(xi(t)−xi)
)
, (2.1)
where h(t|x) is the conditional hazard function, b0(t) is the baseline hazard, xi(t) are the
time-varying covariates, and βi are the survival regression coefficients. For every director-
company spell, I assume that covariates are updated at the time of the director’s election
and then they stay the same until the next election of this director happens.
The analysis with time-varying covariates provides evidence that a higher support rate
is linked to longer duration of director-company spells. Table 2.7 demonstrates results of
four different specifications: base model, models with director’s and company’s controls, and
a “kitchen-sink” model. The support rate has a significant coefficient in all four specifications,
and it has a substantial magnitude in all but the base model specification. Among 3 other
specifications, an increase of one standard deviation in the support rate, is associated with
more than a 6% decline in the hazard rate. When coupled with a staggered board, the
effect grows to a 14% decline. A positive ISS voting recommendation and a majority voting
requirement contribute an additional 2% each to this support rate effect.
A staggered board effect measures at around 38% reduction in the hazard rate. This is
likely due to a large number of directorships at non-staggered boards that do not last longer
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Table 2.7: Survival analysis of director-company spells’ duration using Cox’s time varying pro-
portional hazard model. The table presents estimates of βi coefficients for the following model
of conditional hazard function: h(t|x) = b0(t) exp (
∑n
i=1 βi(xi(t)−xi)), where b0(t) is the baseline
hazard and xi(t) are the time-varying covariates.
Base model Director
controls
Company
controls
Kitchen
Sink
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Support Rate, 100% −0.022∗∗∗ −0.477∗∗∗ −0.301∗∗∗ −0.551∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.096) (0.025) (0.110)
Staggered Board −0.464∗∗∗ −0.467∗∗∗ −0.534∗∗∗ −0.493∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.042) (0.016) (0.047)
Majority Vote req. −0.082∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗
(0.012) (0.028) (0.015) (0.032)
ISS “For” recommendation −0.118∗∗∗ −0.039 0.001 −0.018
(0.012) (0.063) (0.017) (0.071)
Support Rate × Staggered Board −0.551∗∗∗ −0.573∗∗∗ −0.534∗∗∗ −0.599∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.053) (0.020) (0.059)
Support Rate × Maj. Vote. req. −0.223∗∗∗ −0.160∗∗∗ −0.164∗∗∗ −0.133∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.036) (0.019) (0.041)
Support Rate × ISS “For” rec. −0.020∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗∗ −0.130∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗
(0.004) (0.072) (0.020) (0.082)
Director’s characteristics
Director’s Age / 100 0.388∗∗ 0.458∗∗
(0.180) (0.208)
(Director’s Age)2 / 10000 0.514∗∗∗ 0.567∗∗∗
(0.152) (0.175)
Director’s Share, 100% −0.008 −0.006
(0.010) (0.011)
Nominating Committee memb. −0.014 −0.015
(0.029) (0.033)
Governance Committee memb. −0.020 −0.020
(0.029) (0.033)
Compensation Committee memb. −0.040 −0.030
(0.025) (0.029)
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Table 2.7, continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Audit Committee memb. −0.102∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.028)
Director’s employment controls No Yes No Yes
Company’s characteristics
log(Total assets) −0.069∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.008)
Return on assets, % −0.003∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001)
Book to market ratio 0.063∗∗∗ 0.025
(0.005) (0.028)
Leverage 0.041∗∗∗ 0.009
(0.004) (0.014)
Observations 222830 33859 149875 26061
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
than 1 or 2 terms. Therefore, being on a staggered board even for a single term delivers
a sizeable impact on the length of director’s tenure. The majority voting requirement is also
associated with longer directorships with the effect being in the neighbourhood of 8%.
A positive ISS recommendation does not seem to have a substantial effect on its own.
Only in the base model it delivers a 11% decrease in the hazard function, while in other
specifications the effect loses its significance.
The director’s age, in this analysis, has a negative influence on employment spell dura-
tion. A 10-years change in age translates into a 4.5% increase in hazard function. Unlike
in the nomination analysis above, a compensation committee membership does not have
a significant effect on the spell’s length. An audit committee membership has a positive
effect on the spell’s duration as before.
Directors at larger companies enjoy longer employment spells. While a higher return on
assets increases duration of directorships, the effect is rather small: less than a half-percent
decrease in hazard function per a percent increase in the return on assets. Higher book-to-
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market and leverage ratios reduce length of employment spells, but this effect only persists
in the company’s controls specification and disappears in the “kitchen-sink” regression.
2.5 Portfolio composition and voting behavior
In a world where firms are price takers, Fisher separation theorem (Fisher, 1930) establishes
that all shareholders, no matter what portfolios they hold, should unanimously agree on the
firm’s production plan that maximizes its profit. In the real world, price taking assumption
is unlikely to be satisfied, and we may observe a shareholder behavior that is not compatible
with the firm’s profit maximization objective.
In this section, I study the effect of mutual funds mergers on voting behavior of acquiring
funds. In particular, in an event study I demonstrate that a merger with another fund causes
a noticeable change in how the acquiring fund votes the shares it holds. Since a merger is
likely associated with a change in the acquiring fund’s portfolio, this study suggests that
there might be an effect of portfolio structure on the fund’s voting behavior. At the same
time, mergers may also lead to other adjustments for the acquiring fund that might cause
the change in its voting behavior.
Portfolio endogeneity presents a substantial hurdle in the analysis of shareholder’s voting
behavior. Since shareholders may vote both with their shares and with their feet (Admati
& Pfleiderer, 2009), the direct comparison between voting behavior and portfolio structure
might produce spurious results. For example, investors, like mutual funds, may follow certain
sets of principles to select assets into their portfolios and to vote their shares. Therefore,
groups of mutual funds having similar principles could create a correlation between their
portfolio structure and their voting record.
My analysis builds on the assumption that the reasons for a merger of mutual funds
are not directly related to their voting behavior. Literature finds that a poor target fund
performance is a significant factor for within-family mergers. Jayaraman et al. (2002) find
78
that eliminating funds with high cost structures and disguising poor fund performance are the
likely reasons for within-family mergers, while building a larger set of investment objectives
is a probable goal for across-family mergers. Fund families are likely to sell unique portfolios
to other mutual fund families in order to stay focused (Zhao, 2005). McLemore (2019)
finds that fund’s past performance is not significantly related to the likelihood of it being
an acquiring fund. Khorana et al. (2007) find that when a target fund’s board has many
independent directors the chances of a merger for an underperforming fund are higher. I have
not been able to find studies that cover voting behavior of merging mutual funds.
2.5.1 Mutual funds mergers and voting data
The mutual funds’ mergers data comes from the CRSP Mutual Fund database. I find 1346
fund mergers that happened from 2009 to 2016.21 For each acquired fund the database
provides the date of a merger and the acquirer information. I use it to construct the set of
funds that survived the merger (acquirers) and experienced a shock to their portfolio.
The mutual funds’ votes come from the ISS Voting Analytics database. For every ac-
quiring fund I collect all its votes within a two-year timespan (one year prior and one year
post merger). The voting behavior analysis involves learning the differences between votes
of the fund in question in comparison to votes of the other funds. Thus, I also collect the
votes of other mutual funds at the meetings where the acquiring fund was actively present.
2.5.2 Synthetic control method
I analyze an acquiring fund’s voting behavior by comparing it to the behavior of other funds
that vote at the same companies. This poses a challenge as mutual funds are different
from each other, hold non-identical portfolios, and typically do not exhibit identical voting
patterns. I find that synthetic control approach fits the problem well, and I use it to construct
21My choice for the time interval is explained by the mapping I created between CRSP Mutual Fund and
ISS Voting Analytics databases. While the mapping works for a greater timespan, from 2009 to 2016 the
match is substantially better than for other years.
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an artificial, “synthetic”, mutual fund that tracks the voting behavior of the acquiring fund
before a merger (treatment). This allows me to reconstruct a counterfactual case where the
would-be acquiring fund is not treated by a merger. Then, I use this synthetic control to
find a difference in voting behavior of the acquiring fund after the treatment in comparison
to the counterfactual case.
Abadie et al. (2010) introduce synthetic control method in their study of California’s
tobacco control program. I also adopt the factor model they propose as I find it suitable
for a study of funds’ voting behavior. In particular, let Y Nit be the voting decision of a non-
treated fund-i at an election enumerated by a timestamp t. Consider the following factor
model
Y Nit = δt + θtZ i + λtµi + ǫit, (2.2)
where δt is an unknown common time-varying factor affecting funds’ votes, Z i is a vector of
observed time-independent covariates, θt is a vector of unknown parameters, λt is a vector of
unobserved common time-dependent factors, µi is a corresponding vector of unknown factor
loadings, and ǫit represents the error term with zero mean.
In this paper, I interpret time as an indexing axis for the election events a fund par-
ticipates in.22 Thereby, I can come up with the following rationalization for the variables
involved. The vector Z i represents the observed characteristics of a mutual fund that do
not change with time and are not affected by a merger.23 For example, these can be fee
structure, published investment strategy, fund’s management and the board of directors. To
account for a differential impact of fund’s covariates on its voting decision at a particular
election, vector θt contains unknown weights that apply to the covariates in Z i. Since θt
is time-dependent, these weights can be election-specific which allows for a great deal of
flexibility in accounting for fund-specific covariates’ effect on the fund’s voting behavior. In
22Without loss of generality, I assume that every election issue can be assigned a “time” that uniquely
identifies it. Then election and company covariates can be embedded into the “time-dependent” variables.
23Since I track acquiring fund’s behavior only within a fixed time window of 2 years, slow changing
characteristics of a mutual fund can be treated as time-invariant within this model’s framework.
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a similar fashion, vector λt contains unobserved election-specific characteristics that affect
fund’s voting decision. A corresponding vector of unknown weights, µi, reflects how mutual
funds are taking into account those election-specific covariates. Finally, variable δt takes care
of election-specific effects that uniformly affect funds’ voting decisions.
The synthetic control method uses a pool of J donors, mutual funds not involved in
a merger (i = 2, ..., J + 1), to construct an estimate of the counterfactual outcome, Yˆ N1t =∑J+1
j=2 wjY
N
jt , for the treated unit, the acquiring mutual fund (i = 1). The construction
involves a set of weights, w2, ..., wJ+1, that are tuned in order to match the pre-intervention
voting path (2.3) of the acquiring fund and its observed covariates (2.4) as close as possible.
J+1∑
j=2
wjYj1 = Y11,
J+1∑
j=2
wjYj2 = Y12, ...
J+1∑
j=2
wjYjT0 = Y1T0 , (2.3)
J+1∑
j=2
wjZ j = Z 1, (2.4)
where T0 is the last election before the merger.
24 It may not always be feasible to find
a set of weights such that the sets of equations 2.3 and 2.4 hold exactly. In such cases, an
approximate solution is sought. The synthetic control method does not specify how to find
a tradeoff between better approximation of one system of equations over the other and vice-
versa. Since in this section I concentrate on a qualitative study of voting behavior, I focus
solely on the pre-merger voting path match and I ignore matching on funds’ characteristics
when searching for the synthetic control’s weights.
The benefit of using the synthetic control method over a diff-in-diff regression or a similar
model is the absence of the parallel trend assumption. Abadie et al. (2010) show that weights
w2, ..., wJ+1 can only fit (approximately) the systems of equations 2.3 and 2.4 with a high
number of pre-intervention periods if these weights approximate µ1 through a weighed sum of
µj, j ∈ {2, ..., J+1}. That is, if there is a non-linear trend in voting behavior of a mutual fund
24Here, for the sake of notational simplicity, I assume that elections are enumerated by integers that
represent a time sequence.
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of interest, this trend will be picked up by non-linearities in behavior of mutual funds in the
donor pool. Therefore, the synthetic control method accounts for the influence of unobserved
election-specific characteristics in the estimate of acquiring fund’s voting behavior in the
counterfactual case.
One drawback of the synthetic control method is the requirement that every fund in
the donor pool has to have a voting history that completely covers all votes of the acquiring
fund. Since mutual fund portfolios almost never overlap exactly, an additional step is needed
before I can apply the method.
2.5.3 Robust synthetic control method
To overcome the problem of missing data in the donor pool of mutual funds, I use the robust
synthetic control method developed by Amjad et al. (2018). The idea behind this method is
to perform a spectral decomposition of funds’ voting histories and then inverse this procedure
to impute missing voting data. This way I can reconstruct the would-be votes of a mutual
fund from the donor pool at companies that are not in its portfolio.
The spectral decomposition relies on a well-balanced sample of donor funds. For every
acquiring fund in the sample, I construct a donor sample and conduct a separate robust
synthetic control analysis. At the first step, I determine all elections within a two-year
span the acquiring fund participated in. Then, I collect votes of all other funds that have
participated in any of those elections. At the second step, I prune the set of the other funds
participated by leaving only those that have voted in at least 50% of elections before and
after the merger date. Next, I remove acquiring funds with donor pools of fewer than 4
funds from consideration. Figure 2.10 presents the number of funds in a donor pool and the
number of elections considered for the merger events at acquiring funds. For the majority of
mergers, the voting path consists of more than a thousand votes cast by the acquiring fund
and the corresponding donor pool contains more than ten donors.
82
100 101 102
Number of funds in a donor pool
101
102
103
104
105
Nu
m
be
r o
f e
le
ct
io
ns
 c
on
sid
er
ed
Figure 2.10: Sizes of donor pools and considered vote-paths for the acquiring funds’ merger
events. Vote-paths are tracked based on the elections an acquiring fund participated in over
a two-year window around the merger date. Funds in the donor pool are required to have
votes in at least 50% of both pre- and post-merger elections.
2.5.4 Merger’s effect on voting behavior
Acquiring mutual funds experience a significant change in their voting behavior right after
a merger. I track changes in voting behavior of a mutual fund by comparing it to an
implied behavior of such fund in a counterfactual case where the merger never happens. In
particular, using the weights computed by robust synthetic control method, I compute the
implied voting path of the acquiring fund.
Yˆ N1t =
J+1∑
j=2
wjYˆ
N
jt , (2.5)
where Yˆ Njt is an estimate of numerically encoded vote of fund-j at election-t. Yˆ
N
jt is a product
of the robust synthetic control method and is based on the observed part of the fund-j’s
voting-path, Y Njt . I set Y
N
jt = 1, if fund-j voted “For”, Y
N
jt = −1, if the fund voted “Against”,
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“Abstain”, or “Withhold”, and I use Y Njt = 0 to reflect a recorded “Do Not Vote”. If I can
not find a recorded vote of the fund-j at election-t, I leave Y Njt as missing value for the
spectral decomposition to impute.
I compute the difference in voting behavior between an acquiring mutual fund’s voting-
path and the counterfactual case as an absolute difference between the encoded vote of the
acquiring fund and its implied voting-path. I adjust the computed difference by a factor
of 1
2
, so it can be interpreted as a share of cases in disagreement on a scale from 0 to 1.
The resulting vector of differences turns out to be very noisy for any individual acquiring
mutual fund. I group the computed differences into weekly intervals by the elections’ dates.
Then, I use a weighted average to compute a single measure of voting disagreement within
a weekly period along with a 95%-confidence interval. The weights are inversely proportional
to the number of election events an acquiring fund participated in. Weighting scheme has
a purpose of preventing the few funds with high number of votes cast from skewing the
results of averaging.
Figure 2.11 presents a clear jump in voting behavior disagreement between acquiring
mutual funds and their corresponding synthetic controls. In the weeks before a merger, the
disagreement level measures at around 8%, while by the end of the first few weeks after the
merger it spikes to 14% and then consolidates at the level of 11%. It is hard to judge what
happens after a few months from the merger, as long-term predictions with synthetic control
method are less reliable when pre-intervention histories are short.25
2.5.5 A placebo study
The synthetic control method may only use the pre-merger voting path to construct the
control’s weights. This raises a credible concern that if overfitting happens then we can see
a spike in voting behavior disagreement just because the synthetic control performs badly
25While some merger events have very extensive pre-merger voting-paths, others have limited numbers of
acquiring fund’s votes recorded. Averaging of a heterogeneous set of post-intervention estimates likely leads
to worse estimates at long time-horizons as the weighting scheme prefers estimates with smaller number of
votes and, consequently, shorter histories.
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Figure 2.11: The average disagreement in voting behavior between acquiring funds and their
corresponding synthetic controls. The disagreement is computed on a scale [0, 1] as a half
of an absolute difference between encoded fund’s and its control votes. Averaging involves a
weighting scheme to prevent acquiring funds with extensive vote-paths from dominating the
results. Weights are inversely proportional to the number of votes an acquiring funds has.
95% confidence intervals are depicted in gray and are computed separately for each week’s
value.
on the unseen data. Another problem could be caused by timing of mutual funds’ mergers.
I observed a substantial heterogeneity in placement of funds’ merger dates with respect to
the dates of shareholder meetings. This heterogeneity could lead to an artificial jump in
disagreement simply due to a merger being scheduled, for instance, just before a month with
the highest number of shareholder meetings.
To address the concerns above, I implement a placebo study where I replace acquiring
mutual funds with arbitrary funds that did not experience mergers. The nature of the study
allows me to include more data points than the original study could by considering more
than one arbitrary fund per one merger date. This substantially reduces variance in the
resulting graph. Figure 2.12 presents results of the placebo study.
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Figure 2.12: A placebo study of the average disagreement in voting behavior of mutual
funds after mergers. The study involves the actual merger dates, but the acquiring funds
are replaced by arbitrary non-merging funds. The disagreement is computed on a scale [0, 1]
as half of an absolute difference between encoded fund’s and its control votes. Averaging
involves a weighting scheme to prevent the funds with extensive vote-paths from dominating
the results. Weights are inversely proportional to the number of votes a funds has. 95%
confidence intervals are depicted in gray and are computed separately for each week’s value.
To reduce variance of the computed values, multiple arbitrary funds were considered per one
merger date.
The study shows no jump at a merger date. This result strengthens the validity of the
jump in the actual study. A notable feature of placebo test is an upward trend for the
post-merger disagreement values. This trend is likely a result of the drift in funds’ portfolio
structures that happens over time. Another reason could be the method’s limited ability to
predict the counterfactual case’s outcome at longer time intervals.
2.6 Conclusion
In my analysis of shareholder meetings, I find that director elections and auditor ratifications
appear at more than 94% and 80% of shareholder meetings respectively, and together they
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comprise more than 80% of all recorded election events in the ISS Voting Analytics dataset.
Using principal component analysis, I establish that the presence of director elections on
shareholder meeting’s agenda is one of the least significant factors that distinguish between
different compositions of shareholder meetings. This makes director elections a good candi-
date for further study as those almost uniformly appear across shareholder meetings. Then,
I find that the two most frequent election issues, director elections and auditor ratifications,
have skewed distributions of election tallies. Less than 4.7% of director elections and less
than 1% of auditor ratifications received support from less than half of shares outstanding.
For uncontested director elections, I test two hypothesis of delayed effects of election
results on a director’s career prospects. First, I find that low shareholder support predicts
an event of director leaving the company. This result is coherent with Aggarwal et al. (2019)
who find a similar result for a greater percentage of shareholder dissent votes. Second,
I discover that low shareholder support is associated with shorter director-company spells.
This result is comparable in magnitude to the effect of an audit committee membership.
Finally, in an event study, I find that a merger with another mutual fund causes the
acquiring fund to change its voting behavior. Since mergers are likely to modify portfolio
structure, this study suggests that portfolio composition affects voting behavior. At the same
time, mergers may introduce many other modifications to the acquiring fund that might be
responsible for the change in its voting behavior.
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Appendix B
Director spells
An important step in studying the effect of election outcome on director turnover is identify-
ing director employment spells. Unfortunately, the ISS Directors dataset covers only about
40% of firm-director pairs in the ISS Voting Analytics aggregate election results dataset.
At the same time, the aggregate election results dataset provides a detailed description of
agenda items that in the case of director elections includes the full name of director nominee.
Therefore, I implement director’s name matching procedure within each company to identify
his/her spell.
At the first step, I use regex to extract directors’ names from election agenda descrip-
tions.26 I also remove titles that follow the names, e.g. Ph.D., M.D., etc.
At the second step, I focus on each company separately to identify which director elections
across the years correspond to the same person. I assume that no director was a nominee
more than once per year,27 and that there might be gaps between the elections of the same
person.28 While typically a person appears under an exactly identical name, some times there
might be deviations in spelling and auxiliary names (nicknames) attached to his/her name.
To overcome this issue, I consider the matching problem as multidimensional clusterization
problem that allows for a some amount of noise to be present.
26Agenda descriptions for director elections are very well standardized. To extract directors’ names in
99.98% of cases a regex expression with only 4 starting statements was required. The expression was
"(?:Elect +Directors{0,1}|Elect|Reelect|Director) +([\W \w ]+?)(?: as[\W \w ]+)*$".
27An exception from one-election-per-year assumption are elections with “Pending” vote result status.
28For example, some companies have staggered boards of directors. Thus, a director might be elected for
a few years and will not appear in the next year’s nominee list.
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I use Levenshtein distance to compute the difference (distance) between the names in the
pool. A distinctive property of this measure, unlike other string distance measures, is that
it is a metric distance. That is, it satisfies the triangle inequality which in turn, allows me
to “place” directors’ names in a multidimensional space to perform a cluster analysis.
For cluster analysis I use Ordering Points To Identify the Clustering Structure (OPTICS)
algorithm. It is closely related to a better known Density-based spatial clustering of appli-
cations with noise (DBSCAN) algorithm. Unlike DBSCAN, OPTICS is better suited for
finding clusters in data of varying density. Directors’ names in a pool can be represented by
a set of points in a metric space with help of multidimensional scaling. The OPTICS algo-
rithm implementation in Python allows me to directly use a pre-computed distance matrix
which removes the need of using multidimensional scaling. To prevent spurious clusters from
appearing in companies with just few director elections, I limit the maximum Levenshtein
distance to 7 between two samples for them to be considered being in the same neighborhood.
Cluster analysis produces a two-part result. The first part is list of sets of directors’
names where each set corresponds to one person based by his/her name similarity. The
second part is a list of names that were difficult to match with any particular director’s
names set.
I use the following post-processing procedure in order to improve on the result of cluster
analysis. First, I analyze the minimal Levenshtein distance between the name sets in the
first part. If two cluster-identified directors have very small (less than 3) distance between
the name sets and no overlap in the election years I join them together in one set and
treat as a single person. This corrects for clustering algorithm behavior that multiple exact
repetitions of a director’s name lead to a wrongful rejection of a sightly different spelling of
the same person’s name. Second, I loop over the names in the unmatched set and see if these
can be attributed to an already identified person. If no association is possible, I designate
a new director persona for such name.
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Chapter 3
Funds of a Feather: Influencing
Corporate Elections by Voting
Together
3.1 Introduction
The dramatic rise of institutional equity ownership over the last few decades warrants greater
scrutiny over the effects it may have on corporate governance of the U.S. public firms.1 Close
attention in the literature is placed on the role of the “Big Three” (BlackRock, Vanguard,
and State Street) as they command substantial shares in the largest U.S. companies and
frequently populate the lists of top beneficiaries of respective companies.2 Studies have
shown that individual mutual funds within a mutual fund family tend to exhibit similar
voting behavior at corporate elections.3 By voting in a lockstep, a group of shareholders
might exercise greater influence on company’s governance. While literature views mutual
fund families as blockholders, much less attention is devoted to study correlated voting
1Backus et al. (2019b); Baig et al. (2018)
2Bebchuk & Hirst (2019); Coates (2018)
3Fichtner et al. (2017)
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behavior among non-related investors, e.g., individual mutual funds belonging to different
families.
In this article, I explore the factors that are associated with higher chances that a pair of
shareholders makes the same voting decision at corporate elections. I do this by observing
votes of individual mutual funds at director elections. Then, I study how one such factor,
similarity of shareholders’ portfolios, affects shareholder participation.
I find a positive relationship between portfolio similarity of a pair of mutual funds and
probability of their voting decisions being the same. I show that greater portfolio similarity
among mutual funds leads to lower participation of other shareholders in director elections.
Theoretical literature provides a classical result, Fisher separation theorem (Fisher, 1930),
that shareholders with heterogeneous portfolios should unanimously agree on actions that
maximize a firm’s profit under the necessary assumption that firms are price-takers (Milne,
1974; Hart, 1979; DeAngelo, 1981). Therefore, we should not observe heterogeneity in share-
holders’ voting decisions that is based on differences in their portfolios. The observed cor-
relation between portfolio structure and voting decisions suggests that the price taking as-
sumption is most likely violated (and shareholders no longer unanimously want to maximize
the firm’s profits).4 In the absence of perfect competition, profit maximization is less likely
to be a firm’s objective (Hansen & Lott, 1996; Gordon, 2003). Contemporaneous literature
suggests that maximization of a weighted sum of profits of shareholders’ portfolios might be
a reasonable alternative objective (Salop & O’Brien (2000); Azar (2017); Brito et al. (2018),
see also Schmalz (2018) for a detailed review). Thus, a shareholder who wants to maximize
the value of her portfolio may want to account for the effects of between-firm externalities
when setting the firm’s objective through voting at corporate elections.
Mutual funds’ investment advisers have a fiduciary duty to vote proxies “in a manner
consistent with the best interest of the fund and its shareholders” (SEC, 2003a). This ensures
4The other possible explanations might include limited ability of shareholders to collect and process
information, thus differences in portfolio structures may correlate with differences in opinions of what is best
for profit maximization.
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high turnout by mutual funds at corporate elections and, in conjunction with imperfect
competition, provides a testable hypothesis about their voting patterns. Under imperfect
competition governance decisions at one firm may affect the financial outcomes of other firms.
Therefore, a mutual fund, which strives to maximize its portfolio profit,5 must internalize
the effect of a voting outcome at one firm on the value of other firms in its portfolio. I reject
the hypothesis that mutual funds’ voting decisions are not related to their portfolios by
observing a positive correlation between portfolio similarity and voting decisions.
This work contributes to the literature in three main ways. First, I study the voting
behavior of individual mutual funds. Iliev & Lowry (2015) find that funds, that have higher
net benefits of voting, more often vote independently of Institutional Shareholder Services
(ISS) recommendation.6 Fichtner et al. (2017) demonstrate that the “Big Three” families of
mutual funds utilize coordinated voting strategies. Schwartz-Ziv & Wermers (2019) observe
that institutional investors, when making voting decisions, account for firm’s weight in their
portfolio and their fraction-of-company investments. In contrast to the existing literature,
I study how differences in characteristics of mutual funds affect the probability of them
making the same voting decisions. I find that a mutual fund’s family has a significant
impact on the fund’s voting behavior. This result goes in line with Fichtner et al. (2017),
as funds from the same family tend to agree on voting decisions. I then discover that
funds with more similar portfolios tend to cast identical votes more often. This finding
provides evidence that individual mutual fund’s portfolio structure is taken into account
by the decision-making body. Unlike Schwartz-Ziv & Wermers (2019), I find that portfolio
structure at the individual fund level explains the fund’s voting behavior better than portfolio
5In a more realistic scenario a mutual fund would want to maximize profit of its portfolio subject to a
variance constraint. Since between-firm externalities shape the joint distribution of fund’s holdings’ payoffs,
the fund should internalize the effect of voting outcome at one firm on this joint distribution of payoffs. This
would require mutual fund to account for its entire portfolio composition when voting at a single firm.
6Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) is the largest proxy advisory firm. It routinely issues voting
recommendations regarding how investors should vote on corporate questions.
92
structure of its mutual fund family.7 I also find that favorable ISS recommendation reduces
chances of disagreement between the funds. This result adds to the literature of mutual funds’
reliance on Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and management recommendations on
voting decisions (Choi et al., 2009, 2010; Iliev & Lowry, 2015; Malenko & Shen, 2016; Malenko
& Malenko, 2019).
Second, I investigate how highly diversified horizontal shareholders8 affect a company’s
governance process. My analysis shows that portfolio structure affects both: individ-
ual mutual funds’ voting decisions and participation at directors elections as a whole.
This contributes to the literature on the effects of horizontal shareholding and cross-
ownership (Backus et al., 2019a; Elhauge, 2019a,b,c; Morton & Hovenkamp, 2018; Brito
et al., 2019; He et al., 2019). I establish that higher portfolio similarity of mutual funds
causes lower turnout at director elections by other shareholders. This adds to the literature
on rational apathy of investors (Jill E. Fisch, 2017; Nili & Kastiel, 2016), network effects on
voting (Enriques & Romano, 2018), and shareholder free-riding (Lafarre, 2017; Cvijanovic
et al., 2019). Third, I extend the cosine portfolio similarity measure (Bohlin & Rosvall,
2014; Sias et al., 2013; Getmansky et al., 2018; Backus et al., 2019b) to evaluate portfolio
similarity within sets of more than two shareholders.
This paper also provides a bridge between the literature examining the growth of large
index fund families (Bebchuk & Hirst, 2019; Coates, 2018) and the literature on horizontal
shareholding (Elhauge, 2019a,b,c; Morton & Hovenkamp, 2018; Brito et al., 2019; He et al.,
2019). The former focuses on the power of small groups of exceptionally large mutual funds
families in influencing corporate decision making, while the latter considers investors, not
necessarily large ones, that hold multiple competitors in the same product market simulta-
neously. I observe that a mutual fund family is not the only source of power centralization.
7In an unreported regression, I study how similarity of mutual fund families’ portfolios affect the prob-
ability that funds from different families make identical voting decisions. After conditioning on the same
mutual funds’ and their families’ characteristics I do not find a statistically significant relationship.
8Elhauge (2019a) defines horizontal shareholding as an overlap of leading shareholders of horizontal
competitors.
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Since an increase in portfolio similarity tends to correlate with probability of different indi-
vidual mutual funds making the same voting decisions, I infer that the boundaries between
different mutual fund families might be blurred by the disperse nature of their funds’ port-
folios. Therefore, not only the number and size of the top mutual fund families matter for
concentration of decision making power, but also their, and other shareholders, degree of
portfolio similarity, which is driven up by diversification and horizontal shareholding.9
Free-riding is a possible explanation for lower turnout of shareholders at elections with
high portfolio similarity among mutual funds. Retail shareholders may expect mutual funds
votes to be aligned with their position (Cvijanovic et al., 2019); as well as shareholders may
decide not to vote if they are less informed and want more informed voters to participate
instead (Feddersen & Pesendorfer, 1996).
Alternative possible channels might include shareholders’ rational apathy. In the previous
chapter, I establish a firm’s objective function and find that a firm pays greater attention to
shareholders with correlated voting decisions than to the ones with no or negative correlation.
Then, a reasonable explanation for the causal effect of portfolio similarity on shareholder
turnout might be the perception of other shareholders that mutual funds are more likely to
vote the same way as a block. Thus, other shareholders might perceive themselves to have
a smaller impact on the election outcome and hence rationally decide to not take part in the
elections. Literature attributes rational apathy to a lack of sufficient stake, a lack of ability
to make an informed decision, and to the dispersion of ownership (Jill E. Fisch, 2017; Nili
& Kastiel, 2016).
Following the literature, I define portfolio similarity measure as a dot product of corre-
sponding portfolio vectors for a pair of mutual funds (Getmansky et al., 2018; Sias et al.,
2013; Bohlin & Rosvall, 2014). This measure is also known as cosine similarity. I extend
this measure to group similarity measure with a help of a two-step procedure. In the first
9Horizontal shareholding and diversification do not increase portfolio similarity measure if two investors
diversify/hold competitors in two non-overlapping sets of companies. Since investors choose their holdings
from the same universe of companies, these sets almost always overlap.
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step, using mutual funds’ shares in the company, I compute the weighted average portfolio of
a group of mutual funds. In the second step, I compute a weighted average of similarity mea-
sures between this average portfolio and mutual funds’ portfolio vectors. Thus, groups with
closely related portfolios receive larger similarity measure values than groups with highly
heterogeneous portfolios.
I study the effects of portfolio similarity at two different scales. First, I investigate at
the level of individual funds by observing the relationship between portfolio similarity of
a pair of mutual funds and probability that the pair casts the same votes. For every director
election,10 I select a small number of fund pairs at random from the pool of participating
mutual funds.11 This is a necessary data reduction step as considering every possible pair
combination is not feasible for computation. I find a positive and statistically significant
relationship.
Second, I investigate at the level of all mutual funds present at director elections. Using
the portfolio similarity measure for groups, I find that mutual funds groups with more
homogeneous portfolios cause the share12 of votes “For” to drop and the share of “Non-
votes” to rise.
Mutual funds with overlapping portfolios might be involved in self-selection into com-
panies with more passive retail shareholders. At the same time, some retail shareholders
might seek companies with more homogeneous institutional investor portfolios, so they can
free ride on mutual funds’ efforts in supporting good directors. Thus, I believe that my OLS
results for the effect of mutual funds portfolio similarity on election participation might be
biased.
10I concentrate on the sample of director elections because it is relatively homogeneous and abundant:
most firms hold annual director elections with a number of positions to fill in.
11The possible bias from not choosing the non-participating funds should be small as mutual funds exercise
their fiduciary duty by voting and the participation rate for institutional investors is very high (Jill E. Fisch,
2017; Nili & Kastiel, 2016).
12To be able to see the redistribution of shareholders’ votes, I measure the share of particular voting option
out of the total shares outstanding and eligible to vote during the meeting.
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I use reconstitution of Russell 1000/2000 indices (FTSE Russell, 2019) to establish causal-
ity for the effect of mutual funds portfolio similarity on shareholders’ voting decisions. Using
instrumental variable approach, I attempt to capture exogenous variation in the degree of
within-group portfolio similarity and the level of passive ownership. I instrument both vari-
ables in order to disentangle the effects of portfolio structure from the effects of ownership
by index funds.
Since 2007, annual reconstitution of Russell 1000/2000 indices involves a banding proce-
dure. Firms with market capitalization within a vicinity of the 1000th largest firm’s market
capitalization, do not switch the index.13 I exploit both the inclusion of a firm in a certain
index and its banded status to construct my instrumental variables. I use inclusion in Russell
2000 dummy, its lagged version, banded state dummy, and an interaction between banded
state and inclusion in Russell 2000 as instrumental variables.
The weak instrument hypothesis is rejected using a test proposed by Sanderson & Wind-
meijer (2016). This test is specifically designed for the case of multiple endogenous variables.
Conditional F-test statistics substantially exceed the 5% significance level’s critical values
for both endogenous variables.
The results of the instrumental variable approach largely confirm the main result of the
OLS approach: more homogeneous groups of mutual funds, holding shares at a firm, reduce
shareholder participation in director elections.
3.2 Data
The paper relies on three main kinds of data: portfolios of mutual funds, their voting deci-
sions at corporate elections, and aggregate results of these elections. Additionally, I use data
on characteristics of mutual funds and companies, and data on Russell 1000/2000 indices.
13The 1000th largest firm would be the threshold firm if sharp selection rule was used. The bandwidth is
5% of cumulative market capitalization of Russell 3000E.
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As datasets come from a multitude of sources, I employ non-trivial automatic and manual
matching that I describe in detail in this section and later in the Appendix.
My primary data source of mutual funds’ voting decisions is the ISS’s Voting Analytics
database. This database provides individual mutual fund’s votes that come from from N-
PX filings, available on the EDGAR website. Since 2003, mutual funds have been required
to publicly disclose their votes on all shares they hold. Along with mutual fund’s vote,
the Voting Analytics database attributes each mutual fund to a family of mutual funds
and, starting in 2006, provides a link to the N-PX file that voting data was sourced from.
The Voting Analytics database does not link its proprietary fund identifiers to these in other
datasets, thus the links to underlying N-PX filings are very helpful in connecting the datasets.
The ISS’s Voting Analytics database also contains aggregate voting data for Russell 3000
Index companies. Along with the company’s CUSIP, numbers of votes “For,” “Abstain,”
“Against/Withhold,” and “Broker Non-votes,” it also provides proposal’s description, share-
holder meeting date, management and ISS recommendations, sponsor information, number
of shares outstanding, and the Pass/Fail outcome. Each proposal has a unique ID that allows
to connect it to the votes of individual mutual funds.
The mutual funds’ characteristics and portfolio data come from the CRSP Mutual Funds
database. The portfolio composition data has quarterly frequency. For a mutual fund,
which has voted at a corporate election, I use the holdings report that is nearest in terms
of the absolute difference between the report date and shareholder meeting date (but no
more than 183 days apart).14 To ensure that result is not driven by artifacts of the CRSP
MFDB dataset, I repeat the study with data from Thomson Reuters S12 dataset and get
very similar results. Firm’s characteristics are obtained from Compustat quarterly dataset.
14In some cases, for a mutual fund, which participated in a firm’s shareholder meeting, there is no infor-
mation on its share in the firm available in the selected CRSP MFDB’s holdings report. In these cases I use
adjacent holdings report for this fund to retrieve its approximate share in the firm.
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Figure 3.1: The datasets and the links between them. ISS Voting Analytics dataset provides
aggregate corporate election results (numbers of votes “For,” “Against/Abstain,” “With-
hold,” “Broker Non-votes”) along with short proposal description, ISS and management
recommendations, and other vote-related information. I link it to Compustat by CUSIP and
election date, and to Russell indices’ constituents by the period of report and company’s
ticker, retrieved from Compustat. Linking ISS Voting Analytics dataset to CRSP Mutual
Fund database of funds’ characteristics and portfolios is done in two steps. First, I retrieve
the original SEC N-PX filings from EDGAR web database for every mutual fund’s vote in
the ISS dataset. Since a N-PX form may contain voting data for more than one mutual
fund, I match Series Name to Fund Name from the ISS dataset. This allows me to associate
a mutual fund from ISS dataset to its Series ID and Ticker from SEC data. Second, I use
mutual fund’s ticker and date of the N-PX report to link the fund to its records in CRSP
Mutual Fund database. There is also an alternative route that uses WRDS CRSP CIK
MAP dataset that links pairs of CIK and Series ID (Comp CIK) to fund’s records in CRSP
Mutual Fund database. Both paths give very similar match results. Lastly, I match mutual
fund records from CRSP Mutual Fund database to Thomson Reuters 13f (s12) database
using MFLINKS dataset.
Russell 1000 and 2000 indices constituents, their “free float” share numbers, and the
relevant stock prices are obtained from Bloomberg. I then compute the index weights and
impute the ranks of index constituents.
Figure 3.1 presents a diagram of the links that I use to connect the datasets together.
The most complicated step was to connect ISS Voting Analytics mutual funds voting dataset
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Figure 3.2: The average (monthly) match rate between the votes of mutual funds at director
elections obtained from ISS Voting Analytics database and the mutual funds’ portfolio iden-
tifiers from CRSP Mutual Fund database. For every director election in the ISS database,
I retrieve all mutual funds that held shares of the respective company at the time of the
election and reported these holdings in their N-PX filings. Then, for each such mutual fund,
I attempt to find crsp fundno, an identificator of respective mutual fund in the CRSP MF
database, and crsp portno, a portfolio identificator of the respective mutual fund in CRSP
MF database. The matching procedure is described in the data section and in the Appendix.
To find the match rate for a single director election, I divide the number of funds for which I
was able to find corresponding portfolio identificator in CRSP MF database, crsp portno, by
the number of funds present in the ISS dataset for this director election. Then, I compute
an average match rate for all director elections that happened within a calendar month and
plot the figure above.
to CRSP Mutual Funds database. I follow the procedure outlined in Schwartz-Ziv & Wer-
mers (2019); Matvos & Ostrovsky (2008) and Iliev & Lowry (2015). Figure 3.2 shows the
match rate between the votes of mutual funds at director elections obtained from ISS Voting
Analytics database and the mutual funds’ records from CRSP Mutual Fund database. For
years 2009 to 2016 I get a match of around 80% which motivates my choice of the time
interval. I present the details of the match procedure in the Appendix.
99
3.3 Similarity measure
To compute the portfolio similarity measure for a pair of mutual funds I take a dot product
of normalized vectors that represent the respective portfolios. In the literature this measure
is known as cosine similarity. For groups of mutual funds I first compute a weighted-average
portfolio vector and then evaluate the weighted-average similarity measure between the av-
erage portfolio and individual funds’ portfolios.
To formally define the measure consider two mutual funds, i and j. Let vectors βi and
βj represent the respective portfolio allocations. Then the portfolio similarity measure is
Pair Similarity = S(βi, βj) =
〈βi, βj〉
||βi||||βj|| , (3.1)
where || · || is a L2-norm.
This measure has a clear geometrical representation. Consider a unit-sphere in a N -
dimensional space, where N is the number of assets. Any portfolio, less of its scale, has
a corresponding dot on the sphere. The normalized portfolio vector points from the origin
to the point on the sphere. The dot product of a pair of such vectors is equal to the cosine
of the angle between them. Smaller angles correspond to larger cosine values and portfolios’
points being in a small vicinity of each other.
Theoretically, this measure spans from −1 (funds with completely opposite portfolios) to
+1 (funds with identical up-to-scale portfolios), while in practice the range is [0, 1] as short
positions are not observed. Figure 3.3 illustrates the distribution of the measure values
for a pair of mutual funds chosen at random. While most pairs have modest values, the
distribution has a heavy tail and few pairs have values close to 1.
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of portfolio similarity measure’s (cosine similarity) values computed
for 459507 random pairs of mutual funds at corporate elections from 2009 to 2016. For every
director election between 2009 and 2016, I sample 3 random pairs (without return) of mutual
funds. For every fund in a pair I retrieve portfolio data from CRSP MF database if I am able
to match that fund to the respective portfolio. All pairs where one or more mutual funds
miss portfolio data are discarded. Then, I compute the cosine similarity measure between
the portfolios of funds in a pair.
Cosine similarity measure is widely known in the literature. The measure is used in
portfolio analysis (Getmansky et al., 2018; Sias et al., 2013; Bohlin & Rosvall, 2014) and in
text similarity analysis (Hanley & Hoberg, 2010, 2012).15
3.3.1 Similarity in groups
Cosine similarity measure accommodates the case of two mutual funds but it does not cover
the case of many. I adapt the measure by computing a weighted average similarity between
the weighted mean group portfolio and funds’ portfolios.
The goal is to measure how diverse the group’s portfolios are. When most shareholders
have analogous portfolios, the mean portfolio will not be far from these. On the contrary,
shareholders with heterogeneous portfolios will form a mean portfolio that is quite unlike
15Cha (2007) provides a survey of similarity measures. See Kwon & Lee (2003) and Sebastiani (2002) on
usage of cosine similarity in text classification problems.
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theirs. By measuring how similar their portfolios to the mean, I get an idea of how homoge-
neous the shareholders’ portfolios are in the group.
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of group portfolio similarity measure’s (group cosine similarity)
values computed for mutual funds at corporate elections from 2009 to 2016. For every
corporate election, I form a group of mutual funds which held shares of the respective
company at the time of the election and reported these holdings in their N-PX filings.
I match these mutual funds to their respective portfolios in the CRSP MF database. I use
the mutual fund’s share of the company normalized by the share owned by all mutual funds
as the mutual fund’s weight in the group similarity measure. In cases where the fund’s most
recent portfolio does not include shares owned in the company of interest, I use preceding
or succeeding quarters of portfolio data to proxy for fund’s holdings. Funds with missing
portfolio data and funds with missing data on their holdings in the firm of interest are
excluded from the group. Then, I compute the portfolio similarity measure among the funds
remaining in the group.
I use shareholders’ holdings at the company as the weights in this procedure. This ensures
that many small shareholders of the company will not change the averages too much. To
find the weighted mean portfolio of the group I weigh the shareholders’ portfolios allocations
(portfolio vectors with L1-norm being 1) by their shares at the company. Hence, the absolute
size of shareholder’s portfolio does not matter. Next, I use the same weights to compute the
weighted average similarity measure for a group.
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Consider a group of N shareholders, enumerated by i, with portfolio vectors βi, where
each element represents the dollar value allocated to shares of the respective company. Let
A be the weighted mean group portfolio vector at the company n
A =
∑N
i=1 βin ∗ β¯i∑N
i=1 βin
, (3.2)
where β¯i =
βi
||βi||1 and || · ||1 is L1-norm. Then the group similarity measure is
Group Similarity =
∑N
i=1 βin〈A, βi〉∑N
i=1 βin
, (3.3)
where S is pair similarity measure defined above.16
Figure 3.4 illustrates how often we find a company where mutual funds, who are share-
holders in that company, have certain level of portfolio similarity. Overall, this is a unimodal
distribution with some outliers at the right tail.17
3.4 Similar portfolios and voting decisions
The voting outcome at corporate elections arises from decisions of many participants. While
each of them might be too small to significantly affect the result, multiple participants fol-
lowing the same voting strategies may sway the election outcome. In this section I document
that, among other factors, higher portfolio similarity in pairs of mutual funds is associated
with greater probability of both funds making the same voting decision. This suggests that
portfolio structure is likely related to the voting strategies of mutual funds in particular, and
institutional investors in general.
16Another way to define group similarity measure could be the weighted average of pair similarity measure
for all investor pairs. This would change the weighted mean group portfolio vector computation. That is,
L1-norm will be replaced by L2-norm with all the rest being the same. Advantage of this approach is a
more straightforward generalization from the 2 investors case, while the disadvantage is a more complicated
definition of the group mean portfolio vector. In results I use the first approach. I’ve also implemented the
second approach with results being very close to what the first approach yields.
17The value of zero is unattainable in the absence of short positions. The firms in the left tail of the
distribution have mutual fund shareholders with almost non-overlapping portfolios.
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To investigate what may affect shareholders’ voting decisions I focus on votes of randomly
chosen pairs of mutual funds that hold shares and vote at corporate elections.18 For each
fund in a pair, I collect fund characteristics, fund’s share in a firm, and portfolio data. As
a pair of funds does not have any order, both funds are equal participants in a pair. Thus,
I do not directly use funds’ characteristics and instead I construct averages and absolute
differences. Using funds’ portfolio data I compute the value of portfolio similarity measure.
For each pair I also retrieve firm’s characteristics.
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Figure 3.5: Distribution of the number of mutual funds participating in corporate elections
from 2009 to 2016. Since I study all possible actions (including “Non-votes”) a fund can take,
I define participation as holding company’s shares and reporting its vote (or “Non-vote”) in
an N-PX form by the mutual fund.
Shareholders may choose to vote “for,” “against,” “abstain,” and “withhold.” I consider
two views on votes being the same: exact match and aggregation of “against,” “abstain,” and
“withhold” votes. In the first approach, both funds in a pair must submit identical vote to
count these as being the same. The second approach relaxes this condition a little bit: votes
are considered the same as long as both funds submit votes from a single set, where sets are
18Typically, the number of mutual funds participating in a corporate election is relatively large: from 50
to 500 funds (see fig. 3.5). Thus, the number of possible funds pairs is in the range of hundreds to hundreds
of thousands. Since I combine data from multiple election issues and multiple elections, the approach of
looking at every possible pair quickly becomes infeasible. Instead, I randomly select mutual funds into a
pair without return which drastically reduces the number of pairs that could be drawn. As this adversely
affects the randomness of further pairs drawn, I only draw up to three pairs per election issue and in most
cases I draw just one.
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{For} and {Against,Abstain,Withhold}. To test whether the second approach is reasonable,
I also consider a placebo definition where I use sets {Against} and {For,Abstain,Withhold}.
Corporate elections bring up a wide range of agendas: director elections, auditors ratifi-
cation, compensation matters and say on pay votes, and proposals on governance matters.
I concentrate my attention on director elections. The benefits involve the sample being quite
homogeneous and abundant: almost every firm holds annual directors elections with multiple
positions to fill in. The overwhelming majority of these directors run unopposed and are
management-proposed.
For director elections from 2010 to 2016 I draw a single random pair of participating mu-
tual funds. I use logistic regression to explain the relationship between the binary dependent
variable, pair voted the same way, and the explanatory variables. I partially follow Iliev &
Lowry (2015) in my selection of explanatory variables.
Table 3.1 presents the logistic regression results. Both, strict (1) and permissive (2)
specifications yield statistically significant positive coefficient. For a logistic regression in-
terpretation comes in a form of an odds ratio: the ratio of probability that funds make the
same voting decision over the probability of making different decisions is about 41% higher
with identical portfolios in comparison to a case of non-overlapping portfolios keeping other
things fixed.
A pair of funds coming from the same mutual fund family is enormously more likely to
vote the same way than a pair of funds from different families. This is consistent with liter-
ature that provides evidence of centralized voting behavior among the Big Three19 mutual
funds families (Fichtner et al., 2017).
The second most prominent effect comes from the ISS recommendation. A “For” recom-
mendation from the ISS is associated with significantly higher chances of voting the same
way. This is coherent with the literature on the role of the ISS and correlation between its
recommendations and shareholders’ votes (Choi et al., 2010; Iliev & Lowry, 2015; Malenko
19Big Three are BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street mutual fund families.
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Table 3.1: Logistic regression: relationship between making the same voting decision and portfolio
similarity for a randomly chosen pair of mutual funds. The dependent variable is dummy equal to
1 when votes are the same, and 0 otherwise. First specification requires votes to be exactly the
same. Second relaxes the first by treating votes {Against,Abstain,Withhold} as being the same.
Third specification is a placebo that treats votes {For,Abstain,Withhold} as being the same.
Same vote
(strict)
Same vote For/Abs/Wth as
a group
(1) (2) (3)
Similarity measure (pair) 0.349∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.064
(0.053) (0.053) (0.104)
Same family 3.007∗∗∗ 3.084∗∗∗ 3.004∗∗∗
(0.219) (0.225) (0.564)
1 index fund 0.057 0.056 −0.065
(0.036) (0.036) (0.073)
2 index funds 0.059 0.053 −0.214∗∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.103)
Same MSA −0.092 −0.098∗ −0.196∗
(0.059) (0.059) (0.109)
Geometric Averages of Funds Characteristics
Expense ratio (geom. av.) 0.528∗∗∗ 0.531∗∗∗ −0.067
(0.076) (0.076) (0.142)
Management fee (geom. av.) 0.125 0.123 0.044
(0.089) (0.089) (0.180)
Fund turnover ratio (geom. av.) 0.016 0.016 0.205∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.038) (0.080)
Total net assets (log(geom. av.)) −0.023∗∗ −0.023∗ −0.004
(0.012) (0.012) (0.022)
Family size (log(geom. av.)) 0.224∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.020)
% of Total net assets (geom. av.) 0.025 0.029 0.139∗∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.060)
% of Total Equity (geom. av.) 0.002 0.002 0.049
(0.017) (0.017) (0.051)
Ratio of expense ratios 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
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Table 3.1, continued
(1) (2) (3)
Absolute Differences of Funds Characteristics
Management fee (abs. diff.) 0.170∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.038) (0.038) (0.069)
Fund turnover ratio (abs. diff.) 0.027∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.063∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.026)
Total net assets (log(abs. diff.)) 0.018∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.016
(0.009) (0.009) (0.017)
Family size (log(abs. diff.)) −0.041∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.023
(0.009) (0.009) (0.017)
% of Total net assets (abs. diff.) −0.030∗∗ −0.031∗∗ −0.036
(0.015) (0.015) (0.024)
% of Total Equity (abs. diff.) 0.012∗∗ 0.012∗∗ −0.008∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Firm characteristics and ISS Recommendations
S&P 500 0.115∗∗ 0.110∗∗ −0.496∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.047) (0.089)
ISS Against another item −0.377∗∗∗ −0.380∗∗∗ −0.106∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.062)
ISS “For” recommendation 2.493∗∗∗ 2.474∗∗∗ 1.884∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.034) (0.074)
log(Total assets) 0.102∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ −0.221∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.022)
Return on assets −0.001 −0.001 −0.008∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
Book to market ratio −0.116∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗∗ 0.041
(0.023) (0.023) (0.068)
Leverage −0.018 −0.019 0.047∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.025)
Constant −2.799∗∗∗ −2.770∗∗∗ 3.352∗∗∗
(0.167) (0.167) (0.320)
Observations 85099 85099 85099
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
& Shen, 2016). Notably, an ISS recommendation against another item is linked to reduced
chances of vote unanimity within the mutual funds pair.
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Funds with higher expense ratios and from bigger mutual fund families tend to cast
similar votes. Firms in S&P 500 and larger firms in general receive a more homogeneous
treatment from mutual funds, whereas firms with higher book to market ratio are more likely
to receive different votes.
The placebo specification which combines “For,” “Abstain,” and “Withhold” votes per-
forms largely as expected. Portfolio similarity has no significant association with unanimity
in pair’s votes. Same family and ISS recommendation dummies retain relatively large albeit
less significant coefficients. This is likely due to their resolutive power between “For” and
“Against” votes even when “Abstained” and “Withhold” votes somewhat scramble the pair’s
outcomes.
3.5 Similar portfolios and shareholder participation
As individual pairs of mutual funds more likely to cast same votes having analogous portfo-
lios, the same effect should scale to groups of many mutual funds. With higher probability
of them voting the same way, other shareholders may re-evaluate their decision to partici-
pate in elections. I find that at elections where mutual funds, as a group, have more similar
portfolios, other shareholders decide to not submit their votes. This shrinks the pool of votes
cast, which in turn may enhance the power of those who vote.
To see the relationship between portfolio similarity and shareholder participation I inves-
tigate how portfolio similarity is related to aggregate characteristics of elections’ outcomes.
As in the previous section, I focus on director elections to benefit from abundance and
homogeneity of these as well as to maintain consistency within the paper.
3.5.1 Voting standards
The corporate governance process through shareholder voting is covered with a patchwork
regulatory framework composed of federal and state corporate and securities laws, stock
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exchange requirements and company bylaws. Director elections are usually governed by
a state law default if company’s bylaw provides no other standard (Stokdyk & Trotter,
2016). The two most used standards are majority voting and plurality voting.
Shareholders have a variety of options at director elections. They can support the candi-
date by voting “For,” disapprove the candidate by voting “Against” (or “Withhold” under
plurality voting standard), or be more neutral and vote “Abstain.” Another option is to do
nothing and do not vote at all.20 This would result in a “Non-Vote,” an outcome that covers
the case not covered by the options above. Depending on the voting standard, the voting
options have different effect on the election outcome.
Under a plurality voting standard, director candidate who receives the highest number of
votes “For” wins the seat. Notably, if candidate is running unopposed, a single vote “For”
is enough to get elected. Shareholders may wish to vote “Withhold” if they are not happy
with the candidate. While high number of withhold votes does not prevent such candidate
from being elected, the board of director may adjust its director nomination practices (The
Office of Investor Education and Advocacy, 2012).
Under a majority voting standard, director nominee needs to secure enough “For” votes
to satisfy a majority voting requirement. The requirement typically describes a threshold
that the share of “For” votes needs to pass. Table 3.2 shows the subsets of votes used to
calculate the share of “For” votes under different standards. These serve as denominator in
a formula used to compute the support rate. The ISS Voting Analytics dataset suggests that
less than 1% of director elections use majority of outstanding shares as base. For example,
GMI Ratings (2013) report that 94% of companies in both S&P 500 and Russell 1000 exclude
broker non-votes for shareholder proposals.
Majority voting standard does not preclude unpopular directors from getting elected.
This standard has been on the rise since 2004 and by 2007 approximately two-thirds of S&P
20“Abstain” vote is an affirmative choice of a shareholder, represented at the meeting (by proxy or in
person), to not vote “For” or “Against” particular candidate. Abstentions may or may not be considered
“vote cast.” See Schnell & Chen (2019).
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Table 3.2: Types of votes forming the base that is used to compute the share of votes “For” under
different majority voting standards.
For Against Abstain Broker
Non-
Vote
Other
Non-
Vote
Standard
Majority of votes cast
Majority of shares present and entitled to vote
on the subject matter (Default in Delaware)
Majority of shares present and entitled to vote
at the meeting
Majority of outstanding shares
500 firms used some form of majority voting (Allen, 2007). The adoption was not uniform;
at the early stages firms were also introducing a “plurality plus” standard which required
elected candidate to resign, pending an approval of resignation from board of directors, if he
or she fails to win under a majority vote standard. Cai et al. (2013) claims that majority
voting standard is a paper tiger, instituted to appease shareholders, which has little teeth
to affect director elections. Cai et al. (2009) finds that even at poorly performing firms
with bad governance badly performing directors consistently receive more than 90% of votes
“For”; the exceptions are negative ISS recommendation with 19% fewer votes and directors
attending less than 75% of board meetings who receive 14% fewer votes. Hence, in virtually
every case even an unpopular director receives more than 50% of votes “For” which brings
him above the usual threshold in majority voting elections. Cai et al. (2013) find that from
2004 to 2010 from 105445 directors only 294 directors at 153 firms received less than 50% of
“For” votes; among these 153 firms only 14 firms had adopted a version of majority voting
standard and all except 3 of 22 directors that failed elections at these firms secured a seat
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on the board. Thus, majority voting standard is not much different from plurality voting
standard in the case of director elections.
While elections do not weed out unpopular candidates, dissent votes convey a credible
signal of shareholder displeasure to board of directors and management. Yermack (2010)
argues that this signal may pressure management to change the composition of the board,
dismantle takeover defenses, and to revise executive compensation packages. Cai et al. (2009)
estimate that a 1% decrease in support of compensation committee member tends to reduce
unexplained CEO compensation by $143,000 in the following year. They also find that CEO
turnover is more likely when independent directors receive lower votes. Iliev et al. (2015)
show an association between low percentages of “For” votes and a higher number of directors
leaving the board over the next year. So even if director elections have no immediate effect,
there is an evidence of delayed action taken by the board and firm management.
Thus I do not make a distinction between the two voting standards as in both cases
shareholders have a way to display their dissent and the majority voting standard poses
no substantial barriers for directors to get on the board. At the same time election results
matter for the corporate governance in the long run: low percentages of “For” votes nudge
management and the board into taking shareholder appeasing actions.
3.5.2 Data sample
The ISS Voting Analytics dataset provides vote results for corporate elections that in-
clude vote outcome, number of outstanding shares, number of votes “For,” “Abstain,”
“Against”/“Withhold,”21 and number of broker non-votes22 along with individual votes of
mutual funds and other election information.
21ISS does not provide a separate number of “Withhold” votes for records starting 2006; instead it reports
this number in the “Against” column.
22A broker non-vote happens when a beneficial owner does not submit voting instructions to a broker
through which she holds shares. Brokers, in general, are permitted to vote on behalf of beneficial owners
on “routine” matters without explicit instructions from beneficial shareholders but director elections are not
considered “routine.”
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Table 3.3: Director elections sample’s summary statistics. Sample contains 95543 election
datapoints after removing outliers and records with missing values.
Variable Min Max Mean Median std.
“For” votes, % 3.000 99.782 74.694 77.022 12.810
“Against”/“Withhold” votes, % 0.000 71.375 3.330 1.370 5.667
“Abstain” votes, % 0.000 39.112 0.146 0.000 0.785
Broker “Non-Votes”, % 0.000 69.596 9.733 7.953 7.715
Other “Non-Votes”, % 0.000 96.989 12.098 10.657 8.347
Similarity measure 0.151 0.794 0.397 0.375 0.113
log(Total assets) 2.615 14.637 7.973 7.909 1.942
Return on assets, % −49.985 49.844 3.122 3.134 9.264
Book to market ratio 0.001 16.544 0.567 0.479 0.477
Leverage 0.000 9.880 0.870 0.516 1.200
% owned by index funds 0.000 68.362 7.872 7.519 4.302
% owned by non-index funds 0.000 95.818 16.274 15.907 9.479
ISS “For” recommendation 0.000 1.000 0.923 1.000 0.266
For every director election happened between 2009 and 2016 I collect its aggregate voting
outcomes together with the individual votes of mutual funds from ISS Voting Analytics
dataset. Using the numbers of votes cast I construct the number of “Non-votes” which is
the difference between “Shares Outstanding” and total number of votes cast. The number
of “Non-votes” is then split into “Broker non-votes,” reported by the ISS, and “Other non-
votes.” I drop election issues where number of votes cast exceeds the reported number of
shares outstanding.
Using CRSP Mutual Funds database and Thomson Reuters S12 database I retrieve mu-
tual fund portfolios as well as their shares in the firms that they vote at.23 Next, I evaluate
the group portfolio similarity measure for mutual funds participating in director elections.
The firm characteristics are then pulled from Compustat. Finally, I aggregate votes of mutual
funds to evaluate their input into the aggregate voting election results. Table 3.3 provides
summary statistics for the constructed sample.
23The portfolio data is updated quarterly so for some mutual funds I can not directly observe its holdings
at the firm of interest. In such cases I use adjacent quarters data to proxy for the missing number.
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3.5.3 Results
Mutual funds portfolio similarity has a sizable association with directors election outcomes.
Firms where mutual funds, as shareholders, have more similar portfolios are more likely to
see lower shareholder participation in director elections. Fewer votes “Against”/“Withhold”
and substantially fewer “For” votes being cast, while shareholders increase the share of
“Non-Votes” by not submitting their voting instructions.
To explore the relationship between portfolio similarity and election outcomes I regress
the numbers of votes “For,” “Against,” “Abstain,” and “Non-votes,” normalized by the
shares outstanding, on similarity measure, shares of index and non-index mutual funds,
ISS recommendation, and firm controls. The normalization used allows me to see how
shareholders dispose their votes across all possible options. Table 3.4 presents the OLS
regression results.
The percentage of votes “For,” measured as a share of shares outstanding, changes the
most in relation to portfolio similarity. As these five dependent variables cover the entire
set of possible outcomes24, a drop in “For” votes should be accompanied with a hike in
other categories. The share of “Against” votes decreases as well,25 thus the missing “For”
and “Against” votes end up as “Non-Votes” as shareholders reduce their involvement in
the election process. As both “Broker Non-Votes” and “Other Non-Votes” have substantial
positive coefficients for portfolio similarity, I can conclude that both retail and institutional
investors’ decisions are at play.
More homogeneous groups of mutual funds, that hold shares in a firm, thereby decrease26
shareholder turnout. Jill E. Fisch (2017) argues that low turnout among retail shareholders
leads institutional investors to dominate election results; she reports that while 90% of insti-
24ISS uses “Against” column to report “Withhold” votes when needed and I follow this practice here.
25While the coefficient is about an order of magnitude smaller, the effect on “Against” votes is still
substantial as the average number of votes “Against” is also more than a magnitude smaller than the
number of votes “For.” See table 3.3 for a detailed summary statistics.
26Here I will talk about possible causal effects that a lower shareholder turnout may have. I leave the
discussion of whether portfolio similarity causes shareholder turnout to drop for a separate section.
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tutional shares are voted, retail investors turnout averages at less than 30% (see also Matt
Egan (2014)). Nili & Kastiel (2016) claim that retail investors have rational apathy which
stems from the dispersion of ownership and diversification of investor portfolios, and cite
vote outcome distortion, limitation of shareholders’ ability to initiate governance changes,
and dead-lock situations where low shareholder turnout prevents issues from passing as the
direct costs of investors’ apathy.
Election outcome is also responsive to the share of a firm owned by mutual funds. Using
the CRSP Mutual Funds database, I’m able to disentangle the input of index mutual funds27
and non-index mutual funds. Higher share, owned by index mutual funds, reduces observed
number of votes “For” and increases the number of votes “Against” as shareholders tend to
not vote their shares. Quite the opposite happens when non-index mutual funds hold bigger
share: shareholders, institutional and not, tend to vote more often.
ISS issues a favorable recommendation for director elections in more than 90% of the
cases. A lack of favorable ISS recommendation has an expected relationship to the election
outcome: a sharp decrease in the number of votes “For” coming from an increase of even
bigger magnitude in number of votes “Against.” Part of these votes “Against” come from
previously passive shareholders as can be seen from a decrease in the numbers of non-votes.
Larger firms attract more retail shareholder attention. Higher return on assets is associ-
ated with better shareholder participation, while high leverage is associated with lower.
3.6 Instrumental strategy
Since mutual fund’s portfolio choice is likely endogenous to its voting behavior, I instrument
group portfolio similarity measure to establish causality. I use reconstitution of Russell
1000/2000 indices as a source of portfolio variation that is plausibly exogenous to share-
27I consider a mutual fund as an index fund if it has flag “D” in the findex fund flag field of CRSP
Mutual Fund database.
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Table 3.4: The relationship between mutual funds portfolio similarity and election outcome at director elections. Dependent
variables normalized by the shares outstanding. Standard errors are robust to cluster correlation (clustered by meetings).
% For % Against % Abstain % Broker
Non-Vote
% Other
Non-Vote
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Similarity measure −14.151∗∗∗ −2.448∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗ 7.218∗∗∗ 14.892∗∗∗
(1.086) (0.359) (0.063) (0.674) (0.713)
% owned by index funds −0.489∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.001 0.265∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.011) (0.002) (0.020) (0.020)
% owned by non-index funds 0.417∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ −0.000 −0.228∗∗∗ −0.213∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.004) (0.001) (0.008) (0.007)
ISS “For” recommendation 10.404∗∗∗ −14.372∗∗∗ −0.083∗∗∗ 2.159∗∗∗ 3.668∗∗∗
(0.405) (0.250) (0.032) (0.174) (0.215)
log(Total assets) 0.264∗∗∗ −0.018 0.028∗∗∗ −0.474∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.019) (0.005) (0.041) (0.042)
Return on assets, % 0.194∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.001 −0.085∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.004) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008)
Book to market ratio −0.007∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ −0.000∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage −0.185∗ −0.108∗∗∗ 0.008 0.520∗∗∗ −0.238∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.026) (0.011) (0.076) (0.062)
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 95543 95543 95543 95543 95543
R2 0.222 0.434 0.005 0.252 0.710
F stat. 240.3 248.7 19.4 861.9 3329.8
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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holders’ voting practices. The instrumental approach confirms the findings of the previous
section.
There are multiple reasons why the OLS results may not be conclusive evidence that
mutual funds’ portfolio structure affects election outcomes. One possibility is that the highly
diversified mutual funds might be better represented at “boring” firms where shareholders do
not often engage in director elections. This way low shareholder turnout might be correlated
with pools of highly diversified, but essentially holding very similar portfolios, mutual funds.
Another possibility is that mutual funds endogenously determine their portfolios. Funds’
ownership of a stock might be related to factors that directly affect shareholder turnout. This
way a correlation between portfolio similarity and election participation might not represent
a causal relation.
To address the possible endogeneity, I exploit reconstitution of Russell 1000 and Russell
2000 indices, widely adopted market benchmarks, as a quasi-natural experiment in changing
the stock ownership by mutual funds. A substantial difference in the index-weight of a stock
at the top of Russell 2000 and the bottom of Russell 1000, as well as probability of switching
an index, drives the changes in portfolios of investors, which rely on Russell indices in their
portfolio building.
3.6.1 Russell 1000/2000 indices reconstitution
Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 indices, provided by FTSE Russell, are stock market indices
that track the highest-ranking 1000 stocks and stocks ranking 1001 - 3000 respectively.
Many investment managers use Russell 2000 to benchmark their performance in “small-cap”
to “mid-cap” categories and build portfolios. Every year in May - June, FTSE Russell
reconstructs the indices, revealing the result on the last Friday in June.
Historically, there have been two different procedures for Russell 1000/2000 indices re-
constitution. Prior to 2007, index assignment followed a strict threshold rule where stocks
ranked within the 1-1000 interval were assigned to Russell 1000, and stocks ranked in 1001-
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3000 were assigned to Russell 2000. Beginning in 2007, a new approach, called “banding,”
was enacted. The threshold between Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 is now covered with
a band of a certain dollar size, such that companies that fall into the band at reconstitution
do not switch the index. As I concentrate on a data sample from 2009 to 2016 in this paper,
I will skip the discussion of former approach to indices reconstitution and I will focus on the
latter.
Reconstitution starts by forming a ranked list of 3000+ companies that are eligible to
be included in one or more of the Russell indexes. Few criteria for eligibility among others
are having stock price above $1, being a part of the U.S. equity market, having total market
capitalization above $30 million, and having more than 5% of shares available in the mar-
ketplace (float) (FTSE Russell, 2019). Total market capitalization of a firm is obtained by
multiplying total outstanding shares by the market price (last price traded) on the primary
exchange on the rank day28 in May. FTSE Russell estimates the total shares outstanding
by including common stock, partnership units/membership interests, and non-restricted ex-
changeable shares, while any other type of shares (preferred stock, installment receipts, etc.)
are excluded (see FTSE Russell (2019) for a detailed description). Computed total market
capitalization allows Russell to sort companies in a long 3000+ list where position in the list
determines the rank of a company. FTSE Russell treats the computed market capitalizations
as proprietary information and does not make it available to researchers. This hampers the
research trying to exploit reconstitution of Russell indices in a regression discontinuity design
setting (Wei & Young, 2017). The more recent papers (Heath et al., 2018) focus on the post
2006 period and provide new methodology, immune to selection bias.
Next, a band with a width of 5% of cumulative market cap of Russell 3000E is computed
around the market capitalization of security ranked 1000. Any company which total market
capitalization falls within the band does not switch the index. Companies outside the band
and with ranks below 1000 become Russell 1000 constituents, while such companies with
28Schedule of rank days is released by Russell in spring and, typically, rank day is the last trading day in
May (Mullins, 2014).
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ranks above 1000 become Russell 2000 constituents. Thus, banding procedure provides an
additional signal to investors regarding company’s future affiliation with a certain index.
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Figure 3.6: Portfolio weights of stocks in Russell 1000/2000 indices in 2011. Stock’s weight
within an index is computed by dividing the stock’s “float market capitalization” by the sum
of “float market capitalizations” of all index constituents. “Float market capitalization” is
a product of the end-of-June stock’s share price and the number of shares that can be freely
traded by the public. Stock’s rank within an index is equal to its position in a list of all
index constituents, ordered by their weights within the index starting with the largest value.
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Figure 3.7: Portfolio weights of stocks in Russell 1000/2000 indices in 2011. FTSE Russell
determines securities ranks by using proprietary data on firms’ total market capitalizations
on the rank day in May. I compute implied ranks by using May CRSP firms’ market
capitalization data.
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Once the indices memberships have been determined, FTSE Russell adjusts companies’
shares to only include those that can be freely traded by the public (“free float”). Next,
within each index separately the float adjusted shares are used to compute constituents’
weights. Given the sorting nature of the indices, companies at the bottom of Russell 1000
index receive substantially lower weights in comparison to the weights of companies at the
top of Russell 2000 index. Figure 3.6 illustrates the difference between the weights in an
index for the bottom 500 companies from Russell 1000 and the top 500 companies of Russell
2000 in 2011. The average weights of securities at the bottom and top 500 companies of
respective indices are 0.023% and 0.118% respectively.
3.6.2 Exclusion restriction
An important criterion for instrument variable estimation approach is exclusion restriction.
I construct four instrumental variables that are based on the features of indices reconstitu-
tion. In this section I explore the possible critiques of these instruments.
The first pair is a dummy that a certain security belongs to the Russell 2000 index and
its lagged version. Since index reconstitution happens mid-year, for every election before
index reconstitution date I use values from previous two years, while after reconstitution
date I use the current and the past year’s values.
The second pair is the banded status of a firm and an interaction term between the banded
status and the inclusion in Russell 2000 index. The banded status is effectively a proxy for
a possible index switch in a future. Wei & Young (2017) hypothesize that institutional
investors may trade in anticipation of index assignment changes.
In an instrumental regression, I rely on an implicit assumption that these instrumental
variables affect the dependent variables (votes cast at elections) only through its influence
on the variables of interest. Literature suggests that passive and active funds have a differ-
ent impact on firm’s governance and corporate election outcomes (Appel et al., 2016, 2018;
Schmidt & Fahlenbrach, 2017; Brav et al., 2019; Heath et al., 2018). Russell indices recon-
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stitution has also been associated with a significant changes in index fund ownership at firms
that switch the index (Appel et al., 2016; Heath et al., 2018; Gloßner, 2018). Thus, I control
for levels of institutional ownership by including both passive and active ownership shares in
my regression. Then, I go the extra mile by exploiting the different nature of the available
instruments in order to instrument for both the portfolio similarity and the level of passive
ownership. This allows me to disentangle the effect coming from portfolio similarity from
the effects found in the literature studying passive ownership influence (Appel et al., 2018;
Heath et al., 2018; Baig et al., 2018). Following Appel et al. (2018) I also control for market
capitalization and free float of a firm.
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Figure 3.8: Number of director elections per month in the IV sub-sample.
One possible critique is that index switching may generate news coverage or in some
other way attract (or reduce) shareholder attention to a company. Thus, some companies
may enjoy less or more shareholder election participation just due to the switch itself. I do
not find this concern substantial as the bulk of director elections happens many months
after the index reconstitution and any news effect should be worn away by then. Figure 3.8
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provides an illustration that most director elections are over by the end of June when the
new lists of constituents become public.
Another possibility for a violation of exclusion restriction arises if firms are able to manip-
ulate their index assignment. Then their actions might affect not only the index assignment
but also the shareholders’ attitude for election participation. As FTSE Russell does not
reveal the true May rankings, firms have small chances to successfully predict their rank and
then to manipulate the index they belong to or their banded status by a marginal change
in capitalization. The articles that explore Russell reconstitution in regression discontinuity
design setting do not find evidence of firms manipulating their index assignment (Boone &
White, 2015; Chang et al., 2015).
Finally, since the number of instruments used makes the model overidentified, I perform
a Sargan–Hansen test for regressions with statistically significant influence of portfolio simi-
larity (Hayashi, 2000). In all cases the resulting statistic is sufficiently smaller than the one
needed in order to reject the hypothesis of the over-identifying restrictions being valid. This
strengthens my belief that the exclusion restriction is satisfied.
3.6.3 Weak instruments test
An ambitious goal to instrument two endogenous variables requires a careful attention to
the strength of the instruments being used. A simple F -test will not be sufficient in such
case as it does not capture the interplay between the endogenous variables. I rely on a test
proposed by Sanderson & Windmeijer (2016) to rule out weak instruments case.
Table 3.5 summaries the results of the first stage. Both regressions demonstrate an F -
statistic above 10. Thus, the instrument are strong enough at least in the case when just
one variable is instrumented.
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Table 3.5: The first stage of the 2SLS regression. Standard errors are robust to cluster correlation
(clustered by meetings).
Similarity
measure
% owned by
index funds
(1) (2)
Russell2000t 0.020
∗∗ 1.466∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.330)
Russell2000t−1 0.010∗ −0.273
(0.006) (0.223)
Banded state −0.001 −0.303
(0.005) (0.202)
Banded state ×Russell2000t −0.029∗∗∗ 0.353
(0.007) (0.314)
Firm controls Yes Yes
Year controls Yes Yes
Float and mk.cap. controls Yes Yes
Observations 29167 29167
R2 0.238 0.467
Partial F stat. 55.0 177.4
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Sanderson & Windmeijer (2016) argues that in a case of multiple endogenous variables
being instrumented, a simple F -test is necessary but not sufficient. They provide a con-
ditional F -test statistic which I compute for my first stage. The values are 79.8 and 94.8
for similarity measure and share of index fund ownership respectively. Stock, J.H. (2005)
provide the 5% significance level’s critical values for a weak instruments test. The null hy-
pothesis is that instruments are weak and lead to an asymptotic bias of at least 5%. The
critical value for four instruments and two endogenous variables is 11.04. Since both values
are substantially higher than the critical value, the null hypothesis of weak instrument is
rejected at the 5% level.
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3.6.4 Results
Table 3.6 summarizes the results of IV approach. The main result on the influence of portfolio
similarity remains in place. The substantial drop in the share of votes “For” combined with
a hike in the number of broker “Non-Votes” suggest the similar pattern of shareholder fatigue
and reduced participation in director elections. A notable sign change has happened for the
effect coming from share owned by index funds; IV results suggest than an increase in
this share raises retail shareholder participation and increases the level of support directors
receive at elections.
Among other variables, the changes came from the logarithm of total assets and book
to market ratio. The former variable lost its significance in the regression while the latter
obtained much more pronounced effects likely due to inclusion of float and market capital-
ization control variables. The effect of favorable ISS recommendation largely remains the
same.
In tables 3.7 and 3.8, I modify the group similarity measure by only including shares
within the same 1 or 2 digit SIC category. This allows me to see the effect of horizontal
shareholding on voting outcomes. Both regressions’ results are in coherence with results in
table 3.6.
3.7 Conclusion
According to my study of mutual funds’ portfolios and voting patterns, portfolio structure
has an effect on both individual voting behavior and aggregate outcome of director elections.
Funds with more similar portfolios tend to cast identical votes more often. I find that greater
within-group portfolio similarity of mutual funds, invested in a firm, causes lower shareholder
participation in director elections at this firm.
The observed relation between portfolio structure and individual fund’s voting behavior
provides evidence that mutual funds exercise their own judgment to some extent and do not
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Table 3.6: Relationship between mutual funds portfolio similarity and election outcome at director elections (IV approach).
Dependent variables normalized by the shares outstanding. Standard errors are robust to cluster correlation (clustered by
meetings).
% For % Against % Abstain % Broker
Non-Vote
% Other
Non-Vote
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Similarity measure −40.857∗∗ 6.845 −0.407 22.015∗∗ 12.404
(16.723) (6.261) (1.093) (10.659) (10.136)
% owned by index funds 0.675∗∗ −0.200∗ 0.012 −0.442∗∗ −0.045
(0.320) (0.112) (0.019) (0.207) (0.200)
% owned by non-index funds 0.285∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.148∗∗∗ −0.187∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.020) (0.003) (0.033) (0.034)
ISS “For” recommendation 15.855∗∗∗ −17.422∗∗∗ −0.049 0.831∗∗∗ 0.785∗∗
(0.745) (0.556) (0.043) (0.320) (0.346)
log(Total assets) −0.376 0.023 0.002 0.252 0.099
(0.342) (0.119) (0.032) (0.222) (0.221)
Return on assets, % 0.076∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.001 −0.019 −0.080∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.011) (0.002) (0.020) (0.020)
Book to market ratio −2.593∗∗∗ 0.286∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.963∗∗∗ 1.185∗∗∗
(0.530) (0.167) (0.061) (0.338) (0.387)
Leverage −0.591∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗ 0.022 0.748∗∗∗ −0.056
(0.184) (0.060) (0.015) (0.133) (0.083)
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Float and mk.cap. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 29167 29167 29167 29167 29167
R2 0.231 0.462 0.011 0.189 0.136
F stat. 1250.2 1245.1 55.7 1545.3 573.4
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 3.7: Relationship between mutual funds portfolio similarity (using only assets within the same 1-digit SIC category)
and election outcome at director elections (IV approach). Dependent variables normalized by the shares outstanding. Standard
errors are robust to cluster correlation (clustered by meetings).
% For % Against % Abstain % Broker
Non-Vote
% Other
Non-Vote
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Similarity measure (1 digit SIC) −56.051∗∗ 8.930 −0.528 29.071∗∗ 18.578
(23.353) (8.301) (1.446) (14.681) (13.463)
% owned by index funds 0.901∗∗ −0.259∗∗ 0.014 −0.535∗∗ −0.121
(0.371) (0.126) (0.021) (0.231) (0.223)
% owned by non-index funds 0.319∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.170∗∗∗ −0.196∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.016) (0.003) (0.027) (0.028)
ISS “For” recommendation 15.140∗∗∗ −17.190∗∗∗ −0.054 1.131∗∗∗ 0.973∗∗∗
(0.818) (0.558) (0.046) (0.362) (0.369)
log(Total assets) −0.356 0.023 0.002 0.217 0.114
(0.357) (0.117) (0.031) (0.229) (0.216)
Return on assets, % 0.102∗∗∗ 0.015 0.001 −0.031∗ −0.087∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.009) (0.001) (0.017) (0.018)
Book to market ratio −2.529∗∗∗ 0.272 0.159∗∗∗ 0.933∗∗∗ 1.166∗∗∗
(0.549) (0.171) (0.061) (0.350) (0.384)
Leverage −0.610∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗ 0.022 0.759∗∗∗ −0.052
(0.195) (0.061) (0.015) (0.137) (0.084)
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Float and mk.cap. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 29233 29233 29233 29233 29233
R2 0.125 0.446 0.008 0.099 0.113
F stat. 1080.8 1196.9 56.7 1396.8 581.5
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 3.8: Relationship between mutual funds portfolio similarity (using only assets within the same 2-digit SIC category)
and election outcome at director elections (IV approach). Dependent variables normalized by the shares outstanding. Standard
errors are robust to cluster correlation (clustered by meetings).
% For % Against % Abstain % Broker
Non-Vote
% Other
Non-Vote
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Similarity measure (2 digits SIC) −65.216∗ 7.391 −0.792 36.597∗ 22.020
(35.926) (10.006) (1.680) (21.819) (17.475)
% owned by index funds 1.210∗∗ −0.276∗ 0.019 −0.725∗∗ −0.228
(0.561) (0.157) (0.026) (0.338) (0.289)
% owned by non-index funds 0.358∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.189∗∗∗ −0.209∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.012) (0.002) (0.025) (0.022)
ISS “For” recommendation 15.313∗∗∗ −17.230∗∗∗ −0.054 1.055∗∗ 0.916∗∗
(0.936) (0.562) (0.045) (0.417) (0.397)
log(Total assets) −0.516 0.018 −0.001 0.328 0.171
(0.494) (0.137) (0.034) (0.305) (0.257)
Return on assets, % 0.149∗∗∗ 0.008 0.002 −0.057∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.009) (0.001) (0.021) (0.018)
Book to market ratio −3.186∗∗∗ 0.351∗ 0.151∗∗ 1.298∗∗∗ 1.386∗∗∗
(0.705) (0.192) (0.063) (0.415) (0.437)
Leverage −0.553∗∗ −0.120∗ 0.023 0.723∗∗∗ −0.072
(0.236) (0.067) (0.015) (0.154) (0.096)
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Float and mk.cap. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 29231 29231 29231 29231 29231
R2 -0.380 0.434 -0.009 -0.416 -0.046
F stat. 805.7 1185.7 55.4 837.5 494.6
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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blindly follow ISS or firm’s management recommendations. Moreover, this observation also
suggests that firms likely have some market power since the Fisher separation theorem does
not seem to hold.
I discover that other shareholders react to the mutual funds’ portfolio structure. When
a firm is held by mutual funds with closely overlapping portfolios, other shareholders reduce
the number of votes they cast. Rational apathy of investors is a plausible explanation here.
This result also demonstrates that horizontal shareholding has a tangible effect on corporate
governance process.
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Appendix C
Variables dictionary
Table 3.9: Detailed definitions of variables used.
Variable Definition Data source
“Abstain” votes, % The share of votes “Abstain” out of to-
tal shares outstanding. Measured in %.
ISS Voting Analytics
“Against”/“Withhold”
votes, %
The share of votes “Against”/“With-
hold” (aggregated by ISS) out of total
shares outstanding. Measured in %.
ISS Voting Analytics
“For” votes, % The share of votes “For” out of total
shares outstanding. Measured in %.
ISS Voting Analytics
ln(Total assets) Natural logarithm of firm’s total assets. Compustat
1 index fund A dummy variable equal to 1 if one
(and only one) mutual fund in a pair
is an index fund (has flag “D” in the
findex fund flag field).
CRSP Mutual Funds
Database
2 index funds A dummy variable equal to 1 if both
mutual funds in a pair are index funds
(have flag “D” in the findex fund flag
field).
CRSP Mutual Funds
Database
Banded state
×Russell2000t
The interaction term between banded
state and Russell2000t
Bloomberg
Banded state A dummy variable equal to 1, if a firm
was in the banded region during the cur-
rent year’s reconstitution process (if the
election date is past the the index con-
stituents announcement date; or previ-
ous year if the election date is before
that date).
Bloomberg
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Variable Definition Data source
Book to market ratio Book to market ratio of the firm. A
computation resulting in a negative
book to market ratio is treated as a
missing value.
Compustat
Broker “Non-Votes”, % The portion of shares non-voted (no
vote cast) by a broker out of total shares
outstanding. Measured in %.
ISS Voting Analytics
CIK Central Index Key used by the SEC Edgar
Expense ratio An absolute or geometric average of mu-
tual funds’ expense ratios. Data is as of
the most recently completed fiscal year.
When geometric average is computed,
both ratios are censored at zero if nega-
tive, multiplied, and then a square root
is taken. For absolute difference no cen-
soring is applied. Final result is con-
verted to %.
CRSP Mutual Funds
Database
Family size A natural logarithm of a geometric av-
erage or an absolute difference of mu-
tual funds’ families sizes. Family size is
computed by adding all total net assets
of funds belonging to a family. ISS Vot-
ing Analytics provides family structure.
CRSP Mutual Fund Database provides
funds’ total net assets.
ISS Voting Analytics
and CRSP Mutual Fund
Database
Firm Leverage Firm Leverage computed from the
Compustat data.
Compustat
Fund turnover ratio An absolute or geometric average of mu-
tual funds’ turnover ratios. When geo-
metric average is computed, both ratios
are censored at zero if negative, multi-
plied, and then a square root is taken.
CRSP Mutual Funds
Database
ISS Against another
item
A dummy variable equal to 1 if ISS is-
sues a recommendation to vote against
another director nominee at the meet-
ing.
ISS Voting Analytics
ISS Recommendation
“For”
A dummy variable equal to 1 if ISS rec-
ommends to vote “For” on the proposal,
and 0 otherwise.
ISS Voting Analytics
Variable Definition Data source
Leverage Firm’s leverage. Computation results
are truncated within an interval [-0.01,
10].
Compustat
Management fee An absolute or geometric average of
mutual funds’ management fees. The
ratio of management fee and average
net assets. When geometric average is
computed, both values are censored at
zero if negative, multiplied, and then a
square root is taken. For absolute dif-
ference the individual values below −3
are censored at −3.
CRSP Mutual Funds
Database
NPXFileID Name of the N-PX Form file from the
SEC that contains data on the mutual
funds votes. Used to match the ISS
fund ids with additional data available
in the N-PX form.
ISS Voting Analytics
Other “Non-Votes”, % The portion of shares non-voted (no
vote cast) not by a broker out of total
shares outstanding. Measured in %.
ISS Voting Analytics
Russell2000t An indicator that a company belongs to
Russell 2000 index this year if the elec-
tion date is past the index constituents
announcement date; or previous year (if
the election date is before that date).
Bloomberg
Russell2000t−1 An indicator that a company belonged
to Russell 2000 index last year if the
election date is past the current year’s
index constituents announcement date;
or two years ago (if the election date is
before that date).
Bloomberg
Ratio of expense ratios Ratio of mutual funds’ expense ratios.
Evaluated as the larger value divided by
the smaller value (as order in a pair of
mutual funds should not matter). Data
is as of the most recently completed fis-
cal year. If smaller expense ratio is neg-
ative, the value is treated as missing.
CRSP Mutual Funds
Database
Return on assets Return on assets (firm) Compustat
S&P 500 A dummy variable equal to 1 if firm is
a constituent of S&P 500 index at the
date of the election.
ISS Voting Analytics
and Compustat
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Variable Definition Data source
Same MSA A dummy variable equal to 1 if both
funds in a pair have their management
company addresses within the same
Metropolitan Statistical Area.
CRSP Mutual Funds
Database
Same family A dummy variable equal to 1 if both
mutual funds belong to the same family.
ISS Voting Analytics
Total net assets A natural logarithm of a geometric aver-
age or an absolute difference of mutual
funds’ total net assets. The raw values
of funds’ total net assets are censored at
$0.1 if they are smaller than this thresh-
old.
CRSP Mutual Funds
Database
% of Total Equity An absolute or geometric average of mu-
tual funds’ investments in the firm as
percentages of total firm’s equity.
CRSP Mutual Funds
Database and Compus-
tat
% of Total net assets An absolute or geometric average of mu-
tual funds’ percentages of their portfo-
lios invested in the firm. When geomet-
ric average is computed, both values are
censored at zero if negative, multiplied,
and then a square root is taken.
CRSP Mutual Funds
Database
% owned by index funds The portion of shares owned by in-
dex funds (have flag “D” in the
findex fund flag field) out of total
shares outstanding. Measured by aggre-
gating all shares that index funds own
at the company.
CRSP Mutual Funds
Database
% owned by non-index
funds
The portion of shares owned by non-
index funds (do not have flag “D” in
the findex fund flag field) out of total
shares outstanding. Measured by aggre-
gating all shares that non-index funds
own at the company.
CRSP Mutual Funds
Database
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Data matching procedure
The ISS Voting Analytics dataset lacks a mutual fund identification variable that would be
common with other popular datasets on mutual funds, like CRSPMutual Funds database and
Thomson Reuters 13f. This is a known issue in the literature, and Schwartz-Ziv & Wermers
(2019); Matvos & Ostrovsky (2008) and Iliev & Lowry (2015) provide their solutions to the
problem. In this paper, I improve on the combined approach by semi-manually verifying the
funds’ names match between the ISS’s and SEC EDGAR’s data.
First, I use the NPXFileID field to retrieve the corresponding file from EDGAR database
for each record in Voting Analytics database. This allows me to associate a CIK field from
EDGAR with voting records. Then, I focus on a subset of mutual funds with a same
NPXFileID value and establish a match by funds’ names between Voting Analytics and
EDGAR file (I use Series Name field from the N-PX filing). This step appends Voting
Analytics data with Series ID and Ticker fields that identify individual fund in an N-PX
filing.
I perform name matching between funds within an N-PX filing (identified by Series Name)
and funds in ISS Voting Analytics dataset with a corresponding link to the N-PX file. I do
so in a two step procedure. First, for a fund from ISS dataset I rank all funds from an
N-PX filing by their Levenshtein distance in their names to the fund in question. For best
matches with Levenshtein distance of 3 or smaller (where 0 corresponds to a perfect match)
I assume that I assume that funds in both datasets represent the same fund. Second, for
all unmatched funds (with minimum distance of 4 and larger) I conduct a manual name
match (assisted by sorting N-PX filing’s funds by their similarity to a fund in question). If
no match seems reasonable, I assign a no-match label.
Second, I use ticker data from N-PX filings to match individual funds to CRSP Mutual
Funds database. Since a ticker might be shared by different funds over time, I only accept
matches that happen no more than 1 calendar year apart.
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An alternative approach would be to use crsp cik map provided by WRDS. This link-
ing dataset contains association between Series ID and CIK fields from N-PX filings and
corresponding crsp fundno.
Finally, I use MFLinks dataset to connect CRSP Mutual Fund data to information in
Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund Ownership dataset.
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